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This report was produced by the UK Energy Research Centre’s (UKERC) Technology and
Policy Assessment (TPA) function.
The TPA was set up to inform decision-making processes and address key controversies
in the energy field. It aims to provide authoritative and accessible reports that set very
high standards for rigour and transparency. The subject of this report was chosen after
extensive consultation with energy sector stakeholders and upon the recommendation of
the TPA Advisory Group, which is comprised of independent experts from government,
academia and the private sector.
The primary objective of the TPA, reflected in this report, is to provide a thorough review
of the current state of knowledge. New research, such as modelling or primary data
gathering may be carried out when essential. It also aims to explain its findings in a way
that is accessible to non-technical readers and is useful to policymakers.
The TPA uses protocols based upon best practice in evidence-based policy, and UKERC
undertook a systematic search for reports and papers related to this report’s key question.
Experts and stakeholders were invited to comment and contribute through an expert
group. For this review, additional experts were also consulted directly. The project scoping
note and related materials are available from the UKERC website, together with more
details about the TPA and UKERC.
Preface 
8018_1_Prelims:UKERC  10/09/2010  14:43  Page i
G
re
a
t 
E
x
p
e
c
ta
ti
o
n
s
: 
T
h
e
 c
o
s
t 
o
f 
o
ff
s
h
o
re
 w
in
d
 i
n
 U
K
 w
a
te
rs
 –
u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
in
g
 t
h
e
 p
a
s
t 
a
n
d
 p
ro
je
c
ti
n
g
 t
h
e
 f
u
tu
re
ii
8018_1_Prelims:UKERC  10/09/2010  14:43  Page ii
G
re
a
t 
E
x
p
e
c
ta
ti
o
n
s
: 
T
h
e
 c
o
s
t 
o
f 
o
ff
s
h
o
re
 w
in
d
 i
n
 U
K
 w
a
te
rs
 –
u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
in
g
 t
h
e
 p
a
s
t 
a
n
d
 p
ro
je
c
ti
n
g
 t
h
e
 f
u
tu
re
iii
The UK Energy Research Centre carries out world-class research into sustainable future
energy systems.  
It is the hub of UK energy research and the gateway between the UK and the international
energy research communities. Our interdisciplinary, whole systems research informs UK
policy development and research strategy.
www.ukerc.ac.uk
About UKERC 
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Overview
This report by the UKERC Technology and Policy Assessment function is concerned with
recent cost escalations in offshore wind. It documents early expectations and policy goals,
explains recent cost escalations and assesses future prospects.
The reasons for cost escalation are well documented. In common with other energy
technologies, UK offshore wind has been affected by commodity and currency movements.
In addition, offshore wind has been subject to particular supply chain bottlenecks and cost
escalations associated with making offshore turbines reliable and installing them in deeper
more distant sites. As a result, cost reductions anticipated in the late 1990s and early
2000s gave way to dramatic increases in the period from 2005 – 2009.
This report finds evidence that cost increases may have peaked, but does not foresee any
meaningful reductions in the period to 2015. It disaggregates the cost of offshore wind
into key components and tests sensitivity to feasible ranges in the cost of key factors. In
the period to around 2025 the report finds grounds for cautions optimism. There is
potential for innovation to reduce costs, for supply chain pressures to ease and for new
market entrants to provide competitive pressure on costs. However, there are still a
number of factors placing upward pressure on costs, not least the implications of moving
to even more challenging locations. 
The UK is currently leading the world in offshore wind installation, with aspirations to
become a world leading centre for the technology. Yet as much as 80% of a typical
offshore wind farm built in the UK in the last five years will have been imported from
elsewhere in Europe. Bringing more of the supply chain into the UK offers benefits in terms
of reduced exposure to currency movements as well as helping build a ‘green’
manufacturing economy. The UK currently lacks capacity in key parts of the supply chain.
This requires investment and the development of UK offshore wind is likely to require
policy to continue to engage actively in supporting the development of docks and other
facilities. 
Offshore wind is still in its infancy, the UK is still building the equivalent of the first
conventional power station. Cost escalations stand in some contrast to the optimism of
early analysts. However it is not particularly surprising that we have arrived at a point in
the history of a particular emerging technology when costs have increased. Many
technologies go through such a period, and still go on to offer cost effective performance
in the long run. The particular challenge faced by offshore wind is that its role in meeting
UK and EU targets gives rise to a widespread expectation of rapid deployment. 
Overall, there are grounds to be optimistic about offshore wind, tempered with realism
about the challenges associated with its development and the need for policy to engage
effectively with all the factors that will affect its success. Policy will need to create clear,
long term signals that costs must decrease over time. It is also important for policy to
continue to support innovation, reduce problems with planning and grid connection and
support the development of the UK supply chain. 
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1 See main text for sources of all data, comment and analysis cited in the Executive Summary.
Introduction
In December 2008, the EU Renewables Directive committed the European Union to
satisfying 20% of its energy consumption via renewable sources by 2020. The UK’s
national target is 15%. This may mean that the UK will have to find 40% of its electricity
generation from renewable sources by the end of this decade. Offshore wind is widely
expected to play a major role in contributing to this target. The government has not set
a specific target for offshore wind, but projections from a range of analysts suggest the
UK will need 15 to 20 GW of offshore wind by 2020, with aspirations to go well beyond
that in the decades that follow1.
The UK’s ambitions for offshore wind reflect the size of the potential resource and
difficulties associated with public opposition to onshore wind. They also reflect a
widespread expectation in the late 1990s and early 2000s that costs would fall as
deployment expands. However, in the last five years costs have escalated dramatically,
with capital costs doubling from approximately £1.5m/MW to over £3.0m/MW in 2009. 
All the main electricity generation technologies have been subject to cost increases in the
last five to eight years. Exogenous factors such as commodity prices that affect offshore
wind also affect the construction other generation options. Moreover, fossil fuel price
increases have led to additional increases in the levelised costs of conventional power
stations. For example, the cost of electricity from gas turbine (CCGT) plant has almost
doubled; it now stands at approximately £80/MWh compared to approximately £42/MWh
(inflation adjusted) in 2006. Coal, nuclear and onshore wind all experienced large cost
increases over the same period. 
However offshore wind has been subject to particular difficulties and the cost escalations
in offshore wind have been considerably larger than those for onshore wind. Onshore wind
has recently been estimated to be the lowest cost large scale, commercially available low
carbon generator applicable in the UK. In contrast, offshore wind is the most expensive
(though costs for CCS and new nuclear in the UK remain hypothetical at the time of
writing). Whilst some commentators remain optimistic and see the potential for creating
significant economic benefit from offshore wind development, others anticipate a relatively
high cost future for UK offshore wind, at least in the short to medium term. 
It is important to understand why early commentators were wrong about cost trends in
offshore wind. Offshore wind is still very much in its infancy, representing less than 2% of
global installed wind capacity. Yet in the UK roll-out of offshore wind is more advanced
than any other major emerging low carbon generation option, notably new nuclear and
carbon capture and storage. Will cost projections made for other emerging options prove
equally optimistic? Finally, we need to assess what the future is likely to hold for offshore
wind, whether costs are now declining, by how much, how rapidly and what needs to be
done to help this happen.
Executive Summary
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Costs in the early years
Until the mid-2000s the consensus in the offshore wind arena was that costs in the future
would be significantly lower than then contemporary levels. Actual cost data from the early
offshore wind farms were supportive of the idea of a downwards experience curve and
reducing costs. In Denmark, for example, Vindeby offshore wind farm was constructed in
1991 at a cost of €2.6m/MW (£1.82m) whilst Horns Rev was built for €1.67m/MW
(£1.05m) in 2002. In the UK, North Hoyle was completed in 2003 at a reported cost of
£1.35m/MW and Scroby Sands was built the following year for a reported £1.26m/MW. 
Analysts of offshore wind costs also looked at the experience of the onshore sector for
clues as to the likely cost trajectory. The costs of onshore wind energy fell fourfold in the
1980s, and halved again in the 1990s through a combination of innovation and economies
of scale. Grounds for optimism were further supported by positive engineering
assessments and extrapolation of learning rates into the medium and longer term future.
Such cost estimation techniques indicated that the capital and levelised costs of the
nascent offshore wind industry would be likely to fall over time. 
Big ambitions
Cost optimism informed government thinking in the early 2000s. Moreover, it coincided
with climate change becoming more prominent on the policy agenda. Round 1 of UK
offshore wind development commenced in 2001 with aspirations for nearly 2 GW of
installed capacity. This was followed in 2002 by the introduction of the Renewables
Obligation (RO) and a year later by Round 2 which aimed to develop nearly four times as
much offshore wind capacity as the first Round.  
In 2007, the case for even greater offshore wind expansion in the UK became more
compelling with the advent of the EU Renewables Directive described above. Round 3 was
launched in 2008, resulting in nine development zones totalling approximately 32GW of
potential capacity. Meanwhile the RO was successively modified such that currently it runs
to at least 2037 and all offshore projects accredited up to March 2014 qualify for 2
ROCs/MWh.
Cost escalations and emerging problems
UK offshore wind development has been slower than originally expected and has proved
to be significantly more costly than much of the literature anticipated. 
By June 2010, eleven Round 1 wind farms had been completed with a total capacity of just
below 1 GW. Around half the proposed capacity for Round 1 is either still in development
or has been lost to downsizing or withdrawals.  Round 2 is still in the relatively early stages
of development with only one project fully completed and another four under construction.
Currently, the typical timeline for a large UK offshore project is estimated to be between
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seven and nine years, in large part due to the complexity of the planning process (recent
changes may have improved matters, as we discuss below). 
From the mid-2000s onwards, the costs of offshore wind development have been
escalating. For projects coming online in 2008, capital costs were more than double the
2003 level. As of June 2010, the industry consensus is that capital and energy costs are
approximately £3.0m/MW and £150/MWh respectively.
The factors that drove the costs escalations from the mid 2000s are well understood and
reviewed in Chapter 4. A wide range of factors had an impact and detailed quantification
of the contribution of each cannot be substantiated by the available data. However, it is
possible to form a view of the relative contribution from these past major drivers; they
were (in descending order of impact):
1. Materials, commodities and labour costs
2. Currency movements
3. Increasing prices for turbines over and above the cost of materials, due to supply chain
constraints, market conditions and engineering issues
4. The increasing depth and distance of more ambitious projects, affecting installation, 
foundation and operation and maintenance (O&M) costs
5. Supply chain constraints, notably in vessels and ports
6. Planning and consenting delays
In 2009, key industry actors considered that the likely medium term trajectory of offshore
wind costs would be for only a modest fall from 2009 levels out to 2015. Recent evidence
suggests that costs in 2010 are no higher than 2009, suggesting costs may have ‘peaked’.
There is some evidence that a turning point may have been reached; the agreed price of
the latest Round 2 project was reported as £2.9m/MW. 
Future costs
UKERC has considered the prospects to 2025 using a disaggregated approach, examining
each of the drivers or factors that impact on the cost components of offshore wind power: 
Turbines represent the largest single cost item in an offshore wind farm, up to around half
of overall capital expenditure. Turbine prices have gone up in part because of increasing
commodity prices, particularly steel. However the total impact of materials, commodity
and labour cost increases explains only around half the rise in turbine costs. The
remainder may be explained in part by improving reliability in response to problems with
early farms. There is also evidence that turbine prices in the early 2000s did not properly
represent production costs, since many turbine makers were not making economic
returns. However many analysts and industry experts believe that low levels of
competition had an important impact. Moreover, offshore wind is a small element of wider
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turbine manufacture, and although long term benefits may emerge for ‘first movers’ as
this grows, it is to be expected that, at first, serving such a ‘niche’ will require a premium. 
Looking ahead, new market entrants, scale effects, innovation, recent movements in
exchange rates and lower commodity prices bode well for the future price of turbines.
Technology experts expect a range of design improvements, continued upscaling and other
innovations to emerge in the coming decade. Given the uncertainties, a downside risk
remains and if a range of problems are not addressed the price of turbines could even rise.
It does not appear likely that turbine prices will fall rapidly; indeed they are likely to
remain at or around their current level until around 2015 or so. However, provided a range
of drivers move in the right direction together and assuming no further adverse currency
effects (ideally because production moves to the UK) cost reductions could be significant
in the period 2010 to 2025. We suggest that turbine cost reductions of up to perhaps 40%
could be achieved in that timeframe, with an implication for overall levelised costs of a
reduction of up to around 15%.
Foundations are subject to a similar set of drivers to turbines. With the exception of the
Beatrice development, there has been no UK manufacture of foundations. Most have been
sourced from Holland and have therefore been subject to Sterling-Euro currency
fluctuations. Steel prices have also had a significant impact, and moving to deeper waters
creates a significant challenge that is likely to increase costs in the short run. Whilst we
did not find evidence of insufficient competition in foundation supply, several
commentators highlight supply chain constraints. There is considerable potential for
innovation, which many believe to offer substantial potential for cost reduction. Overall,
we believe that there is a considerable spread of possible outcomes for foundations hence
the range is from a 20% cost increase to a 30% reduction. The impact on levelised costs
is moderated by the fact that foundations account for a relatively small share of total
costs, and lies in a range of less than 5% either way.  
Depth and distance are of particular relevance to future UK offshore wind development
given the more challenging ambitions of UK Round 3. We provide crude estimates of the
cost levels for the nine Round 3 zones relative to the capital and levelised costs of a typical
mid-depth/mid-distance site more typical of Round 2. Levelised costs increase in all cases
but one by between 5% and 24%. Whilst innovation and learning in installation,
foundations, maintenance and a range of other factors ought to mitigate the impacts of
going to more inherently costly locations, on the whole we believe that depth and distance
are likely to place upward pressure on costs. It appears unlikely that better wind speeds
will be sufficient to compensate for additional costs associated with going further offshore.
Assuming no mitigating factors, a range of up to around 15 to 20% increase in the cost of
energy is possible. 
Load factor is another key intrinsic factor. This has been given particular attention by
developers and manufacturers, and improved turbine reliability and better O&M should
improve turbine availability. A downside risk remains, since it is possible that the greater
distances associated with some Round 3 sites will negatively affect availability, due to
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greater access restrictions. If Round 3 sites are only able to achieve availability and load
factors that are at the lowest end of the plausible range then levelised costs may rise by
around 9%. If availability problems are resolved then better wind conditions and
optimisation of turbines has the potential to reduce levelised costs. If UK Round 3
developments are able to secure load factors similar to those achieved in several Danish
developments, other factors being equal, levelised costs could be reduced by up to around
15%. 
O&M costs. The relationship between improving O&M and optimising availability is
important. Whilst a range of learning effects are likely to improve effectiveness and
decrease relative costs, absolute increases in O&M costs are not unlikely, given both more
challenging conditions and the importance of improved availability. However, a 25%
increase or decrease in O&M spend will respectively increase or decrease levelised costs
by less than 3%.
Currency movements are obviously outside the control of project developers (currency
hedging aside) or direct policy support for offshore wind. Whilst we do not speculate on
the future of sterling, it is important to note how large an impact currency movement has
had on offshore wind prices. Appreciation/depreciation of 20% has the potential to
increase/decrease costs by around 12%, assuming that around 80% by value of an
offshore wind farm is imported. Increasing the UK built, sterling denominated, proportion
of offshore wind farm costs therefore has considerable merits in terms of reducing
uncertainty as well as bringing wider economic benefits to UK companies and regions.
Bringing more of the supply chain to Britain will also maintain downward pressure on costs
if the pound remains relatively cheap by historic norms, in line with recent UK government
expectations. 
Commodity price movements had a big impact on the price of some of the key components
of offshore wind farms, notably turbines and foundations. However, the impact of any
single material input on the overall costs of offshore wind should not be overstated. Steel
for example accounts for only around 12% of the capital cost of an offshore wind farm.
We do not speculate on commodity prices out to 2025, though it is worth noting that the
price of steel returned to its historic mean in 2008 and there are few reasons to expect
dramatic increases in commodity prices in the short term. We illustrate the impact of steel
over the longer run by testing sensitivity to a 50% increase/decrease in costs. Fluctuations
of this magnitude only change levelised costs by around 5% in either direction. 
Docks and ports are already inadequate to the task and considerable investment is
needed. Better facilities exist in mainland Europe, in part because of public investment in
docks. Sustained commitment, and perhaps further public spending, is likely to be needed
to support an emerging UK supply chain.  
Vessels and the wider installation supply chain are also tightly constrained at present and
the wind industry must often compete with offshore oil and gas. Longer term, increasing
confidence in the stability of the offshore market especially from Round 3 would be
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expected to lead to increasing supply. Investment in vessels and associated capabilities is
expanding.
Planning delays have had a substantive impact on Rounds 1 and 2. We have not attempted
to quantify this, but in terms of both absolute costs and revenue foregone it has a
substantial and material impact on project finance and economics. It also places further
strain on the supply chain, since lengthy delays undermine confidence. The IPC promised
to improve matters, and it is essential that the Coalition government’s revised
arrangements do not compromise these improvements.
Conclusions about future costs 
Whilst there a few reasons to expect meaningful costs reductions by 2015, many of the
factors that drove costs up have either moderated or have the potential to be remedied.
Looking ahead to the mid 2020s there are grounds for optimism.
To illustrate the range of possibilities, UKERC used sensitivity analysis to develop a range
of plausible developments in key cost factors in the period to 2025. Because of the
uncertainties that currently surround offshore wind costs we do not attempt to apply a
learning curve based approach, instead we recommend expert market and engineering
based assessment. This approach informs UKERC’s analysis of costs, reported in Chapter
5. In our worse case, the costs rise from a current level of around £145/MWh to around
£185/MWh. If favourable developments take place in all of the main factors, then costs
could fall to under £95/MWh. 
Cost projections have to be tentative at this current stage in the history of the offshore
wind industry. However, we believe a gradual fall in the cost of offshore wind is a
reasonable possibility over the period between now and 2025, particularly if policy can
place downward pressure on costs and support the emerging UK supply chain. 
Our ‘best guess’ figure for the mid 2020s is a fall of around 20% from current levels to
just over £115/MWh, with continued falls thereafter.
Greater reductions are possible, but would require most, if not all, of the major cost
drivers to move decisively in the right direction at once. A significant downside risk
remains and it is possible that the costs of offshore wind could continue to go up,
particularly if supply chain problems are not addressed.
Implications for policy 
Our analysis suggests that achieving overall costs which are consistent with reducing
support from the Renewables Obligation Certificate (ROC) multiple back down to 1.5
ROCs/MWh will require capital cost reduction of the order of 17-18%, assuming no major
change in other factors. 
Several key developments could help place downward pressure on costs:
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Long term signals and cost monitoring capabilities
Concern has been expressed by some commentators about the relationship between the
emergence of the 2 ROC multiple and the market power of some in the offshore wind
supply chain, with limited competition in some areas and strong demand from a booming
onshore market. A range of factors conspired to drive up costs and the government made
the decision to provide ‘emergency’ 2 ROC support in response. Without additional
support it is likely that offshore wind development would have faltered. Industry
representatives will obviously wish to alert policymakers to cost escalations when
development depends in part on policy subsidies. However, industry ‘capture’ of
regulatory change is clearly a danger if support levels are in some part the product of a
negotiation between policymakers and industry, particularly where industry structure is
relatively concentrated. 
Detailed development of a process for setting ROC multiples or Feed in Tariff (FiT) rates
is beyond the scope of this report. Nevertheless we believe that it is essential for such
arrangements to create clear, long term and binding signals that costs need to be reduced.
Periodic ‘reviews’ cannot set long term signals and may be amenable to lobbying by
special interests, particularly where key cost data is allowed to reside solely within the
private sector. One means by which this might be achieved would be for the government
to establish clearly specified regression in support levels over time. This is common in FiT
regimes overseas, a feature of the micro-generation FiT, and whilst simplest in FiT systems
could apply to either FiT or ROC based support for UK offshore wind in future. In order to
better inform this it may also be desirable for the government to support the development
of an independent, non-commercial cost monitoring capability, perhaps in collaboration
with other countries, international bodies and academia. Such a capability could shape
expectations ahead of time. 
Planning and transmission
It is essential that the government’s proposed changes to planning rules do not undermine
progress made towards accelerating planning. ‘Join-up’ is essential, since the benefits of
a streamlined system for offshore assets would be undermined by a slower process for
substations and other onshore assets.  Similar concerns relate to Offshore Transmission
Owners (OFTOs) and connections to the national grid – though we have excluded these
aspects from this review. 
Support for innovation
Given the importance of continued innovation to cost reduction we also recommend that
support for innovation in offshore wind continues to be given a priority in research,
development and redeployment (RD&D) programmes. Important research on innovative,
cost-reducing solutions is already a focus of the Carbon Trust’s offshore wind ‘accelerator’,
the Energy Technologies Institute (ETI) offshore wind work and the European Wind Energy
Technology Platform.
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Support for the UK supply chain
Our analysis also suggests that building a UK industry offers benefits in terms of transport
costs and currency stability. Since UK consumers foot the bill for offshore wind a case can
also be made that policy should seek to maximise benefits to UK companies, helping build
a ‘green’ manufacturing economy. This will require investment, particularly in dock
facilities, since there is little point in making turbines and other large components in the
UK if we lack the wherewithal to install from UK bases. Direct and targeted support lower
in the supply chain, in addition to the overarching incentive provided by the RO (or a FiT),
is likely to be a cost effective way to secure UK based offshore wind. Failing to do this
effectively risks both a higher cost trajectory for offshore wind and that UK developments
are built out of ports in other parts of Europe. It is beyond the scope of this report to
speculate further about the role of policy in securing UK manufacture, but doing so is likely
to be key, both to cost reduction and perhaps to maintaining support from consumers. 
Further work could investigate the potential to explicitly target a fraction of the support
coming through the RO to the UK supply chain and perhaps UK RD&D.
Conclusions
Offshore wind offers lessons for policymakers and technology analysts alike. This report
charts the progress with offshore wind – and the aspirations for it – from its beginnings in
Denmark in the 1990s to present developments in Britain, now the world leader in offshore
installation. Our review suggests that early, small scale, developments did not give a good
guide to future costs and indicates that rapid upscaling of an emerging technology can create
supply chain constraints, amplify design flaws and cause costs to rise whilst progress is
slower than expected. External economic factors can also, at least for a while, overwhelm
intrinsic learning or other effects. 
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that offshore wind is still in its infancy – in terms
of energy output we are still building the equivalent of the UK’s first conventional power
station. So-called ‘first of a kind’ costs still apply in large part to offshore wind. It is also
important to avoid ‘dogged optimism’; extending the timeframe in order to reconcile
emerging evidence of cost escalation with a desire to demonstrate that costs can be
attractive, eventually. However, we should not be particularly surprised that we have arrived
at a point in the history of a particular emerging technology when costs have increased and
problems mounted. Many technologies go through such a period, and still go on to offer cost
effective performance in the long run. Overall, there are grounds to be optimistic about
offshore wind, tempered with realism about the challenges associated with its development
and the need for policy to engage effectively with all the factors that will affect its success.
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Capex Capital expenditure
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CF Capacity Factor
COD Commercial Operation Date
DC Direct Current
DECC UK Department of Energy and Climate Change
DEFRA UK Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs
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DTI UK Department of Trade and Industry
EAC UK House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee
E&Y Ernst & Young
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ETI Energy Technologies Institute
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LR Learning rate or ratio
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MW Megawatt
MWh Megawatt hour
NETA New Electricity Trading Arrangements
NFFO Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation
O&M Operation and maintenance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Ofgem Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets
OFTO Offshore Transmission Owner
ONS Office of National Statistics
OPEC Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
Opex Operating expenditure
OSW Offshore wind
PIU Performance and Innovation Unit
PTC US Production Tax Credit
PR Progress ratio
RAB Renewables Advisory Board
R&D Research and development
RD&D Research, development and deployment
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TPA UKERC Technology and Policy Assessment
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UKERC UK Energy Research Centre
WTG Wind turbine generator
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1.1  Context and aims of the
report
In December 2008, the EU Renewables
Directive committed the European Union
to satisfying 20% of its energy
consumption via renewable sources by
2020. The UK’s national target under this
legislation is 15%. Depending on the
contributions made by the heat and
transport sectors this may mean that the
UK will have to find 40% of its electricity
generation from renewable sources by the
end of this decade. Offshore wind is widely
expected to play a major role in
contributing to this target. Exactly how
much offshore wind is needed has not
been specified precisely by the
government and will depend on the
contribution of other renewables and
success with efforts at demand reduction.
Many commentators have suggested that
the UK will need to build in the region of
15 to 20 GW of offshore wind by 2020
(HoL, 2008). Some commentators
describe this as a challenge similar in scale
to developing North Sea oil and gas in the
1960s and 1970s (Carbon Trust, 2008).
However, the escalation in capital costs
(capex) and levelised costs of energy in
recent years has made the future
development of offshore wind power look
increasingly expensive.
The UK’s ambitions for offshore wind
reflect the size of the potential resource
and difficulties associated with public
opposition to onshore wind (DTI, 2002).
They also reflect a widespread expectation
that costs will fall as deployment expands.
Using a combination of experience curves
and engineering assessments, the
consensus in the literature from the late
1990s onwards has been an expectation of
falling costs. In fact, during the period
2000 to 2004, offshore wind power costs
in the UK were relatively stable with
typical capex ranging from around
£1.2m/MW to £1.5m/MW (BWEA and
Garrad Hassan, 2009a). However, in the
last five years costs have escalated
dramatically. According to the majority of
industry observers typical capex has
doubled from approximately £1.5m/MW to
£3.0m/MW, and as a result estimates of
the levelised cost of energy generation
have risen from around £85/MWh to
around £150/MWh (DTI, 2006, Mott
MacDonald, 2010). 
All the main electricity generation
technologies have been subject to cost
increases in the last five to eight years.
Exogenous factors such as commodity
prices that affect offshore wind also affect
the construction of other generation
options. Moreover, fossil fuel price
increases have led to additional increases
in the levelised costs of conventional
power stations. For example, the cost of
electricity from gas turbine (CCGT) plant
has almost doubled; it now stands at
approximately £80/MWh compared to
approximately £42/MWh (inflation
adjusted) in 2006. Coal, nuclear and
onshore wind all experienced large cost
increases over the same period (DTI,
2006, Mott MacDonald, 2010).
However offshore wind has been subject
to particular difficulties and the cost
escalations in offshore wind have been
considerably larger than those for onshore
wind. Onshore wind has recently been
estimated to be the lowest cost large
scale, commercially available low carbon
generator applicable in the UK. In
1.  Introduction
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contrast, offshore wind is the most
expensive (though costs for CCS and new
nuclear in the UK remain hypothetical at
the time of writing) (Mott MacDonald,
2010). Whilst some commentators remain
optimistic and see the potential for creating
significant economic benefit from offshore
wind development (BCG, 2010), others
anticipate a relatively high cost future for
UK offshore wind, at least in the short to
medium term (Mott MacDonald, 2010).
Recent estimates of the short to medium
term cost outlook are that in the absence
of extreme movements in macro-
economic conditions and/or the onshore
wind power market, offshore wind capex is
not expected to alter dramatically over the
next five years (BWEA and Garrad Hassan,
2009a). In fact, the industry consensus in
2009 regarding future trends was for a
slight rise in the next two years followed
by a slight fall out to 2014/2015. Such
short to medium term projections are, of
course, by definition uncertain. Even more
uncertain is the longer term. Nevertheless
the question of what may happen to costs
beyond 2015, and what potential there is
for costs to return to predicted trends, is
extremely important.
Given the EU renewables targets and the
aspirations for offshore wind development,
the trajectory of future costs is therefore
of considerable significance, both to the
offshore wind industry itself and to the UK
government. It is also important to
understand why early commentators were
so wrong about cost trends in offshore
wind. Development in offshore wind is
more advanced than new nuclear and
carbon capture and storage. Given the
more muted increases for onshore wind
developments, we need to assess whether
the factors that caused costs to rise
offshore were unique or generic, hence
whether projections made for nuclear or
carbon capture might be subject to similar
escalations. Finally it is important to
assess how policy can bear down upon
costs; whether and how it can address the
factors that caused costs to rise.
The aims of this report are as follows:
(i) It examines the historical context of
offshore wind costs and future cost
estimates, charting the optimistic
expectations of early analysis and the
policy support that this garnered. 
(ii) It reviews the literature exploring
subsequent cost escalations, and the
drivers behind these.
(iii) It considers the likely costs trajectory
going forward, in particular during the
UK Round 3 period i.e. from 2015 out
to the mid 2020s when the nine Round
3 zones should be fully operational. 
(iv) Finally, the report assesses
implications for policy.
The report does not consider the range of
grid connection issues that relate to the
development and economics of offshore
wind. Of particular relevance are delays
and uncertainties related to the Offshore
Transmission Operator licences (OFTOs)
and the timeline and processes affecting
onshore transmission upgrades or
extensions. Like planning, these aspects
have the potential to slow down
development. They may also create direct
costs. However we exclude them from
scope both in order to focus more directly
on costs of offshore wind farms and
because the OFTO arrangements are still
in flux at the time of writing.
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1.2  Methodology
1.2.1 TPA Approach
The report is authored by the Technology
and Policy Assessment (TPA) function of
the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC).
The TPA function was set up to address
key issues and controversies in the energy
field and aims to provide authoritative
inputs to decision-making processes in
this arena, using an approach which learns
from the practice of systematic review,
which aspires to provide more convincing
evidence for policymakers and
practitioners, avoid duplication of
research, encourage higher research
standards and identify research gaps. This
evidence-based approach is common in
areas such as education, criminal justice
and healthcare. 
The goal is to achieve high standards of
rigour and transparency. However, energy
policy gives rise to a number of difficulties
for prospective systematic review
practitioners and the approach is not
common in energy. We have therefore set
up a process that is inspired by the
evidence-based approach, but that is not
bound to any narrowly defined method or
techniques. 
1.2.2 Assessment sequence
This assessment follows a generalised
approach developed for all TPA work. The
TPA has identified a series of steps that
need to be undertaken in each of its
assessments. These steps, derived from
the practise of systematic review in non-
energy policy analysis, give rise to the
specific process for this study, outlined in
Figure 1.1 below.
 
Scoping
prospective
issues
Solicit
expert
input
Define
  criteria for
assessment
Review
literature
Synthesis
and
analysis
Prepare
draft
report
Consult,
 peer review
and refine
Publish
and
promote
• What are
 key
 problems
 and issues?
• Need to
 reflect a
 range of
 informed
 opinion
• Ensure
 transparent,
 rigorous and
 replicable
 process
• Need to seek
 peer review
 and gain
 wide ranging
 criticism of
 initial work
• Need to 
 ensure
 report
 reaches
 key
 audience
• Design
 and
 graphics
• Publication
• Launch
 events
• Assessment
 protocols
• Draft
 report
• Final
 report
• Published
 report
• Web
 publication
 of expert
 group
• Scoping
 note
• Host
 stakeholder
 workshop to
 discuss draft
 report
• Send draft
 report for
 peer review
• Make
 appropriate
 revisions to
 draft report
• Write
 preliminary
 draft
 assessment
• Apply
 protocol to
 evaluation
 and
 synthesis of
 literature
• Detailed and
 transparent
 assessment
 of evidence
 base
• Apply
 protocol to
 literature
 search
• Detailed and
 transparent
 ʻtrawlʼ
• Identify
 relevant
 sources
• Develop
 assessment
 protocols
• Discuss with
 expert group
 and AG
• Place
 protocols in
 public
 domain
• Appoint
 expert
 group
• Hold
 expert
 stakeholder
 workshop
• Write
 scoping
 note
• Seek
 feedback
 from 
 advisory
 group
• Seek
 feedback
 from online
 listing of
 initial
 scoping
• Need to
 identify key
 issues and
 discuss initial
 findings with
 stakeholders
• Need to
 apply
 rigorous
 criteria to
 evaluation
 of relevant
 studies
• Need to
 review
 literature
 thoroughly
Questions/issues
Actions
Outputs
Figure 1.1 Process for TPA studies
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1.2.3 Systematic review, expert
elicitation and sensitivity analysis
The majority of the data used in this
report is sourced from a systematic review
of the available literature most directly
relevant to offshore wind power costs. The
project team also consulted extensively
with industry experts, including wind farm
developers and financiers, see Annex 3 for
details of the expert group and industry
interviewees.
The systematic review set out with a set of
key words and search terms was
determined that provided the basis for the
creation of specific search strings using
Boolean terminology. A systematic search
was then carried out for reports and papers
related to the subject in academic and other
targeted research sources (see Annex 1).
The challenge was to keep the number of
search strings to a manageable level
without losing relevant papers from the
review process. The project team
therefore selected those combinations of
terms deemed to provide the appropriate
coverage (see Annex 1) and the
systematic search revealed approximately
1150 evidence hits. However, a great
many of these were duplicates across the
databases and removal of these reduced
the results total to approximately 450.
This number was then approximately
halved by removal of any hits that, judging
from their title or abstract, were
immediately obvious as being of little or
no relevance. The total was then increased
by the addition of evidence from following
‘citation trails’ and from specific
recommendations, and also from non-
academic sources such as industry
publications (e.g. Wind Power Monthly)
and relevant websites (e.g. Renewable UK
(previously BWEA)).
This process produced a total of
approximately 350 pieces of evidence that
have been rated for relevance (see Annex
1). In the writing of this report, the
majority of the evidence used is rated 1 or
2 with only very limited contextual use
made of evidence rated 3 and 4.
The TPA team also undertook its own
disaggregated quantitative analysis to
examine the sensitivity of the levelised
costs of offshore wind energy generation
to key cost drivers. This analysis used a
simple model of cost allocation between
the various components of wind turbines,
their installation offshore and
performance, to assess the impact of a
range of cost reducing and cost increasing
trends derived from expert inputs and our
analysis of the literature.
1.3  Report structure
The structure of this report is as follows:
• Chapter 2 examines the early costs of
offshore wind. It reviews the
development of actual costs up to the
mid-2000s. The focus here is empirical
in terms of capex, operating
expenditure (opex), and levelised
energy generation costs. Following this,
it reviews the same time period but
focuses on the development of
contemporary expectations concerning
likely future costs and cost trajectories.
• Chapter 3 considers the development of
offshore wind in the UK from the point
of view of government policy and major
industry developments over the last
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decade.  In particular, it examines the
evolving policy and industry context in
terms of a number of key drivers and
responses that chart the UK’s growing
enthusiasm for offshore wind energy.
• Chapter 4 examines the problems,
challenges and expectations in UK
offshore wind development that have
emerged since the middle of the 2000s.
It looks at the delays to Rounds 1 and
2 and the cost escalations that have
characterised the second half of the
decade and also analyses the possible
drivers behind these increases. In
addition, it considers recent costs
expectations for the medium term out
to 2015 and for the longer term as far
as 2050. 
• Chapter 5 provides analysis and
conclusions as to what the outlook for
costs might be out to the mid 2020s.
This is considered using a
disaggregated approach, examining
each of the drivers or factors that
impact, positively or negatively, on the
cost components of offshore wind
power using sensitivity analysis. It also
presents conclusions regarding the
historical experience and potential
future of offshore wind costs and
discusses implications for future policy.
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2.1  Introduction
Chapter 2 examines the costs of offshore
wind from two perspectives. First, section
2.2 reviews the historical development of
offshore wind costs from the first Danish
wind farms in the early 1990s through to
the completion of the UK’s Round 1
projects in the mid-2000s. The focus here
is empirical i.e. on actual cost experience
in terms of capex, opex, and levelised
energy generation costs. Section 2.3
reviews the same time period up to the
mid-2000s but focuses instead on the
development of contemporary
expectations concerning likely future costs
and cost trajectories. Here, a combination
of continuing technological advances,
falling costs to date (particularly in
onshore generation), and a convincing
body of literature on experience curves,
learning rates and engineering
assessments suggested that cost
trajectories would be downwards and that
grounds for optimism were well-founded.
2.2  A brief history of costs
During the 1990s, the first country to
begin to experiment with offshore wind
was Denmark. The roots of the modern
development of wind energy in Denmark
can be found in the OPEC induced oil price
shocks of 1973/4 and in the burgeoning
green movement of that era (Danish
Energy Ministry, 1999). The 1973 oil crisis
resulted in the first Danish energy
strategy, Danish Energy Policy 1976,
followed five years later by Energy 81,
which by then had been given added
urgency by the second oil crisis of
1979/80.
Area resources for wind farms on land are
limited in Denmark and by 1991 the first
of Denmark’s offshore projects – Vindeby,
a 5MW demonstration program - was
operational. This was followed in 1995 by
a second 5MW installation at Tuno Knob
(Danish Energy Ministry, 1999). Both
projects had similar investments costs at
approximately 2.1 – 2.2 million ECUs/MW
(£1.43 million/MW)2. However the costs of
energy differed significantly – 0.085
ECU/kWh for the 1991 farm and 0.066
ECU/kWh for the 1995 farm (Cockerill et
al., 1998); (Barthelmie and Pryor, 2001).
The difference may arise from the relative
wind speeds/availability (Tuno Knob is four
times the distance from shore) and from
improvements in turbine efficiency
between 1991 and 1995.
In the Netherlands, the 1994 2MW Lely
offshore project carried an investment
cost of only 1.7 million ECUs/MW (£1.1
million/MW) (Cockerill et al., 1998).
Situated just 1 km from shore, its energy
cost was comparable to the Danish
Vindeby farm at 0.083 ECU/kWh. Note
however that discrepancies in cost figures
are not untypical in the literature and
Barthelmie and Pryor (2001) reported a
much larger investment cost (quoted in
Euros) of €2.2 million/MW and a cost of
energy of €0.112/kWh. However, Shikha
et al. (2005) suggested that generation
costs of early Danish offshore farms were
around 6p/kWh which assuming a 2001
2.  Costs in the early years: 
experience and expectations
2 Note that all cost figures are taken ‘as found’ from the evidence reviewed and, unless specifically stated, have not been
converted from original currencies into British pounds nor revised to account for inflation. The exception to this is the data
appearing in cost charts produced by the UKERC TPA team for this report. In these cases, conversion to sterling and adjustment
for inflation have been undertaken.
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exchange rate of approximately £1 = €1.6
gives a lower cost of energy figure of
around €0.096/kWh.
In 1996, a second and larger Dutch
offshore project came online. The Irene
Vorrink farm had installed capacity of
16.8MW and carried an investment cost of
€1.2 million/MW – almost half the cost of
the earlier project (using the figures from
(Barthelmie and Pryor, 2001)). Energy
costs showed a similarly impressive
reduction down to €0.054/kWh.
In 1997 a plan of action for offshore wind
farms in Denmark was submitted to the
Danish Minister of Environment and
Energy. The main conclusion of the action
plan was that the technology for a
commercial offshore development could
be expected to be available after the year
2000 and that the economic prospects
looked good in comparison with onshore
installations. The government reached an
agreement with the Danish utilities to
develop the first 750MW of offshore wind
power from five large wind farms during
the period 2001 to 2008. Together, these
five wind farms would produce about 8%
of Denmark’s electricity consumption. 
Government approvals of the specific sites
were given in June 1999 together with the
approval of a 40MW site at Middelgrunden
close to Copenhagen harbour (Jones et al.,
2001). Middelgrunden was installed in
2000 and based on data from several
commentators, capital costs were in the
approximate range US$1 million/MW to
US$1.3 million/MW (Jones et al., 2001);
(IEA, 2003a); (Beurskens and de Noord,
2003). The cost of energy according to
Barthelmie and Pryor (2001) was
€0.053/kWh. 
2000 was a landmark year in the UK that
saw both the launch of the Round 1
offshore development bidding process by
The Crown Estate and the completion of
the UK’s first offshore wind farm near
Blyth Harbour, Northumberland.  Installed
capacity was 4MW and the project capex
was between €1.5m/MW and €1.6m/MW
(approximately £1.1m/MW) (Beurskens
and de Noord, 2003); (Barthelmie and
Pryor, 2001). The cost of electricity
production was in the range €0.07 –
0.08/kWh (Barthelmie and Pryor, 2001).
Round 1 is explained in more detail in
Chapter 3.
In 2002, the first large scale Danish farm
came on line at Horns Rev in the North
Sea with 160MW of installed capacity at a
cost of €1.675 million/MW. In the UK,
2002 marked both the introduction of the
Renewables Obligation and the DTI’s three
month consultation on a strategic
framework for the UK offshore wind
industry. Shortly afterwards in February
2003, The Crown Estate initiated Round 2
of the UK’s offshore wind exploitation
which identified three key areas as
appropriate for development: the Thames
Estuary; the Greater Wash; and the North
West (BWEA, 2009). 
Table 2.1 below summarises capital costs
for UK Round 1 and other European
offshore projects, either already
constructed, or to be constructed in the
time period 2003 to 2005.
With the exception of Vorrink –
comparatively a much larger project which
possibly benefitted from significant
economies of scale – the early projects
cost as much or more than the later ones.
Cost data such as this was therefore
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logically supportive of the idea of a
downwards experience curve and a
reducing cost trend.
Understandably, Garrad Hassan (2003)
considered the Horns Rev, North Hoyle,
Nysted and Scroby Sands wind farms to be
more representative of that generation of
projects in terms of turbine size and
project nature, and hence the report
considered these the best cost references.
On that basis the cost range appeared to
be around £1.1 – £1.35 million/MW
installed3. This was approximately the
same as the costs in 2000/01 but cheaper
than the first projects in the early/mid
nineties. 
Table 2.2 from Gross et al. (2007) broadly
supports the range suggested by Garrad
Hassan (2003) and also provides levelised
costs of energy. Note that the cost of
Danish output is considerably cheaper
than the UK installations. This is partly due
to currency and load factor differentials.
However it also suggests that Danish
developers had been able to attract
finance with a relatively low cost of capital. 
Project Date Capacity Depth Distance Capex
(MW) (m) (km) (£m/MW)
Vindeby 1991 4.95 2.5 – 5.0 1.5 – 3.0 1.45
Lely 1994 2.00 2.5 – 5.0 0.8 1.58
Tuno Knob 1995 5.00 3.0 – 5.0 3.0 – 6.0 1.45
Irene Vorrink 1996-97 16.80 2.5 – 3.0 0.8 0.85
Bockstigen 1997 2.50 6.0 – 9.0 4.0 – 5.8 1.32
Blyth 2000 4.00 5.0 1.0 1.11
Utgrunden 2000 10.00 13.0 – 14.0 4.2 – 7.3 0.97
Middelgrunden 2000-01 40.00 2.0 – 6.0 2.0 0.90
Horns Rev 2001-03 160.00 6.0 – 14.0 14.0 – 20.0 1.31
Samsoe 2002-03 23.00 10.0 – 13.0 4.0 1.07
North Hoyle 2003 60.00 5.0 – 11.0 7.2 – 9.2 1.35
Nysted 2003 158.40 6.0 – 9.0 10.8 1.19
Scroby Sands 2003-04 60.00 13 2.3 – 3.6 1.26
Table 2.1 Published total technical capital costs for offshore wind farms derived from
(Garrad Hassan, 2003). See original evidence for notes and qualifications.
3 Several industry experts have suggested subsequently that some suppliers to early Round 1 projects made losses and therefore
the capital costs reported at the time may have been unrealistically low. It is unlikely that this information was available in 2003
however, and not clear how large the impact of this loss making might have been.
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Figure 2.1 provides a typical breakdown of
UK Round 1 capital costs.
At this time, the data on O&M costs were
particularly sparse. Garrad Hassan (2003)
suggested that the first project that could
serve as a reference was Horns Rev
(though acknowledging that it had not yet
completed a year of full operation). All
earlier projects were either too small or
too favourably-located (e.g. in very
sheltered waters) to be a useful reference.
A figure of £70,000 per turbine per annum
was deemed reasonable and this included
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance,
owner’s operating costs, and insurances
(the latter are not included in some
Development/estimate Capital O&M* O&M* Life Cost of Load Levelised
cost (£/kW) (p/kWh) (years) capital factor cost
(£/kW) (%) (%) (£/MWh)
Future Offshore (DTI 2002) 1000 1.2 20 10 35 51a
Energy Review (DTI 2006d) 1500 46 20 10 33 79a,c
Danish Wind Industry
(see footnotes) 1100 0.7 20 7.5 470 33b
Horns Rev (DK) 13101 0.72 20 7.5 453 40a
Nysted (DK) 11901 0.72 20 7.5 373 42a
North Hoyle (UK) 13504 355 20 10 374 60a
Scroby Sands (UK) 12506 256 20 10 346 58a
Table 2.2 Cost estimates and real costs for offshore wind (Gross et al., 2007)
Notes: 
Exchange rates: £1 GBP = 10.9766 DKK 
Discount rate: 
a. 10% nominal (DTI 2003) and (DTI 2006d) 
b. 5% real, assumed to be 7.5% nominal (as quoted in Danish Wind Industry 2003 and by assumption for Horns Rev and Nysted) 
c. All costs in this table calculated ‘overnight’ – for simplicity neglecting interest during construction. 
DTI 2006 published levelised costs include interests during construction, and on this basis their central estimate of costs is
£83/MWh. 
Technical data:
0. Approximation implied by data published by Danish Wind Industry – see 
http://www.windpower.org/en/tour/econ/offshore.htm 
1. From (Garrad Hassan 2003) 
2. From Danish Wind Industry (see above) 
3. Operational data. Published by Wind Stats Newsletters (Vols. 18 – 20, 2005 – 2007 – see 
http://www.windstats.com), quoted figure averaged from the following quarterly data: Winter 2005 (0.57 Horns Rev, 0.5
Nysted), Spring 2005 (0.40, 0.33), Summer 2005 (0.30, 0.27) Autumn 2005 (0.54, 0.4), Winter 2006 (0.45, 0.35), Summer
2006 (0.27, 0.23 ), Autumn 2006 (0.58, 0.54) 
4. npower 2006 report to DTI - http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file32843.pdf 
5. Long run estimate from npower’s 2nd report to DTI http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file32844.pdf. 
6. Scroby Sands report to DTI, 2005: http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file34791.pdf 
* O&M costs may be annualised, capitalised or expressed per unit. We have used two conventions here following the relevant
studies. In principle each convention can be converted to the other.
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definitions of O&M). It did not however
include lease payments to The Crown
Estate or Transmission Network Use of
System charges.
2.2.1 Summary of reported actual
capital costs up to 2005
Figure 2.2 presents the in-year average
actual capex per MW installed for offshore
wind projects reported in the literature
reviewed by the UKERC TPA team.
Amounts have been converted from the
original reported currency into GBP at the
exchange rate prevailing at the year of the
estimate, and inflated to 2009 values
using ONS indices.
For the period up to 2005, the in-year
average follows a trend that is roughly in
line with that discussed above. The
averages do however mask a significant
range of reported costs within each year,
with the difference between the highest
and lowest in each year up to 2005 being
between approximately £0.5M and £1.0M
per MW. See Annex 2 for the full plot of the
underlying data.
2.3  Grounds for optimism
Between the late 1990s and the early
2000s the consensus amongst observers
of the offshore wind arena was that
investment and generating costs in the
medium to long-term future would be
significantly lower than contemporary
levels. Cost experience to date, as
described in the previous sub-section,
broadly supported this expectation.
Understandably given the lack of historical
experience, the offshore wind industry
looked in major part at the experience of
the onshore sector for clues as to the likely
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Figure 2.1 Typical breakdown of capital costs (UK Round 1) (Garrad Hassan, 2003)
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offshore cost trajectory. The costs of
onshore wind energy fell fourfold in the
1980s, and halved again in the 1990s
(PIU, 2002b). Cockerill et al (1998), for
example, noted that the cost of onshore
wind plants had fallen substantially during
the previous fifteen years, and that
analyses of contemporary data indicated
that this trend was continuing. The overall
trend in Danish wind energy prices over
the previous decade (including an
assumption of 5% interest rate and 20
year life), showed an 8% per annum fall in
prices. Meanwhile, the minimum prices for
wind energy under the UK non-fossil fuel
obligation (NFFO) scheme also showed a
similar rate of fall, although it is suggested
by some commentators that prices under
the later NFFO rounds were too low and
did not reflect the true costs (Mitchell and
Connor, 2004).
The first generation offshore farms of the
1990s, however, were still relatively
expensive, being prototypes that were
often over-engineered or required
optimisation after installation. Moreover,
the turbines deployed were typically in the
range 220-600 kW rather than the early
2000s generation of 2 to 2.5MW and the
number of units installed was usually less
than 20 per cluster (Barthelmie and Pryor,
2001). Indeed, analysis carried out for the
Danish utilities showed that the use of
larger wind turbines - up to 1500 kW rated
output - would realise substantial savings
(Cockerill et al., 1998). Assuming a wind
farm was sited around 6 km from the
coast, in a depth of 5-6m, the electricity
price might be expected to fall from
around 6 ECU cents/kWh (as at Tuno) to
around 3.8 ECU cents/kWh. 
Thus, based on information available at
the time, it appeared that the above
considerations combined to promise
significant potential for cost reductions in
the future. Cockerill et al. (1998)
£0
£500,000
£1,000,000
£1,500,000
£2,000,000
£2,500,000
£3,000,000
GB
P
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Year
Average actual CAPEX (per MW, 2009 GBP)
In-year avg capex In-year min In-year max
Figure 2.2 In-year average actual capex, up to 2005 (from UKERC TPA analysis)
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concluded that “offshore wind energy
prices are now moving down rapidly and
will probably continue to do so, as new
installations are commissioned. There is
considerable scope for future price
reductions, supported by several studies.”
At least for a while this view proved to be
correct. Section 2.3.1 examines some of
the methods used to make such
judgements, their advantages and
limitations, before we review early
projections in this chapter. More recent
projections are reviewed in Chapter 4. 
2.3.1 Estimating cost reductions
The grounds for optimism considered above
were further supported and validated by
the use of experience curves to calculate
and extrapolate learning rates and progress
ratios into the medium and longer term
future, and by engineering assessments of
likely technical and cost reduction progress.
The following sub-sections explore both
approaches in more detail.
2.3.2 Experience curves, learning
rates, and progress ratios
Experience curves - also referred to as
‘learning curves’ - document the
quantitative relationship between
cumulative production capacity and the
price or cost of a given technology
(Candelise, 2009). The learning curve
model operationalizes the explanatory
variable ‘experience’ using as its proxy a
cumulative measure of production or use.
Changes in cost (and/or price) typically
provide a measure of learning and
technological improvement, and represent
the dependent variable. 
Note that implicit within the explanatory
variable ‘experience’ is both the idea of
potential gains resulting from learning and
also potential returns to scale where
average unit cost may decrease as the
level of production and installation
increases (Kahouli-Brahmi, 2009).
The central parameter in the learning
curve model is the exponent defining the
slope of a power function. This parameter
is known as the learning coefficient and
can be used to calculate the progress ratio
(PR) and learning ratio (LR) (Nemet,
2006). The progress ratio expresses the
effect on cost (or price) for each doubling
of production capacity. For example, if a
cost has reduced from 100 to 80 as
production has doubled then the progress
ratio equals 80%. The learning rate is the
complement of the progress ratio, i.e.
(100 minus the progress ratio). 
An experience curve is thus a tool for
describing, analysing and extrapolating cost
trends and performance of technologies.
The extrapolated outcomes of experience
curves are subject to two basic variables:
the slope of the learning curve which may
be more or less steep; and the rate of
market deployment in the industry under
study, which may be more or less rapid.
Thus, a steep learning curve with relatively
weak market growth may achieve a unit
cost reduction in approximately the same
time as a shallower learning curve with
strong growth. 
In theory, experience curves can be used to
show the investment and capacity needed
to make a technology such as offshore wind
competitive (though it does not forecast
when the technology will break-even unless
assumptions are made regarding
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deployment rates) (IEA, 2000). However,
Ferioli et al. (2009) is one of several
commentators who argue that extrapolating
cost reductions over long-time frames or
capacity expansions, while providing
valuable insight, requires caution if it is to
be used as a reliable tool for strategic
planning in the energy sector. The following
sub-section explores this in more detail.
Experience curves: uncertainties and
caveats
There are a number of arguments in the
literature for the limitations of experience
curves and why future projections derived
from them should therefore be considered
carefully. Particularly problematic in the
case of offshore wind was the early
application of learning curves, since the
amount of installed capacity was still too
small and thus the market data were
inadequate (Chapman and Gross, 2001)
(see also the next sub-section). Candelise
(2009) summarises some of the other
main issues (adapted in this report where
appropriate to reflect the context of
offshore wind power):
• Progress and learning is not constant
over time and experience curves cannot
predict discontinuities in the learning
rate (citing IEA, 2000, Nemet, 2006).
• The timing of future cost reductions is
sensitive to small changes in learning
rates (citing Neij, 1997, Nemet, 2006).
• Whilst learning curves can provide cost
reduction projections, they are less
suited to predict potential technology
breakthroughs. 
• Learning curve theory assumes each
firm in an industry will benefit from the
learning-by-doing and experience of all
firms, i.e. homogenous spillovers
among firms, which is not always the
case in reality (citing Albrecht, 2007,
Nemet, 2006).
• Offshore wind technology is a
compound learning system containing
several elements such as turbines,
foundations, installation, grid-
connection, and O&M. But different
elements can have different learning
rates and are affected by different
learning and cost reduction factors. A
single experience curve ignores
information on such sub-systems and
their potential evolution.
• Experience as the only factor of cost
reductions (i.e. the only explanatory
variable) ignores the effect of
knowledge acquired from other sources
(citing Nemet, 2006), such as from
other industries, e.g. oil and gas, and
from R&D. 
Notwithstanding the above caveats, Ferioli
(2009) suggests that learning curves can
nevertheless provide insight into future
cost trends for energy technologies and
are, once the limitations of the
methodology are taken into account, an
attractive tool for both scientific analysts
and public policy-makers. The following
sub-section considers the evidence in the
literature derived from experience curves
regarding the potential future trajectories
of offshore wind costs.
Experience curves and the wind power
industry
The most critical factor to consider in the
use of experience curves for offshore wind
cost trajectories is that at least until the
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mid 2000s there was little primary data
from which to construct such curves.
Offshore wind was still in its relative
infancy. Consequently, the curves were
often borrowed and adapted from the
more historically mature onshore
experience. However the cost components
and load factors of onshore and offshore
are different. A comparison of the two is
not like for like and simply extrapolating
from onshore experience curves may well
be problematic.
It is also important to note that onshore
learning rates vary quite considerably in
the literature depending on region and
time period. McDonald and
Schrattenholzer (2001) shows a wide
range of wind power learning rates in
Table 2.3. Similarly, Junginger et al.
(2005) presents a list of 20 widely
divergent wind power progress ratios
ranging from 68% to over 100% (where
costs are rising not falling). 
Our review of the offshore literature
revealed a range of progress ratios that
were being used to formulate scenarios or
project costs across a range of time
periods. Capital cost progress ratios
tended to be higher than energy cost
ratios (i.e. assumed learning rates for
capex tended to be lower than for energy
costs) and ranged from 90% to 97.5%.
Assumed progress ratios for levelised
costs of energy ranged from 70% to 91%
with a mean range of approximately 80%
to 85%.  
Writing in 2001, Chapman and Gross
(2001) argued that it was still too early to
construct meaningful experience curves
for offshore wind from actual data and
emphasised the need for caution in
extrapolating trends from the onshore
wind industry. Subsequent experience
validates this cautionary note and with the
benefit of hindsight it appears that
learning curves indeed were applied to the
Country/region Time period Estimated learning rate
OECD 1981 – 1995 17
US 1985 – 1994 32
California 1980 – 1994 18
EU 1980 – 1995 18
Germany 1990 – 1998 8
Germany 1990 – 1998 8
Denmark 1982 – 1997 8 (all turbine sizes)
Denmark 1982 – 1997 4 (55kW or larger)
Table 2.3 Estimated wind power learning rates adapted from (McDonald and
Schrattenholzer, 2001)
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offshore wind sector at a premature and
unrepresentative stage.
Nevertheless, in the early 2000s the
downward trend in onshore costs gave
commentators at the time reasonable
grounds for optimism regarding offshore
learning rates. Chapman and Gross
(2001), for example, did develop offshore
learning curve projections based upon the
projections for high-cost sites onshore,
but where development offshore was
effectively 5 years ‘behind’. The study
concluded that a 15 – 20% learning rate
for offshore wind was a reasonable
expectation (subject to its overall note of
caution).
In the following year, Lako (2002)
constructed learning curves for one of the
few studies to make a distinction between
‘near-shore’ wind power  (i.e. sheltered,
shallow sites) and ‘true’ offshore (such as
the harsher environments of the Baltic and
North Seas). Based on assumptions about
cumulative growth, Lako (2002) presented
‘reference’ and ‘low’ experience curves for
near-shore wind and offshore wind as a
function of time (Figure 2.3 and Figure
2.4).
By 2010, the cost of an offshore wind farm
was projected to fall to between €1.3m
and €1.4m/MW. Looking further out to
2030, Lako (2002) estimated that near-
shore investment costs could come down
from €1,375/kW (in 2000) to €885/kW
(reference) or possibly €755/kW (‘low’).
Near-shore wind could thus become 
nearly as competitive as onshore wind 
by virtue of its relatively high capacity
factor compared to onshore wind 
(possibly approximately 36% vis-à-vis
approximately 24% for onshore wind).
Meanwhile, true offshore investment costs
could reduce from €1,700/kW (in 2002) to
€1,140/kW (reference) or possibly
€970/kW (‘low’) in 2030. The capacity
factor assumed here is approximately
40%.
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Figure 2.3 Specific investment cost of a near-shore windfarm, 2000-2030 (Lako, 2002)
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The same year the DTI developed learning
curves for the levelised cost of energy
from offshore wind postulating three
different scenarios (Figure 2.5). 
Note that the scenarios are not intended
as actual predictions but use hypothetical
learning curves to show the potential for
cost reduction if a given learning rate is
achieved. Nevertheless, DTI (2002) and
other reports and journal articles such as
ICEPT (2002), IEA (2003b), Dale et al.
(2004), Gross (2004), and Junginger et al.
(2005) were representative of the
understandable view that investment and
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Figure 2.4 Specific investment cost of offshore windfarms, 2000-2030 (Lako, 2002)
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Figure 2.5 Scenarios for future offshore wind costs (DTI, 2002)
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generating costs of offshore wind power
would fall over the next decade and
beyond. Sub-sections 2.4 and 2.5 describe
such expectations in more detail. First,
however, we consider the role of
engineering assessment in estimating
potential cost reductions.
2.3.3 Engineering assessment
Because of their aggregate nature,
learning curves do not offer detailed
explanatory information regarding
technological and concomitant cost
improvements. Engineering approaches,
by contrast, disaggregate a given
technology system into components ‘from
the bottom up’ thus providing a more
detailed analysis of individual
contributions to efficiency and cost
(Mukora et al., 2009). This analysis may
be qualitative or quantitative. The use of
expert judgement is one approach
employed, with predictions of likely future
costs based on experience in estimation.
Typically, assessment of technologies
places them on a spectrum that ranges
from ‘mature’ to ‘emerging’ (Chapman and
Gross, 2001). In contrast to mature
technologies, emerging ones are those
considered to have significant potential for
further development and cost reduction
through innovation. In the late 1990s and
early/mid 2000s, offshore wind power
seemed an obvious example. 
The main advantage of the engineering
assessment approach is that it need not
rely upon previous trends in cost reduction
– that may turn out not be repeatable, or
(as in the case of offshore wind) are not
yet available because market experience is
very limited. The main disadvantage is
that engineering assessments based on
expert opinion can differ, and may be open
to interpretation and manipulation
(Chapman and Gross, 2001).
In addition, Mukora et al. (2009) cautions
that estimating costs in the early stages of
development is inevitably difficult and that
whilst engineering assessment methods
involve more detailed technology–specific
approaches, on their own they do not offer
the long-term forecasts required for policy
making. Indeed, the bulk of the early
forecast data and predictive analysis
revealed in our evidence search would
appear to have drawn upon learning curve
methodology not engineering assessments.
Nevertheless, some instances of
engineering assessment analysis do occur.
Chapman and Gross (2001), for example,
noted that then current offshore wind
costs were based upon very limited
experience, using turbines essentially
developed for onshore generation. There
were therefore two key areas for
technology development and learning:  
(i) The development of turbine
technologies explicitly designed for
the offshore environment.
(ii) Offshore engineering of wind farm
installation. 
The key question was thus the extent to
which learning and technology
development could offset rising
engineering challenges, and how rapidly.
As for all technologies, this would depend
upon both installation rates and the
learning rate.
Chapman and Gross (2001) considered
what could be inferred from onshore wind
development – and what could not – and
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assessed the extent to which offshore
wind could draw upon existing practice in
marine engineering in other areas. Their
conclusions at the time were that: 
• There is clearly ‘spillover’ between
learning investments in onshore
technologies and in development
offshore. However the move offshore
offers opportunity for additional
technological development – for
example, turbines may be larger and
need not be designed to minimise
noise, tip speeds may thus rise, raising
conversion efficiency.
• The contention that follows from this is
that turbine designs for offshore wind
will continue to exhibit learning rates at
least as high as the historical average
for onshore.
• Whilst offshore wind engineering would
appear closely related to other offshore
industries, the devil is in the detail, and
as a result the potential for innovation
and learning remains high and the
direct application of learning rates from
other industries difficult to justify.
• Continued learning and considerable
cost reductions should be expected as
developments offshore take place on a
significant scale. How to best to
characterise and quantify this is less
clear however. 
• Overall, given both engineering
considerations and learning curve
methodology a cost range of 2.0 – 3.0
p/kWh by 2020 seems reasonable. The
upper end of this range is conservative
in comparison to the historical
developments in wind energy onshore
and in the light of the engineering
evidence considered by Chapman and
Gross (2001). 
Two years later, Garrad Hassan (2003)
estimated the costs for a nominal UK
Round 2 project installed in 2008. A
disaggregated component and engineering
assessment-type approach was used to
consider the potential for cost change.
Based on the assessment, they concluded
that capital costs could be expected to
reduce by around 15% over the following
five years on a per MW basis. In addition
the report considered there to be more
scope for higher than for lower reductions.
Gross (2004) referred to engineering
assessments to consider the scope for
innovation in offshore wind. Potential
areas identified as likely to offer continued
cost reductions were as follows: 
• Turbines that spin faster thus increasing
output for a given size of machine, and
reduced blade size and loadings on
bearings and structures relative to
onshore machines of similar capacity. 
• The emergence of dedicated industry
with associated dock facilities, marine
installation plant, and expertise in
offshore wind installation.
• Innovation in turbine tower design and
installation to reduce weight and ease
construction, transport and installation. 
• A variety of turbine refinements and
innovations: larger turbines, variable
speed direct current (DC) drives, and
improved cabling and forecasting
techniques. 
Engineering assessment that combined all
of the above, and considered the cost
reduction potential for each cost
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component of offshore wind, suggested
that these factors could deliver a capital
cost reduction of around 40% by 2012
compared to the 2002 Danish development
at Horns Rev (Milborrow, 2003).
The analysis of Milborrow (2003)
postulated a hypothetical offshore wind
development in excess of 500 MW in size
that could be as much as 100 km from the
shore. This was because moving further
offshore in order to accommodate much
larger developments would, it was argued,
bring considerable economies of scale.
Wind speeds would also be higher, around
1 m/s increase in average wind speed, for
an additional 100 km from shore, and this
would yield around 20% energy cost
reduction, holding all other factors
constant. These cost savings would not be
significantly offset by the higher cost of
cabling longer distances: cabling costs
would remain around 10% of total capital
expenditure for larger farms further off-
shore. Thus, argued Milborrow (2003),
any assumption that greater distances to
shore would automatically lead to
increased costs appeared mistaken.
Similarly, with regard to depth Gross
(2004) noted that very large areas of
relatively shallow water were available
around the UK (citing DTI, 2002c), and
approximately 150,000 km2 were
available at less than 35 m in the North
Sea. Thus, Gross (2004) argued that the
assumption that shallow water, near shore
locations would be used up appeared
unlikely to be the case in the timeframe to
2020. These mitigating factors regarding
distance and depth tended to undermine
the assumption that progressively higher
costs would necessarily accompany the
expansion offshore.
2.4  Cost reduction
expectations in the late
1990s and early 2000s
In (Neij, 1999) two scenarios for global
growth in wind power (aggregating on and
offshore) are postulated using an
experience curve with a 95% progress
ratio (i.e. a 5% learning rate). The results
show that the average cost of wind-
generated electricity would be reduced by
44% and 48% over the time period
1997–2020, for 15% and 20% per annum
market growth scenarios, respectively.
In its chapter on Renewable Energy
Technologies the 2000 World Energy
Assessment cited two future scenarios for
global wind power capacity growth and
cost reductions (UNDP and WEC, 2000). A
‘business as usual’ scenario assumed a
15% - and later a 12% and then 10% -
cost reduction, for each doubling of
cumulative capacity. By 2020, the cost of
generating has fallen on average to
US$0.032/kWh (1998 level), ±15%
(depending on wind speed, connection
costs to the grid, and other
considerations). A faster growth scenario
with a different learning curve but the
same starting conditions postulated a
lower cost of US$0.027, again ±15% (see
Figure 2.6).
No distinction was made between on and
offshore generation and given the date of
the report it must be assumed that the
analysis was based substantially on
onshore experience. Nevertheless, cost
reductions of up to 45% appeared feasible
within 15 - 20 years and the scenarios are
indicative of the confidence in future cost
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achievements that would also inform
offshore projections. 
Of course a variety of opinions and
judgements arise in the literature, with
even short-range cost estimates proving
variable in accuracy. For example,
Cockerill et al. (2001) modelled the
levelised costs of a range of offshore wind
farms including Horns Rev which became
fully operational in 2003. The model
predicted costs of between 5 and 7 ECU
cents/kWh. Four years on Gross et al.
(2007) reported that the levelised cost at
Horns Rev was £40/MWh or 4p/kWh which
is in the range predicted. However,
Barthelmie and Pryor (2001) also reported
estimated future generation costs for
Horns Rev but states a figure in euros of
€0.047/kWh that is anywhere between 6%
and 33% lower than the modelled range
and in any case is 30% lower than the
Gross et al. (2007) figure. See Table 2.4
for a list of cost projections from
Barthelmie and Pryor (2001). 
Table 2.5 presents UK cost ranges for
2020 from different studies in the early
2000s.
By 2002, the DTI noted that it was now
‘cheaper than ever’ to build wind farms
offshore. Based on a hypothetical offshore
wind farm, the DTI estimated the total
cost of electricity to be around £50/MWh
or 5p/kWh. This was based on capital
costs of £1 million/MW and assumed a 20
year lifetime with either a 10% cost of
finance and a 35% load factor or a 12%
cost of finance and a 40% load factor
(DTI, 2002). The breakdown of costs is
shown in Table 2.6.
Whilst the DTI report acknowledged that
offshore wind was still a relatively expensive
way to generate electricity, it expected costs
to fall quickly. On the basis of several
learning curve scenarios (see Figure 2.5),
the report suggested that the cost of
offshore wind could fall by up to 50% over
the next two decades to between 20 and 30
£/MWh i.e. 2 to 3p/kWh. Encouraged by the
rapid global expansion of onshore wind
capacity the UK government would
therefore make preparations to enable a
large scale development of the offshore
industry to take place beginning with Round
2 (DTI, 2002).
2
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Recent trends scenario
2001 2013
Figure 2.6 Potential cost reductions for wind power 1997 – 2020 (UNDP and WEC, 2000)
Source: BTM Consult, 1999
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Table 2.4 Planned offshore farms where economic assessments available (Barthelmie and
Pryor, 2001)
Name Turbines Total Year Eurocent Projected Reference
/kWh production
MWh/y
Horns Rev, DK 80 Vestas 160 2002 4.7 Madsen (1997), DEA/
2MW CADDET (2000)
Rødsand, DK 72 Bonus 158 2002 4.8 Energistyrelsen (1997),
2.2MW Madsen (1997),
DEA/CADDET (2000)
Breedt, FR 7.5 2002 6.4 http://www.espace-
eolien.fr/lille/Ofshore/
centrbreedt.htm
Laesø Syd, DK1 150 2003 4.8 396,000 Madsen (1997), DEA/ 
CADDET (2000), Hartnell
and Milborrow (2000)
Nearshore, NL 100 2003 7-8 300,000 Requires subsidy of NLG
60 m Hartnell and
Milborrow (2000),
Omø Stålgrunde, DK1 150 2004 5.0 434,000 DEA/CADDET (2000)
Hartnell and Milborrow
(2000), Madsen (1997)
Gedser, DK1 150 2006 5.1 Anonymous (1998)
Energistyrelsen (1997),
Madsen (1997)
DEA/CADDET (2000)
1. In January 2002, the newly-elected Danish Government called for further review of these proposed offshore developments.
Study/group estimate Date Cost range (£/MWh)
PIU Energy Review 2002 20 – 30
Interdepartmental Analysts Group 2002 25 – 30
Future Energy Solutions for Markal 2002/2003 (figures 39 – 57
modelling work originally appeared 1998)
Table 2.5 Cost estimates for offshore wind in 2020 in different UK studies from (Gross,
2004)
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2.5  Cost reduction
expectations in the mid
2000s
Medium term expectations
In 2003, the economics of offshore wind
were reviewed in detail by Garrad Hassan
(2003). One of the aims was to estimate
costs for a nominal UK Round 2 project
installed in 2008. Based on a range of
assumptions, capital costs were expected to
reduce by around 15% over the next 5 years
on a per MW basis. Given that current capex
was estimated at £1.1 - £1.35 million/MW,
this results in a reduction to between
£935,000 and £1,150,000/MW by 2008.
A further aim of the study was to
investigate the longer cost trends in
offshore wind. The analysis used a 92%
progress ratio but expressed a number of
caveats concerning the transfer of
experience curves from the onshore to
offshore wind context. Nevertheless, it
anticipated that over a 20 year timescale
Table 2.6 Estimated costs for a hypothetical UK offshore wind farm (DTI, 2002)
Hypothetical UK Wind Farm
General information
Capacity (MW) 100
Load factor (%), (a) 35
Depreciation period (years) 20
Cost of capital (%) 10
Capital cost per MW (£m) 1
Investment cost for 100MW installation (£m)
Turbines 51
Foundations 16
Cable and network connection 25
Other capital costs 8
Total (b) 100
Annuity, per annum, (c) = calculated from (b) 12
MWh per MW per annum, (d) = 24x365x(a) 3,066
Capital costs, £/MWh, (e) = (c) / (d) 38
Total unit costs, (£/MWh)
Capital costs, (e) 38
Operating and maintenance 12
Crown Estate rent 0.88
TOTAL 51
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i.e. until the early to mid 2020s, capital
costs could fall by 40% to between
£660,000 and £780,000/MW. 
Garrad Hassan was also charged by the
DTI and the Carbon Trust with identifying
and assessing critical parts of the supply
chain. The specific question examined was
whether “existing companies will have the
resources, skills and time required to
install in excess of 1GW per year from
2008, given the annual window for
construction in the North Sea” (which was
also taken to include the Thames Estuary
and the Irish Sea). The conclusion at the
time was broadly optimistic.
Other studies during this period also
remained positive though expectations
varied considerably. The IEA, for example,
saw offshore wind capex reduction
potential in the range 5 – 10% over the
next decade i.e. to 2013 (IEA, 2003a). A
report by BERR in 2005 set the target level
for 2010 at £750,000/MW of installed
capacity with O&M costs at £10/MWh
(BERR, 2005). The IEA, in the same year,
was more cautious, projecting 2010
capital costs in the range £860,000/MW to
£1,120,000/MW (IEA, 2005).
Enviros Consulting (2005) anticipated that
generating costs would decline rapidly so
long as the then current build rates were
sustained, and expected that by 2008 the
cost of generation would fall to £60/MWh.
The IEA was even more positive,
expecting generation costs in 2010 to fall
to between £44 and £57/MWh depending
on the discount rate used (IEA, 2005).
Junginger (2005) was similarly optimistic,
concluding that the data might indicate
more rapid price reduction opportunities
than had so far been assumed. In the
future, it was argued, such reductions
were likely to emanate less from increases
in turbine capacity and more from
increased size of wind farm array and from
mass production returns to scale. 
Longer term expectations
The DTI modelled offshore wind costs in
2020 to produce a cost of energy of
3.05p/kWh (upper limit 4.6p/kWh (IEA,
2005)) assuming a 10% discount rate
(DTI, 2003b). Junginger (2004) used both
onshore experience curves and offshore
engineering assessment to formulate a
cost reduction in 2020 of between 25%
and 39%. This resulted in a capital cost
range of €980,000 to €1,300,000/MW
(approximately £680,000 to
£900,000/MW). Assuming a capacity
factor of 38% and an interest rate of 8%,
the levelised costs of electricity are
reduced to €0.042 to €0.054/kWh (i.e.
approximately 2.9p to 3.75p/kWh).
The Carbon Trust was more optimistic,
projecting an energy cost of 2.2p/kWh by
2020 though with the caveat that
reductions would depend on building
installations of 1000MW or more, using
standardised equipment to achieve
economies of scale, and assuming
engineering constraints related to layout
and location, foundation structures and
off-shore O&M could be overcome (Carbon
Trust, 2003). Meanwhile Morgan and
Peirano (2004) saw the potential for a
60% drop in capex by 2020 from 2003
levels. Assumptions here were a 20%
annual growth in installation rate and a
learning rate of 8%.
On an even longer timescale, the IEA
estimated capital costs out to 2030.
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Starting from a 2001 baseline of
approximately US$1.7 million/MW,
offshore wind capex drops to under US$1
million/MW by 2030. This assumed a
learning rate of 10% between 2001 and
2020, and a rate of 5% between 2021 and
2030 (IEA, 2003b).
Figure 2.7 below shows the in-year
average of forecast capex for estimates
made up to 2005, and clearly
demonstrates the expectation that costs
would fall over time as the industry
matured. See also Figure 4.8 in Chapter 4
which compares these earlier estimates
with those made post-2005.
Note however that Gross (2004)
emphasised the considerable uncertainty
regarding estimating future offshore wind
costs, pointing out that different studies
take different approaches for different
purposes and a straightforward
comparison is not necessarily valid. Gross
(2004) cites the example of one approach
which was based on a simple learning
function for energy costs (citing PIU,
2002a) whilst another study by Future
Energy Solutions (FES) used a range of
values for capital cost, availability (load
factor) and operating costs (DTI, 2003b).
Gross (2004) observed that the FES data
was therefore amenable to sensitivity
analysis, and that changes to some
variables could have profound impacts.
For instance, wind costs are highly
sensitive to financing assumptions and
reducing the discount rate from 15% to
10% reduces the cost of a first ‘tranche’ of
offshore wind to approx 3.0 p/kWh. 
Finally, it is unlikely that few, if any, of
these analyses from the 1990s and early
2000s envisaged the scale and pace of
offshore wind development now being
attempted. It is unclear whether their
estimates might have been materially
different if they had.
£0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
£1,000,000
£500,000
£2,000,000
£1,500,000
£4,000,000
£3,500,000
£5,000,000
£4,500,000
£3,000,000
£2,500,000G
BP
Forecasts made up to 2005
In-year average forecast CAPEX per MW, 2009 GBP
Forecast year
Figure 2.7 Forecast capex, pre-2005 estimates (from UKERC TPA analysis)
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2.6  Summary
Between the late 1990s and the mid-
2000s the consensus amongst observers
of the offshore wind arena was that
investment and generating costs in the
medium to long-term future would be
significantly lower than contemporary
levels. Cost estimation techniques such as
engineering assessment and learning
curves strongly suggested that, based on
the experience of other emerging energy
technologies (especially onshore wind),
the capital and levelised costs of the
nascent offshore wind industry would be
likely to fall over time.
Moreover, actual cost data from the early
offshore wind farms completed in the
1990s and early 2000s were also broadly
supportive of the idea of a downwards
experience curve and reducing costs
trend. In Denmark, for example, Vindeby
was constructed in 1991 at a cost of
€2.6m/MW, Tuno Knob cost €2.3m/MW in
1995, and Horns Rev was built for
€1.675m/MW in 2002 (Beurskens and de
Noord, 2003). In 2003, a typical UK
offshore installation carried capital costs of
around £1.1 – £1.35 million/MW (although
some analysts have suggested
subsequently that reported capital costs
may have been unrealistically low, due to
loss making in the supply chain). 
Grounds for continued optimism appeared
justifiable, such that a range of
commentators during the first half of the
decade estimated that by 2020 capex
would fall to between £700,000 and
£900,000/MW and levelised costs would
be between approximately £20 and
£60/MWh. With the benefit of hindsight it
now appears that learning curves were
applied to the offshore wind sector at a
premature and unrepresentative stage.
Whilst long term projections made in the
early 2000s could of course still prove to
be correct, the reality is that by the middle
of the decade costs were actually starting
to increase with generation costs for new
plant estimated to come in at around
£80/MWh. This new trend of cost
escalation is explored in more detail in
Chapter 4.
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3.1  Introduction
This chapter considers the development of
offshore wind in the UK from the point of
view of government policy and major
industry developments over the last
decade.  In particular, it examines the
evolving policy and industry context in
terms of a number of key drivers and
responses which chart the UK’s growing
enthusiasm for offshore wind energy. The
major milestones of UK offshore wind
development are assessed beginning, in
section 3.2, with Round 1. Subsequent
sections consider the Renewables
Obligation, the 2003 Energy White Paper,
Round 2, the 2007 EU Directive, ROC
banding and Round 3. A chronology of
significant events is presented in Table
3.5.
3.2  UK offshore wind
development  
3.2.1 Round 1
After an initial 4MW test site at Blyth
Harbour in 2000, the UK commenced
offshore wind development in earnest in
December 2000 when The Crown Estate
announced so-called ‘Round 1’ of UK
seabed site leases in order to assess the
interest of wind power developers
(Beurskens and de Noord, 2003). 
In April 2001, 18 companies were awarded
agreements for Round 1 leases by The
Crown Estate. Under the agreements, the
companies were given a three-year period
in which to obtain the necessary consents
for a lease to be granted (ODE Limited,
2007). The first consents were issued in
April 2002, and in December 2003, North
Hoyle became the first Round 1 project to
start generating with 60MW of installed
capacity. 
By June 2010, 11 Round 1 wind farms had
been completed with a total capacity of
nearly 1GW. However, so far this falls
significantly short of the original planned
capacity for Round 1 of nearly 2GW.
Progress has been slower than expected
with nearly 500MW still in construction,
pre-construction or dormant phase and
approximately 425MW ‘lost’ to project
withdrawals or downsizing (but see also
sub-section 3.4.4 regarding extensions to
Rounds 1 and 2).
Table 3.1 shows the current status and
capacity of UK Round 1 wind farms.
Problems onshore
At the time of Round 1, aspirations to
move offshore were fuelled, in significant
measure, by the problems associated with
securing planning permission for onshore
wind farms. By the early 2000s the
planning process was emerging as a major
factor limiting the rate of deployment of
onshore wind projects. The difficulties and
costs experienced by many onshore
developers in gaining planning permission
stemmed from concerns amongst some
sections of local communities about the
impact of wind turbine siting – especially
aesthetic objections but also concerns
about noise (PIU, 2002b). 
By the beginning of the decade it was
becoming clear that the offshore option
might ease the constraints on wind power
developers in the UK and that a particular
advantage offshore was the potential for
3.  Big ambitions: policy goals,
instruments and milestones
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greater public acceptability, chiefly
because of the lower visual impact (PIU,
2002a). This in turn meant that it would
be possible to build much larger turbines
than might be acceptable on land, a
benefit enhanced by the higher wind
speeds typically encountered at sea (DTI,
2002). 
3.2.2  The Renewables Obligation
In 2002, the NFFO was replaced by the
Renewables Obligation (RO) which
remains the UK government’s principal
mechanism for supporting the generation
of renewable electricity. The RO is a
certificate trading scheme and places a
Round Site Start date or status Planned MW Actual MW (May 2010)
Pre- R 1 Blyth 2000 4 4
Round 1 North Hoyle 2003 90 60
Round 1 Scroby Sands 2004 60 60
Round 1 Kentish Flats 2005 90 90
Round 1 Barrow 2006 90 90
Round 1 Burbo Bank 2007 90 90
Pilot Beatrice 2007 10 10
Round 1 Lynn 2008 97 97
Round 1 Inner Dowsing 2008 97 97
Round 1 Rhyl Flats 2009 90 90
Round 1 Gunfleet Sands I 2010 108 108
Round 1 Robin Rigg A 2009 90 90
Round 1 Robin Rigg B 2009 90 90
Round 1 Teeside Approved 90 0
See note Ormonde Construction 150 0
See note Tunes Plateau Dormant 250 0
Round 1 Cromer Withdrawn 108 0
Round 1 Scarweather Sands Withdrawn 108 0
Round 1 Shell Flats Withdrawn 180 0
Total R1 1892 976
Table 3.1 Status and capacity of UK Round 1 wind farms (May 2010)
Source: (4C Offshore Limited, 2010) and (Wind Power Monthly, 2010)
Note: Ormonde and Tunes Plateau were outside the original Round 1 process but conform to its terms.
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mandatory requirement on electricity
suppliers in the UK to source an increasing
proportion of electricity from renewables
(see for example (DTI, 2007)). 
As noted later, the targets, termination
date and the specific ROC award for
offshore wind generation have
subsequently been revised as sector
experience and policy thinking have
evolved. The RO, together with the 2001
Offshore Wind Capital Grants Scheme and
the 2002 policy programme ‘Future
Offshore’ designed specifically to
accelerate offshore wind development,
helped develop an emerging market in
offshore wind energy.
3.2.3  ‘Future Offshore’ 2002
Green Paper
In its 2002 Green Paper, ‘Future Offshore’,
the UK Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) noted that notwithstanding the many
uncertainties, the UK had a vast resource of
potentially suitable seabed that could
theoretically provide several hundred GW of
electricity from offshore wind farms (see
Table 3.2) (DTI, 2002). This was based on
research by the Energy Technology Support
Unit and Future Energy Solutions in 1998
that estimated a theoretical potential
generation from UK offshore wind of 3500
TWh/year and an economically practical
potential of 100 TWh/year (DTI, 1998).
This represented nearly one-third of then
UK electricity demand (or approximately
one quarter of current demand).
In addition to premier wind and site
resources, the UK was also judged to have
the financial, entrepreneurial, and skills
resources needed to exploit the offshore
potential on a large scale. In 2003, the
Carbon Trust noted that UK companies had
experience in design, installation and
operations in off-shore environments and
could convert its oil and gas experience to
create a globally-competitive position in
offshore wind. UK companies were well
positioned for export growth in areas
including the provision of installation and
maintenance vessels and offshore
operations and maintenance services
overseas. Assuming a suitably ambitious
investment programme, UK businesses
could establish themselves across much of
the value chain and aim to achieve a
market share of as much as 80% by value
(Carbon Trust, 2003).
3.3  The 2003 Energy White
Paper
The RO and Round 1 were indicative of the
way in which climate change – and the
mitigating role of low carbon, renewable
energy – had by then begun to work their
way up the policy agenda. The interest in
the subject of the then Prime Minister,
Tony Blair, and the resultant 2002 Energy
Review made climate change one of four
‘pillars’ of UK energy policy – together with
security, competitiveness and fuel poverty.
In the words of the PIU report, “…the issue
of climate change has been identified as a
key challenge for our future energy
system” (PIU, 2002a).
February 2003 saw the publication of the
Energy White Paper itself. The remit of the
White Paper was very broad, covering all
aspects of energy use including transport,
efficiency, and progress towards a low-
carbon economy. In terms of more specific
relevance to offshore wind, it endorsed a
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10% renewable electricity target set for
2010 and included an “aspiration” to
double this by 2020 though at the time it
fell short of setting a firm target (DTI,
2003a).
Whilst offshore wind power had not yet
gained the pre-eminent position in
government renewable energy policy that
it has since the EU’s 2007 Renewable
Energy Directive, nevertheless it fitted the
bill in a number of ways: 
• it could make a significant contribution
to emissions abatement
• as already discussed, it provided a
solution to onshore planning problems
• the size of the potential resource was
very large
Water depths 5 to 30 metres 30 to 50 metres
Region Area % MW TWh/yr Area % MW TWh/yr
sq.km sq.km
Within territorial waters
North West 2,748 17 32,976 115 634 3 7,608 27
Greater Wash 2,037 12 24,444 85 202 1 2,424 8
Thames Estuary 2,068 12 24,816 87 812 4 9,744 34
Other 9,769 59 117,228 410 18,371 92 220,452 771
Sub total 16,622 100 199,464 697 20,019 100 240,228 840
Outside territorial waters
North West 597 6 7,164 25 1,433 5 17,196 60
Greater Wash 5,354 50 64,248 225 744 3 8,928 31
Thames Estuary 31 0 372 1 36 0 432 2
Other 4,662 44 55,944 196 27,070 92 324,840 1,136
Sub total 10,644 100 127,728 447 29,283 100 351,396 1,229
All waters
North West 3,345 12 40,140 140 2,067 4 24,804 87
Greater Wash 7,391 27 88,692 310 946 2 11,352 40
Thames Estuary 2,099 8 25,188 88 848 2 10,176 35
Other 14,431 53 173,172 606 45,441 92 545,292 1907
Total 27,266 100 327,192 1,144 49,302 100 591,624 2,069
Table 3.2 Potential offshore wind resource in proposed Round 2/3 regions (DTI, 2002)
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• and, as described in Chapter 2, there
was considerable optimism about the
potential for cost reductions over the
medium to long term.
In the summer of 2003, the Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry requested
that The Crown Estate invite developers to
bid for site option agreements under a
second round of the offshore wind
development programme. 
3.3.1  Round 2
‘Round 2’ of site leases consisted of a
further 7 - 8GW of sites, mostly off the
east coast plus some significant
developments in the north west and in the
Thames Estuary (Carbon Trust, 2008). 15
projects were proposed - to be developed
between 2008 and 2014 - and supported
by the then prevailing ROC incentives. By
now, the government’s ambitions for
offshore wind were both clear and
substantial: 
“There is clear evidence that the biggest
new contributor to our renewables target
is going to be offshore wind and the
government has a strong interest in
encouraging it to develop quickly and
successfully.” (Bower (2003) citing DTI
General Question and Answer Briefing 14
July 2003).
In terms of installed capacity, the situation
to date is that Round 1 has produced
nearly 1GW and Round 2 has one
operational project (Gunfleet Sands II)
with 64MW of capacity. The original Round
2 capacity aspiration between 2008 and
2014 was approximately 7500MW (but see
also sub-section 3.4.4 regarding
extensions to Rounds 1 and 2). Currently,
another four Round 2 projects are under
construction totalling an approximate
installed capacity of 1300MW (see Table
3.3 for the current status and capacity of
UK Round 2 wind farms).
With regard to implementation costs, at
the time of the launch of Round 2, it was
anticipated that capex would be up to 20%
less than for the Round 1 projects,
reflecting the learning effects, R&D and
other factors since the inception of Round
1 (ODE Limited, 2007). Actual experience
however has proved to be rather different
for reasons that will be explored in more
detail in Chapter 4. 
3.4  Responding to problems
and raising the stakes 
3.4.1  Changes to the RO
By 2006, government energy strategy in
general was under close scrutiny due to
increases in UK carbon emissions since
2002, because of concerns about future
reliance on imported gas, and because of
a greater awareness of the scale of
investment required in new (and in part,
renewable) generating plant in the face of
a potential electricity capacity shortfall in
2016 (HoC, 2006). There was thus an
increased focus on those low carbon
technologies that could also contribute on
a large scale relatively quickly. Off-shore
wind was an obvious leading contender
with the government declaring that “the
prospects for offshore wind were
promising” (DTI, 2006).
However, at the time a variety of
observers including the House of
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Commons Environmental Audit Committee
(EAC) judged that progress so far in
deploying key low carbon technologies
was inadequate. It accused the
government of failing to address the core
issue of whether the policy and regulatory
framework then in place was sufficient to
stimulate the growth of lower-carbon
generation on the scale required. 
One of the EAC’s recommendations was a
modification of the RO to provide a range
of different incentives – ‘so-called ROC
banding’ – for different technologies (HoC,
2006). This would ultimately result in a
boost for offshore wind and a reversal of
the idea that policy should be technology
neutral though this recommendation did
not become a reality until 2009 (see
section 3.4.3). 
Round Site Start date or status Planned MW Actual MW
(May 2010)
Round 2 Gunfleet Sands II 2010 64 64
Round 2 Docking Shoal Submitted 500 0
Round 2 Race Bank Submitted 620 0
Round 2 Sheringham Shoal Under construction 317 0
Round 2 Humber Gateway Submitted 300 0
Round 2 Triton Knoll Planning 1200 0
Round 2 Lincs Approved 270 0
Round 2 Westermost Rough Planning 240 0
Round 2 Dudgeon Submitted 560 0
Round 2 Greater Gabbard Under construction 504 0
Round 2 London Array I Approved 630 0
Round 2 London Array II Approved 370 0
Round 2 Thanet Under construction 300 0
Round 2 Walney I Under construction 184 0
Round 2 Walney II Approved 184 0
Round 2 Gwynt y Mor Approved 738 0
Round 2 West Duddon Approved 500 0
Total R2 7481 64
Table 3.3 Status and capacity of UK Round 2 wind farms
Source: (4C Offshore Limited, 2010)
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3.4.2  The 2020 targets
The case for offshore wind development in
the UK became stronger in March 2007
when the European Union proposed a
target that 20% of energy consumed
across Europe would need to come from
renewable sources by 2020. Under a
burden-sharing agreement different
countries took on different targets, based
on both their existing renewables capacity
and relative GDP per capita. Legally
committed as of December 2008, the UK
needs to achieve a target of 15% of final
energy consumption from renewable
sources by 2020 shared across the three
main energy consumption categories:
transport; heat; and electricity (Carbon
Trust, 2008). 
Offshore wind is widely expected to play a
major role in contributing to this target.
Exactly how much offshore wind is needed
has not been specified precisely by the
government and will depend on the
contribution of other renewables and
success with efforts at demand reduction.
Many commentators suggest that the UK
will need to build in the region of 15 to 20
GW of offshore wind by 2020 (HoL, 2008).
Domestically, the Climate Change Act
enacted in 2008 made the UK the first
country in the world to have a legally
binding long-term framework to cut
carbon emissions. This set a new level of
ambition for UK climate policy with an
initial goal of reducing emissions 34% by
2020 compared to 1990 levels (Appleyard,
2009).
3.4.3  Round 3 
In December 2007 the UK government
began planning for a massive expansion of
offshore wind capacity by conducting a
Strategic Environmental Assessment of
additional offshore sites. The existing
plans dating back to 2001 and 2003 for
approximately 8GW of offshore wind under
Rounds 1 and 2 were insufficient, both to
achieve the EU targets and to meet
expected market demand for new offshore
wind development rights (DECC, 2009). 
It was estimated that the UK would have
to find nearly 30GW of electricity from
offshore wind plant but whilst recognising
this to be extremely challenging, the
Carbon Trust considered that it was
technically feasible, pointing out that
29GW of offshore wind farms only needed
0.5% of total UK sea floor, a combined
space the size of the county of Somerset.
Not only was there sufficient room in UK
waters, even with all the current
constraints on where plant can be located,
but up to 40GW of wind (on and offshore)
could be incorporated into the UK’s
electricity system without compromising
security of supply4 (Carbon Trust, 2008).
In June 2008, Round 3 was formally
launched when The Crown Estates invited
applications for exclusive rights to develop
projects in specified zones. Bidding closed
in March 2009 and nine successful
applicants were announced in January
2010 totalling over 32 GW of installed
capacity (see Table 3.4). Actual
construction is not expected to commence
4 But the system would have to operate with a reduced load factor of conventional generation and an increased need for
balancing services.
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until 2014 at the earliest with the first
phases of the new wind farms becoming
operational in 2015 or 2016 (DECC,
2009). 
RO extension and the 2 ROC multiple
2008 also saw the government announce
that the RO would be extended until at
least 2037. Alongside the RO, a number of
other government support mechanisms
have been announced, including the £10
million Low Carbon Energy Demonstration
Fund which is aimed at accelerating the
technology needed to see more large-
scale offshore turbines. Moreover, in order
to further boost its development, offshore
wind generation became eligible for an
additional 0.5 ROC per MWh from April
2009 and during the course of 2009 the
ROC incentive was further extended.
Currently, all offshore projects accredited
up to March 2014 will qualify for 2
ROCs/MWh5. The government has said
that this would provide an extra £400m in
support for the offshore sector and allow
the development of a further 3 GW in
capacity (Backwell, 2009).
Other factors affecting Round 3
The launch of Round 3 was also given
added support by The Crown Estate’s
decision that it would co-invest with
consortia in the development risk up to the
point of site consent (Carbon Trust, 2008).
In addition, The Crown Estate
commissioned a detailed connection study
Round Site Start date or status Planned MW Actual MW
Round 3 Moray Firth Planning 1300 N/A
Round 3 Firth of Forth Planning 3500 N/A
Round 3 Dogger Bank Planning 9000 N/A
Round 3 Hornsea Planning 4000 N/A
Round 3 Norfolk Bank Planning 7200 N/A
Round 3 Hastings Planning 600 N/A
Round 3 Isle of Wight Planning 900 N/A
Round 3 Atlantic Array Submitted 1500 N/A
Round 3 Irish Sea Planning 4200 N/A
Total R3 32200 N/A
Table 3.4 Status and capacity of UK Round 3 wind farms
Source: (4C Offshore Limited, 2010)
5 The value of one ROC to a generator depends on the size of the ROC buyout fund which is redistributed (recycled) to ROC
holders each year, and the ROC buyout price which is set by the regulator. In turn the size of buyout fund depends on the
‘headroom’ between the RO target and actual qualifying renewable electricity generation. The precise value cannot therefore be
known in advance, but using the current buyout price of £37/MWh and the central estimate of the ROC recycle value from (Ernst
& Young, 2009) suggests that each 2 ROC multiple is worth around £100 per MWh of offshore wind generated.
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examining the potential requirements of
offshore transmission connections for
Round 3 wind farms. It also explicitly
recognised that supply chain constraint
has been one of the most significant issues
facing developers. The Crown Estate’s
strategic approach to Round 3 is intended
to provide turbine manufacturers and
other links in the supply chain with greater
visibility and certainty of future demand. It
is hoped that this will allow them to make
the necessary investments to meet that
demand and reduce constraints (The
Crown Estate, 2009, BVG Associates,
2009a). 
UK port capacity is another crucial factor.
In February 2009 the Department of
Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
published an independent report into the
ability of UK ports to meet the demands of
future offshore wind expansion and to
attract inward investment from overseas
turbine manufacturers and component
suppliers (BVG Associates, 2009b). The
report argued that there was plenty of
potential port capacity in the UK, both in
terms of location and land availability, but
that investment in infrastructure would be
required. According to DECC, UK ports
have started to realise the potential
opportunities in this sector, and have been
showing interest in investment6. Overall,
the government suggested that the UK
was well placed to meet many of the
bottlenecks in the offshore wind supply
chain, such as gearboxes, generators,
blades, electrical and control systems
(DECC, 2009). 
One final issue of significance is
availability of project finance. In the April
2009 Budget, the government announced
measures designed to improve the
prospects for wind development, with
renewable and energy projects generally
standing to benefit from up to £4 billion of
new capital from the European Investment
Bank, which the government says will
remove blockages in financing (Appleyard,
2009). The issue of finance availability is
one to which we return in Chapter 5.
3.4.4  Extensions to Round 
1 and 2
In the summer of 2009 The Crown Estate
offered Round 1 and 2 developers the
opportunity to tender for site area
extensions to their existing projects (or
planned ones subject to certain
conditions). Known colloquially as Round
2.5, its purpose was “to take advantage of
the possible accelerated delivery of project
extensions, in order that construction
could be underway before development
starts on Round 3 projects” (The Crown
Estate, 2010a). It is anticipated that this
will help to deliver a stable flow of projects
to the supply chain as it gears up for
Round 3.
The awards were made in May 2010 with
five Round 1 and 2 projects gaining site
extensions. The additional capacity
amounts to 285MW for Round 1 and 1.4
GW for Round 2 and will help replace
capacity lost to project downsizing or
cancellation (partially in the case of Round
6 In 2010 £60m of government investment in one or more UK ports was announced in the March budget Wind Power Monthly
(2010) Special Report June 2010. Wind Power Monthly. Haymarket Business Media, London.
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1 and more than fully in the case of Round
2 – see sub-sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2).
3.5  Summary
Round 1 of UK offshore wind development
was launched in 2000/2001 and in 2002,
the NFFO was replaced by the Renewables
Obligation. Both the RO and Round 1 were
indicative of the way in which climate
change had begun to work its way up the
policy agenda such that the 2002 Energy
Review made climate change one of the
four ‘pillars’ of UK energy policy.
Offshore wind was seen as an obvious
large scale, low/zero carbon solution. Not
only does the UK have a vast resource of
available wind and potentially suitable
seabed, but it was also judged to have the
financial, entrepreneurial, and skills
resources needed to exploit the offshore
potential on a large scale. Moreover, a
combination of continuing technological
advances, falling onshore wind costs, and
convincing experience curves suggested
that cost trajectories would be
downwards. Such optimism
understandably informed government
thinking with, for example, DTI analysis in
2002, suggesting that the capital costs of
offshore wind could fall by up to 50% over
the next 20 years (DTI, 2002). An
additional factor was the planning
permission constraints for onshore wind
farms and hence the potential for the
offshore option to ease the pressure for
land use.
In consequence, the government began
making preparations to enable a large
scale development of the offshore wind
industry to take place and in July 2003 a
second round of leasing for offshore sites
was announced. Four years later, the case
for a major change in offshore wind
expansion in the UK became more
compelling with the advent of the EU
Renewables Directive in March 2007. In
2008, Round 3 was formally launched and
the government also announced that the
RO would be extended until at least 2037.
During the course of 2009 the ROC
incentive was further enhanced and
currently all offshore projects accredited
up to March 2014 will qualify for 2
ROCs/MWh. Bidding on Round 3 closed in
March 2009 and 9 successful applicants
were announced in January 2010 totalling
over 32 GW of installed capacity.
By June 2010, eleven Round 1 wind farms
had been completed with a total capacity
of nearly 1GW. The original planned
capacity for Round 1 was approximately
1900MW but progress has been slower
than expected with nearly 500MW still in
construction, pre-construction or dormant
phase and approximately 425MW ‘lost’ to
project withdrawals or downsizing (see
Table 3.1). Round 2 is still in the relatively
early stages of development with one
operational project (64MW) and another
four under construction with an
approximate installed capacity of 1300MW.
This compares to an original Round 2
capacity aspiration of nearly 7500MW. Site
extensions to Rounds 1 and 2 have since
increased their joint capacity potential by
nearly 1.7GW.
The chronology of significant policy and
industry developments beginning with
Round 1 is summarised in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5 Offshore wind milestones and dates
Year/Month Event
2000 December Round 1 development phase launched by The Crown Estate.
UK’s first offshore wind farm commissioned off Blyth Harbour (installed
capacity approximately 4MW).
2001 April Successful Round 1 applicants announced: 18 sites, 13 locations.
New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) begin.
2002 April Introduction of the Renewables Obligation (RO). Obligation level set to
rise from 3% in 2002/2003 to 10.4% by 2010/2011.
2002 November – The DTI hold ‘Future Offshore’ consultation on the development of a
2003 February strategic framework for the UK offshore wind industry.
2003 February Publication of 2003 Energy White Paper.
The Crown Estate seeks expressions of interest for Round 2. 
2003 March Interest from 29 companies at 70 locations around UK coastline.
2003 December North Hoyle, 1st Round 1 farm commissioned, is switched on (installed
capacity 60MW).
2003 December RO expanded from 10.4% by 2010/11 to 15% by 2015.
Results of Round 2 announced: right to develop 15 sites totalling over 
7GW awarded to 10 companies or consortia.
2004 Energy Act 2004 creates a legal framework for development outside of
UK territorial waters.
2004 December Scroby Sands Round 1 farm is switched on (capacity 60MW).
2005 RO level extended to rise from 10.4% in 2010/2011 to 15.4% in
2015/2016 and then remain at that level until 2027.
2005 December Kentish Flats Round 1 farm is switched on (capacity 90MW).
2006 January Publication of Energy Review by DTI including announcement of an
additional RO target of 20% renewable electricity by 2020-21 (but 40%
in Scotland). Agreement to consult on ROC banding.
2006 July Barrow Round 1 farm is switched on (capacity 90MW).
2007 Energy White Paper 2007: ‘Meeting the energy challenge’.
Agreement by UK to EU target of generating 20% of energy supply from
renewables by 2020. UK’s allocated target is 15%.
2007 August Completion of Beatrice wind farm (capacity 10MW).
Continued overleaf
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2007 October Completion of Burbo Bank Round 1 farm (capacity 90MW).
2007 December Government plans massive wind expansion by conducting SEA of 25 GW
of offshore sites in preparation for Round 3.
2008 January Energy Bill updates UK’s energy legislative framework.
2008 June The Crown Estate invites applications for Round 3 – up to 25 GW
additional to existing/planned 8 GW from Rounds 1 and 2.
2008 October Completion of Lynn and Inner Dowsing Round 1 wind farm (capacity
194.4MW).
2008 November Climate Change Act passed into law.
2008 Energy Act includes ROC banding from April 2009. RO extended to
at least 2037.
2009 January 2007 EU targets formalised by EU Renewables Directive.
2009 March Round 3 bidding closes.
2009 April Start of ROC banding introduced in 2008 Energy Act – offshore wind 1.5
ROC subsequently revised upwards to 2 ROCs in response to concerns
over steeply rising costs.
2009 July Publication of UK Low Carbon Transition Plan stipulating 40% of electricity
to come from renewables, nuclear and clean coal.
2009 Autumn Gunfleet Sands commissioned (installed capacity 172.8MW between
Gunfleet I and II).
Tendering for so-called ‘Round 2.5’ site extensions.
2010 January Round 3 successful applicants announced.
2010 May Round 2.5 awards made.
Table 3.5 continued
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4.1  Introduction
Chapter 4 examines both the problems
and challenges in UK offshore wind
development that have emerged since the
middle of the 2000s and more recent
expectations regarding future offshore
wind cost trends, and discusses those
factors which have driven the cost
increases. Section 4.2 looks at the delays
to Rounds 1 and 2 and the cost escalations
that have characterised the second half of
the decade. Section 4.3 considers costs
expectations in 2008 and 2009 for the
medium term out to 2015, whilst section
4.4 considers expectations in the longer
term as far as 2050. Section 4.5 examines
the reasons why costs have risen.
4.2  Delays and cost
escalations from the mid
2000s
4.2.1  Clouds on the horizon:
Round 1 delays
Successful Round 1 applicants were
announced in April 2001 and the first
project, North Hoyle, began generating in
December 2003. However, it was a year
later before Scroby Sands went online in
December 2004 and a further year before
the third Round 1 wind farm at Kentish
Flats was completed. By 2006,
installations were due to increase
substantially with the UK set to become
the world leader in installed capacity. The
situation changed, however, when three
large projects due for construction
encountered major contracting problems,
with Centrica’s Lynn and Inner Dowsing
projects and Eon’s Solway Firth projects all
failing to agree terms with their preferred
contractors (Westwood, 2005).  
Thus, by 2006, progress on the 18 UK
Round 1 projects allocated in 2001 was
slower than expected. By that year, all
Round 1 should have been completed but
in fact only four were operational, three
had not even received planning approval,
and one had been abandoned (HoC, 2006).
The remainder were in varying stages of
development though two of these would
also subsequently be withdrawn.
Reporting in the same year, Westwood
(2006) noted that contracts should have
been progressing on larger wind farms and
costs should have been falling, yet neither
was the case. Contract negotiations on
future projects were stalling and the costs
of offshore wind development were
escalating. Only one full UK project would
be completed in 2006 and only one more
the following year. By the end of 2007, the
installed operational capacity of Round 1
was less than 400MW and at least one
developer had switched focus from Round
1 to Round 2 (reflecting the desire for
larger installed projects) to Round 1’s
detriment (BVG Associates, 2007). 
By 2007 the typical timeline for a large UK
offshore project was estimated to be
seven years with three years in
planning/consenting7 (BVG Associates,
2007). The wind farms at Lynn and Inner
Dowsing did not start generating until
2008 whilst 2009 finally saw the
4.  Emerging problems,
expectations and cost drivers
7 Industry commentators expect Round 3 timelines to be shorter, in particular because of improvements to the planning and
consents process
8018_5_Chap4:UKERC  10/09/2010  14:14  Page 39
G
re
a
t 
E
x
p
e
c
ta
ti
o
n
s
: 
T
h
e
 c
o
s
t 
o
f 
o
ff
s
h
o
re
 w
in
d
 i
n
 U
K
 w
a
te
rs
 –
u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
in
g
 t
h
e
 p
a
s
t 
a
n
d
 p
ro
je
c
ti
n
g
 t
h
e
 f
u
tu
re
40
completion of Rhyl Flats. By June 2010,
Round 1 projects totalling approximately
500MW have still to be completed and
another 400MW of initially planned
capacity has been withdrawn (see Table
3.1 of Chapter 3, section 3.2.1). However,
this shortfall should be partially made up
by the additional 285MW of Round 1
capacity planned under Round 2.5.
4.2.2  Progress in Round 2
The results of Round 2 were announced in
December 2003 and gave 15 companies or
consortia the rights to develop over 7GW
of offshore wind capacity. However, as
early as 2005 many Round 2 projects were
already facing delays (Douglas-Westwood
Limited and ODE Limited, 2005), and a
year later only four of the 15 projects had
got as far as making planning applications
to the DTI (HoC, 2006).
By the time the government’s 2006
Energy Review was published, there was a
growing realisation of the technical
difficulties, rising costs, and supply chain
limitations of offshore wind development
(BVG Associates, 2007). The increase to
1.5 ROCs for offshore wind power in the
2007 Energy White Paper was generally
well received. However, major issues
regarding planning uncertainties and
timescales were compromising both
onshore and offshore aspects of offshore
development.
Industry commentators argued that the
economic gap between capital costs,
expected operational costs and revenue
for most projects remained too large for
substantial industry commitment (BWEA,
2006). The report noted that under the
existing RO and capital grants regime,
Round 1 projects had been built at an
average rate of only one per year, and that
there were still no signs of the stable
pipeline of projects required by the supply
chain to drive forward investment in
Round 2 (BWEA, 2006). Despite this,
some commentators remained optimistic.
ODE Limited (2007), for example,
suggested that the target for the
commencement of the first Round 2
projects remained 2007 and it was
anticipated that costs for implementation
would be up to 20% less than for Round 1
projects.
The reality however was that by 2008
some 5GW of Round 2 projects were still
to even clear the planning system (BWEA,
2008) and the time it was taking for
projects to move through the site
assessment and consenting procedure was
considerable. Aubrey (2008) noted with
regard to Round 1 that the duration from
the award of a site lease to actual
installation was rising to 8-9 years for
many proposals, sometimes more. In the
opinion of the Carbon Trust the planning
process for both onshore and offshore
wind was unsatisfactory given the time
taken to go from application to approval
and the complexity of dealing with
multiple planning bodies (Carbon Trust,
2008). The result was not only long delays
for building new capacity but also
developers withdrawing from projects
entirely8. In consequence, Round 2
capacity delivery was predicted (i) to have
a longer ‘tail’ than previously foreseen
with the BWEA projecting around 1.5GW
still to be built after 2015; and (ii) to fail
8 But see sub-section 4.3.2 ‘Planning and consent’ for information on more recent changes to the planning process.
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to reach planned levels, falling
approximately 1GW short of the original
nominal figures announced in The Crown
Estate’s Round 2 leasing process (BWEA
and Garrad Hassan, 2009b). This shortfall
could be made up by the additional 1.4GW
of Round 2 capacity planned under Round
2.5.
In addition to consent/planning issues the
2009 report by the BWEA and Garrad
Hassan also identified several other
sources of delay including developer
resource limits; waiting for transmission
grid upgrades; weak economics;
construction delays; and shortage of wind
turbines (BWEA and Garrad Hassan,
2009b). Together, these have been either
a source or symptom of the cost
escalations experienced in the offshore
wind industry from the mid-2000s
onwards and provide the context in which
plans for Round 3 are being prepared. It is
to these cost escalations that the report
now turns.
4.2.3  Cost escalation from the
mid-2000s
By 2005 it was becoming evident that
offshore wind costs were increasing. This
was contrary to early expectations and, as
noted in Chapter 2, it now appears that
learning curves were applied to the
offshore wind sector at a premature and
unrepresentative stage where the amount
of installed capacity was too small and
thus the market data were inadequate. 
Costs had risen since the first of the Round
I projects were installed and contractors
were becoming increasingly aware of the
realities of undertaking large contracts
bearing high risk. Indeed this in itself led
to project delays (Westwood, 2005).
Approximate costs per MW installed were
now running at between €1.6m and
€1.75m, well above the contemporary
target figure of €1.4m/MW.
For 2006/2007, a range of capital, O&M
and generating costs were reported in the
literature. Capex was between
£1,236,000/MW and £1,731,000/MW (PB
Power, 2006); (HoC, 2006); (DTI, 2006);
(E&Y, 2007); (ODE Limited, 2007). O&M
costs were estimated to be between
£45,000 and £66,000/MW/yr (excluding
transmission use of system charges) (E&Y,
2007). Levelised costs ranged between:
• £55 and £72/MWh estimated by EDF;
£55 and £70/MWh estimated by
Centrica; £62 and £84/MWh estimated
by E.ON (HoC, 2006)
• £56 and £88/MWh estimated by 2006
Energy Review (DTI, 2006)9
• £55 and £90/MWh estimated by (PB
Power, 2006)
• £81 and £101/MWh estimated by (E&Y,
2007).
Costs continued to escalate in 2007 with
the Rhyl Flats wind farm (completed in
2009) costing over £2 million/MW
installed. Costs had risen to the point
where the biggest owners/developers (the
major utilities) were re-assessing the rates
9 An extended range reflecting full sensitivities to capex, discount rate, O&M costs, load factor and interest rate margin was
estimated at between £55 and £110/MWh. Assumptions underlying the above values were capital costs of £1,532,000/MW, O&M
costs at £46/MWh, a 20 year lifetime and generating availability of 33% (DTI, 2006).
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of return on their development portfolios
(Douglas-Westwood, 2008). 
By 2008 capex had escalated to between
£2.18m and £3.05m/MW installed whilst
energy costs ranged from £76 to
£118/MWh (Carbon Trust, 2008). This
compared with an average cost of energy
for the first four Round 1 projects
(completed between 2003 and 2006) of
£69/MWh (Feng et al., 2010). By this time
offshore generation was at least 60%
more expensive than onshore (Carbon
Trust, 2008).
The following year, Ernst & Young (2009)
reported that average capital costs had
doubled over the previous five years to
more than £3.2m/MW in 2009 (for
projects due to be completed in 2012).
Ernst & Young (2009) noted that total
capital costs had increased by
approximately 30% over the period 2006-
2008 (contracted costs) and that this
trend had continued through to 2010-12
(current 2009 quoted costs). Levelised
energy costs showed a 58% increase
between 2006 and 2009 from £91/MWh to
£144/MWh (E&Y, 2009).
In 2009, following a review by the
government, the ROC multiple for offshore
wind was increased to 2 ROCs per MWh.
Offshore developers had been claiming
that a combination of falling brown power
prices and several years of rising costs
meant that future investments could fail to
make hurdle rates of return consistent
with offshore risk profiles. Nearly 3000MW
of already consented capacity was
believed to be in this situation (RAB,
2009). 
In 2010, the majority of industry
commentators were content that capex
figures reported by Ernst & Young a year
previously were still broadly in line with
current prices. On this basis a typical mid-
depth, mid-distance UK project is
£3.2m/MW with levelised costs at
£144/MWh. A recent report by Mott
MacDonald (2010) suggests a current
capital cost range between approximately
£2.3m and £3.6m depending on whether
the project is ‘first of a kind’ (FOAK) or
‘nth of a kind’ (NOAK). Levelised costs
range from approximately £149 to
£161/MWh assuming a 10% discount rate. 
The costs of offshore wind farms differ
according to circumstance, but the range
of data reviewed above suggests that a
cost range of between £3.0 and
£3.5m/MW and £140 - £150/MWh is not
unreasonable as an approximation.
Levelised costs of £150/MWh approximate
to an inflation-adjusted rise of around
50% from the mid-2000s, and can be
contrasted with an increase in levelised
costs of roughly a third (from and
inflation-adjusted £66/MWh to £88/MWh)
for onshore wind during the same period
(DTI, 2006) and (Mott MacDonald, 2010).
It is too early to detect clearly the trend
going forward. However the reported cost
of a recent Round 2 project, Gwynt Y Mor,
agreed in June this year (approximately
£2.9m/MW including export cabling)
(RWE, 2010), provides some evidence of a
‘peak’ and possible slight fall relative to
2009 levels.
4.2.4  Summary of reported actual
capital costs from 2005
Figure 4.1 presents the in-year average
actual capex per MW installed for offshore
wind projects reported in the literature
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reviewed by the UKERC TPA team. As for
Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2, amounts have
been converted from the original reported
currency into GBP at the exchange rate
prevailing at the year of the estimate, and
inflated to 2009 values using ONS indices.
As was also noted in Chapter 2, the
averages mask a significant range of
reported costs within each year, with the
difference between the highest and lowest
in each year from 2005 being between
approximately £1m and £2m per MW
(compared with a £0.5m to £1.0m range
for up to 2005). The cumulative installed
capacity of UK offshore wind is shown on
the right hand axis. See Annex 2 for the
full plot of the underlying data.
4.3  Recent estimates of
medium term costs
4.3.1  Estimates in 2008/9
In 2008, the Carbon Trust estimated that
contemporary offshore wind levelised
costs lay in a range between £76 and
£118/MWh depending on depth, distance
and load factor (Carbon Trust, 2008) with
an average of just over £100/MWh. Capital
costs ranged between £2.18m and
£3.05m/MW installed with an average of
approximately £2.6m/MW. Using three
different learning rate scenarios, the
Carbon Trust estimated that by 2015
levelised costs could fall by 13-14% (with
a 9% learning rate), by 19-21% (13%
learning rate), and by 35-37% (15%
learning rate). Using a 2008 average of
£100/MWh produces modelled projections
of £86-87/MWh, £80-81/MWh, and £63-
65/MWh respectively.
Figure 4.1 In-year average actual capex, (from UKERC TPA analysis)
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The following year the report by the BWEA
and Garrad Hassan used a higher capex
figure of £3.1m/MW (for projects recently
contracted or likely to be contracted
shortly) from which to estimate future
costs. The report noted that the consensus
in 2009 of key industry players was for a
slight rise in the next two years followed
by a slight fall by 2015 (BWEA and Garrad
Hassan, 2009a). Whilst acknowledging the
increasing technical demands, especially
on foundations and installation activities,
the main factors cited for an anticipated
reversal of recent costs escalations were:
• Increased wind turbine supply arising
from both additional investment by
existing suppliers and from new
entrants to the offshore market.
• Longer-term contractual arrangements
in place.
• Eased commodity prices.
• General increase in contractor
competition.
• Increasing efficiency including
standardisation.
The BWEA/Garrad Hassan report
integrated a range of industry views
canvassed through a consultation exercise
with historical data on cost trends and
their own analysis of the sensitivity of
capital costs to various industry drivers.
Using a capex model, they projected five-
year future cost trends under various
macro-economic and industry
assumptions. The relationship between
macro-economics and industry supply
chains was considered to be fundamental
to formulating an outlook of future capital
costs as was the interaction between the
supply chain for the offshore wind industry
and those of other industries, especially
onshore wind. Hence the cost trend
scenarios were formulated with reference
to the global economic outlook in general,
the outlook for onshore wind, and the
overall level of confidence in the supply
chain for offshore wind. The scenarios
modelled were:
• Economic recovery with onshore wind
surge: "Green-driven growth"; with
either low or high offshore wind supply
chain confidence.
• Prolonged recession with onshore wind
surge: "European utilities look
landwards"; with either low or high
offshore wind supply chain confidence.
• Prolonged recession with onshore wind
cooling: "European utilities look
seawards"; with either low or high
offshore wind supply chain confidence.
All prices were considered at 2009 levels
and the influence of the move towards
offshore transmission regulation (the
OFTO regime) was taken to be neutral for
the purposes of the study. The results are
summarised in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 shows a significant level of
divergence between the various scenarios
with the difference between the most
optimistic and pessimistic being 51% at
mid-2014. This 'spread', said the report,
was a reflection of both the uncertainty
over macro-economic and industry specific
factors as well as the high level of
sensitivity to which offshore wind capex is
subject. One striking finding from the
scenario results is that offshore wind
capital costs are inversely proportional to
both economic recovery and the growth of
onshore wind. 
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The results also demonstrate the high
importance of the offshore wind supply
chain response to shifts in macro-
economics and onshore wind growth
trends. For example, the average
mitigating effects of high confidence is
24% at mid-2014 with two of the three
high confidence scenarios leading to an
overall reduction of capex. 
However, because both macro-economic
conditions and the development of the
onshore wind industry are outside the
control of the offshore wind sector, the
BWEA/Garrad Hassan report also
considered it useful to consider the
scenario results with a 'neutral' outlook
focusing simply on the level of supply
chain confidence within the offshore wind
arena. The results demonstrated the
criticality of supply chain confidence when
considering the costs outlook for offshore
wind (Figure 4.3).
The 'high confidence' scenario implies the
beginnings of a successful bifurcation of
the onshore and offshore supply chains,
thus creating a dedicated industrial base
for the offshore sector. The projections
suggested that such a shift could reduce
capital costs to the range £2.3m to
£2.8m/MW by 2015. By contrast, if
industrial momentum were lost due to the
supply chain losing confidence in the
viability of the sector, project capex is
likely to rise over the next five years, with
the projections suggesting a range of
£3.0m to £3.9m/MW by 2014 (BWEA and
Garrad Hassan, 2009a). 
Also in 2009, Ernst & Young produced a
report for DECC on the ‘Cost of and
Financial Support for Offshore Wind’ (E&Y,
2009). Using estimated current and future
project costs (calculated in January 2009
real terms), E&Y created a discounted
cash flow model to derive levelised costs
for projects reaching financial close in
2009 and in 2015. 
Figure 4.2 Summary of five year capex projections (BWEA and Garrad Hassan, 2009a) 
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As more offshore wind capacity is built and
operational experience increases over the
next five years the E&Y report has
anticipated learning effects to lead to a
reduction in levelised cost. However, this
expectation is contingent upon supply
chain issues not pushing prices in the
other direction – a critical factor already
noted on several occasions herein. By
applying learning effects to the current
cost of offshore wind, Ernst & Young
(2009) suggested that the levelised cost
could reduce by around 10% by 2015.
Figure 4.4 shows the possible decrease in
Figure 4.3 Environment-neutral capex projections (BWEA and Garrad Hassan, 2009a)
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Figure 4.4 Cumulative decrease in levelised cost on current Round 1 and 2 projects if
learning effects are included (at specified hurdle rates) (E&Y, 2009)
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levelised costs (and RO banding levels) on
contemporary projects (i.e. those near or
at financial close in January 2009) as a
result of learning effects and the easing of
supply constraints in the offshore wind
sector. The analysis models two discount
rates – 12% and 10%.
The European Wind Energy Association
also published a report in 2009, which
estimated the medium-term cost
development of offshore wind power also
using learning curve methodology, though
relative to a 2006 baseline (EWEA,
2009a). These medium-term cost
predictions were made under the following
conditions: 
• Manufacturing capacity constraints for
turbines will continue until 2010. A
more balanced demand and supply is
not expected to occur before 2011. 
• The total capacity development of wind
power is assumed to be the main
driving factor for the cost development
of offshore turbines, since most of the
turbine costs are related to the general
development of the wind industry.
• Thus, the growth rate of installed
capacity is assumed to be a doubling of
cumulative installations every three
years. 
• For the period between 1985 and 2004,
a learning rate of approximately 10%
was estimated (citing Neij, 2003). In
2011, this learning rate is again
expected to be achieved by the industry
up until 2015. 
Based on the above, the average cost of
offshore wind capacity was expected to
decrease from €2.1m/MW in 2006 to
€1.81m/MW in 2015, or by approximately
15% (Table 4.1). Note that the EWEA’s
cost figures are substantially lower than
the UK experience where, for example,
current capex is over £3.0m/MW. Whilst
there is a considerable spread of costs,
from €1.55m/MW to €2.06m/MW, the
highest EWEA figure (forecast in 2015) is
fully one third less than current UK capital
costs.
Finally, it is worth noting that the UK
government’s view in 2009 was that the
increase in offshore wind costs would be
short term (DECC, 2009) and costs would
reduce over time as the technology is
industrialised, due to:
• increasing competition in the supply
chain
• reducing risk due to technology
developments and standardization
• economies of scale.
DECC acknowledged that site selection
would also play a critical role in
progressing economic offshore wind
Table 4.1 Estimates for cost development of offshore wind turbines until 2015, constant
2006-€. (EWEA, 2009a)
InvESTmEnT CoSTS, mIllIon €/mW o&m CAP. FACToR
min Average max €/mWh %
2006 1.8 2.1 2.4 16 37.5
2015 1.55 1.81 2.06 13 37.5
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development, and suggested that sites
might be situated in shallower, closer to
shore areas.
4.4  Estimates of long term
costs
4.4.1  Estimates in 2008
In estimating possible offshore wind costs
in 2020, the Carbon Trust’s 2008 report on
offshore wind also emphasised the
primary importance of optimal project
siting as well as the role of RD&D funding
to develop technology and reduce costs.
At its most optimistic, the report
suggested that the investment required to
deliver 29GW of offshore wind could be
reduced by as much as 40% by 2020 –
from £75bn to £45bn. This implies a very
best case capital cost in 2020 of
approximately £1.55m/MW. With regard to
levelised costs, depending on site and load
factor, and assuming a conservative 9%
learning rate, the report estimated a
reduction of 19% to 21% by 2020 i.e.
resulting in a range between
approximately £77 and £95/MWh (Carbon
Trust, 2008).
The middle and high scenarios see the
supply chain prioritise offshore wind and
hence increase RD&D and maximise
economies of scale, thus fulfilling potential
technology cost reduction. The offshore
turbine demonstrates a learning rate of
13% and 15% respectively for the middle
and high scenarios, whilst the foundations
and installation components exhibit
learning effects of 10 - 20% derived from
economies of scale. The middle scenario
proposes a reduction of 29% to 30% by
2020, resulting in a levelised cost range
between approximately £68 and
£83/MWh. In the high scenario, the cost of
energy reduces by 42% to 44% i.e. a
range between £54 and £68/MWh. 
In addition, the Carbon Trust extrapolated
different learning rates, based on different
installation sites, in order to extend the
forecast range out to 2030. The resultant
levelised cost of energy ranges between
approximately £40/MWh and £80/MWh
(Figure 4.5).
As we have seen with the Carbon Trust’s
scenario work, the spread of costs can be
considerable. Figure 4.6 shows a range of
levelised costs estimated in recent
literature. All costs shown relate to 2020
except for UKERC costs which are based
on a systematic review of costs from a
range of years (and German FITs (onshore
wind section of graph) which are based on
2008 levels) (CCC, 2008).
4.4.2  Estimates in 2009
In 2009, the Committee on Climate
Change estimated levelised costs in the
year 2020 at £69 to £77/MWh, on the
basis of a social discount rate (CCC,
2009). This is somewhat lower than its
conclusions the previous year when the
Committee reported that its forecast of
likely levelised costs in 2020 lay towards
the upper end of the estimates reviewed in
the literature between £85 and £90/MWh
(CCC, 2008). Meanwhile, the EWEA
projected offshore capital costs of
€1.3m/MW in 2020 and €1.2m/MW by
2030 (based on an assumption of
€2.3m/MW in 2007) (EWEA, 2009b).
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Figure 4.5 offshore wind costs – site and learning scenarios (Carbon Trust, 2008)
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Figure 4.6 Estimates of levelised costs for wind (CCC, 2008) 
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Looking further out, the IEA projected cost
reductions in the longer term (see
scenario map (Figure 4.7) below) (IEA,
2009). On the basis of a 9% learning rate,
offshore investment costs would fall:
• 27% by 2030 implying capex of
US$2.19m/MW at that time (and
assumes O&M10 costs fall by 25%).
• 38% in 2050 implying capex of
US$1.86m/MW at that time (and
assumes O&M11 costs fall by 35%).
Note however, the starting assumption of
US$3.0m/MW for capital costs whereas
the current UK experience (expressed in
US dollars) is over US$4.5m.
Also looking at mid-century, the European
Commission’s PRIMES capital cost model
assumes capex of €1.16m/MW in 2050
(Blanco, 2009).
Finally, modelled scenarios in the UK
Energy Research Centre’s ‘Energy 2050’
report used a capex range between
approximately £500,000 and
£850,000/MW by mid-century. The higher
baseline figure assumes an annual cost
reduction rate of 1% up to 2020 and 0.5%
thereafter. The lower ‘accelerated
technological development’ figure
assumes an annual cost reduction rate of
3% up to 2020 and 1% thereafter
(UKERC, 2009).
4.4.3  Summary of forecast capital
costs
Figure 4.8 presents a summary of the
forecast capex values reported in the
literature reviewed by the UKERC TPA
team, and shows the in-year average
Figure 4.7 Scenario projections for development of onshore and offshore wind investment
costs (USD/mW) (IEA, 2009)
0
1.0
1.5
2.0
3.0
3.5
0.5
2.5
US
D 
m
illi
on
 /
 M
W
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Offshore Onshore
Source: SKM (2008), Ernst & Young (2006), UKERC (2006), Redpoint et al (2008), Carbon Trust (2008). Calculations of German
feed-in-tariffs (FITs) based on www.wind-energie.de.and www.windworks.org 
Note: £ 2008.
10 The IEA ‘O&M’ definition includes service, spare parts, insurance, administration, site rent, consumables and power from the
grid.
11 As per footnote 10.
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forecast costs for two groups, one
consisting of those forecasts made up to
2005, and one of those forecasts made
from 2005 onwards. Amounts have been
converted from the original reported
currency into GBP at the exchange rate
prevailing at the year of the estimate, and
inflated to 2009 values using ONS indices.
See Annex 2 for full details.
The data reinforce the message that
analysts have consistently expected costs
to fall over time. What changed after 2005
is that forecast costs in the relatively near
future were higher, but were still expected
to fall in the longer term, returning to
broadly the same level as earlier forecasts.
Since this implies a higher rate of cost
reduction, it raises the question as to what
is influencing these expectations. There
may be good reasons to hope that long
run costs can be reduced a great deal, but
it is important to ensure that this is based
in reasoned analysis. It may be that long
run costs become clearer in the period to
2015, when a better grounded basis for
assessment becomes available. 
4.5  Cost escalation drivers
4.5.1 Overview
In section 4.2 we saw how early optimism
regarding future offshore wind costs gave
way, from the mid-2000s onwards, to
significant increases in actual costs.
Section 4.5 now examines the drivers
behind these cost escalations.
For obvious reasons, offshore wind
generation is inherently more expensive
than onshore - indeed, a recent report by
Mott MacDonald (2010) shows that
onshore wind is the cheapest of the low
Figure 4.8 Forecast capex, comparing pre- and post-2005 estimates (from UKERC TPA
analysis)
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carbon technologies being deployed at
scale in the UK. Foundations for offshore
wind are more substantial and the laying
of them is far more complex. Installing
wind farms at sea is a much greater
challenge, usually limited to summer
periods but still exposed to severe weather
risks - and the windier the site, the greater
the risk. Accessing turbines for operation
and maintenance also entails challenges
and risks. Moreover, the wind turbines
themselves are more expensive than
onshore ones (approximately 20% more)
(ODE Limited, 2007) and need to operate
in a more or less continuously hostile
environment where reliability is of even
greater importance, given the difficulty of
maintaining wind turbines at sea (Carbon
Trust, 2008). 
Nevertheless, over and above such
considerations, offshore wind costs have
increased dramatically since the mid-
2000s. Even during the post-boom credit
crisis of 2007/2008, costs continued to
rise although there is now some signs that
a possible plateau has been reached. In
recent years, offshore wind commentators
have suggested a range of reasons for the
increase in capital, O&M, and energy
generation costs12. These drivers may be
categorised as either (i) ‘intrinsic’ or (ii)
‘external’, reflecting the extent to which
offshore wind developers and energy
policymakers are able to influence them.
Intrinsic drivers include:
• depth (especially for foundation costs)
and distance
• availability/reliability and load factor
• lack of competition in production of key
components
• supply chain/infrastructure bottlenecks
• planning and consent
• operation and maintenance costs.
External drivers of cost escalation include:
• cost of finance
• exchange rates
• commodity prices.
The division between ‘intrinsic’ and
‘external’ is to some degree open to
debate. For example, supply chain and
infrastructure could be considered as
external issues driven by market forces.
However, we include such factors within
the intrinsic grouping because the UK
government has the potential to influence
them through, for example, grants or
regional subsidies.
4.5.2  Intrinsic drivers
Depth & distance
The need to develop and service
installation sites that are further from
shore and in deeper waters creates
additional risk and technology challenges
and, where not compensated by higher
wind speeds and load factors, will increase
costs. Snyder and Kaiser (2009b) point
out that the distance to shore influences
both construction and O&M costs. During
construction ships will have to make a
number of trips to load equipment
therefore the closer an offshore site is to
12 Some industry commentators have suggested that in addition to the drivers explored in this chapter the increased ROC
multiples have also contributed to recent cost rises. 
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port, the less expensive installation will
be. During operation a maintenance crew
will need to make regular trips to monitor
and/or maintain the foundations, towers
and turbines. 
The distance to shore also dictates the
amount of transmission cabling required.
Figure 4.9 shows the evolution of electrical
infrastructure costs versus distance from
shore for a range of Round 1 and Round 2
projects, and indicates that the cost of
electrical infrastructure is closely
correlated to a project’s distance (E&Y,
2009). Since more recent projects are
located further offshore they incur higher
electrical infrastructure costs than earlier
near-shore projects. The impact of other
factors on the cost of electrical
infrastructure has been found to be
relatively small by comparison (for
example, Ernst & Young (2009) found little
evidence of tight supply for electrical
infrastructure components in 2009). 
As in the oil and gas industry, water depth
is also a primary factor and will play an
increasingly important role in determining
costs as wind farms are installed in ever
deeper water. Figure 4.10 provides an
example of how greater depth increases
foundation costs.
Increasing depths increase the price of
construction by making monopile and
gravity foundations impractical and
potentially requiring the use of more
expensive, jacketed foundations and more
expensive marine vessels for installation.
On the other hand, Snyder and Kaiser
(2009b) notes that depth and distance
costs are likely to be (at least partially)
mitigated by the increased turbine size
typically associated with recent, more
distant installations. 
The Carbon Trust summarised the key
depth and distance cost drivers as follows
(Carbon Trust, 2008):
Figure 4.9 Electrical infrastructure cost vs. distance from shore (E&Y, 2009) 
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• Installation costs increase with both
distance from shore and water depth;
costs for sites more than 60 nautical
miles (nm) from shore and in 40 to 60m
of water are expected to be 230%
higher than for sites less than 12nm
from shore and in 0 to 20m of water.  
• Foundation costs for sites in 40 to 60m
of water are expected to be 160%
greater than for sites in 0 to 20m of
water.
• Grid connection for sites more than
60nm from shore may be by HVDC
connection. Total grid connection costs
for these sites may be 200% higher
than for the sites less than 12nm from
shore.
• Operation and maintenance costs vary
with the expected replacement cycles of
all the major components and as a
result will increase over the lifetime of
the wind farm, and also increase with
distance from shore.
Site location is thus critical to the
economics of an offshore wind
development. The capex of different sites
can vary by up to 40% (Carbon Trust,
2008) but revenues increase with wind
speed because the power available from
the wind is a function of the cube of the
speed. If the wind speed doubles, its
energy content will increase eight fold. A
major advantage offered by offshore wind
therefore is that wind speeds are generally
higher and more stable than onshore wind
sites. Turbines can be expected to operate
at high capacity for a larger percentage of
the time and this should give offshore
wind a significant advantage over onshore
generation in terms of energy productivity
(ODE Limited, 2007).
Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 show 2008
capex and levelised costs for the main
available UK site types.
In terms of the sensitivity of the levelised
cost to key drivers, the most important
factor is the wind speed, followed by depth
Figure 4.10 Foundation costs as a function of depth (Ramboll offshore Wind, 2010)
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and then distance (see Figure 4.13 for
sensitivities to cost and revenue drivers).
Thus the two most attractive site types as
per Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 above are
the near-shore, shallow water site with
relatively lower capital costs (similar to
Figure 4.11 2008 capex for 5mW turbines at different sites (Carbon Trust, 2008)
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Figure 4.12 2008 average levelised costs for 5mW turbines at different sites, weighted by
site/wind resource availability (Carbon Trust, 2008)
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early Round 2 sites) and the mid-distance,
mid-depth site that has higher costs but
greater wind speeds. The latter has a
higher capex of £2.54/MW versus the
former’s capex of £2.21/MW but lower
levelised cost of £94/MWh versus
£97/MWh thanks to the higher wind
speeds of these sites (Carbon Trust,
2008). This illustrates the trade-off
between increased costs at greater
depth/distance and the (typically) greater
resource availability at such sites.
Availability/reliability and load factor
As noted above, a major advantage
offered by offshore wind is that wind
speeds are generally higher and more
stable than onshore sites. Snyder and
Kaiser (2009a) suggests that moving
onshore to offshore should lead to an
increase in the capacity factor from
roughly 25% to 40%. However, the load
factor of a wind turbine is determined by
two variables: the wind conditions and the
availability of the wind turbine and related
equipment – a measure of a wind farm’s
readiness to generate should wind
conditions permit. For onshore farms,
annual availability has typically been 97%,
or above, and only 1% operate at less
than 80% availability (Feng et al., 2010).
UK offshore farms have experienced
higher than expected loss of generation –
in particular from gearbox failure
(especially bearings); generator failures;
subsea cable damage; and operator
access limitations (BVG Associates, 2007).
Feng et al. (2010) analysed the
operational experience of UK Round 1
projects and found that at only 80.3% the
average availability had indeed fallen well
short of expectations.
As a result, the annual average capacity
factor for reporting UK Round 1 wind
farms has been 29.5% (Feng et al., 2010)
- higher than the average value of 27.3%
reported in 2007 for UK onshore wind
farms but lower than the expected 35.0%
for UK offshore and the reported capacity
factors of approximately 40% for the
Danish offshore wind farms (Wind Stats,
2009b, Wind Stats, 2009a). There is a
Figure 4.13 Sensitivities to main revenue and cost drivers (Carbon Trust, 2008)
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direct correlation between availability data
and reported load factors. Simple
arithmetic indicates that if availability is
reduced from 95% to 80% and wind
conditions held constant then load factor
will decline from approximately 35% to
30%. Moreover, the higher the theoretical
load factor, the worse the impact of poor
availability.
Poor availability was perhaps not
anticipated because early farms proved to
be reasonably reliable, the average annual
availability of Denmark’s well-established
near-shore installation at Middelgrunden,
for example, is over 93% (Larsen et al.,
2005).
Competition in turbine manufacture
Turbine prices went up between the mid
2000s and 2009 for a range of reasons.
Improving reliability to remedy the
problems described above is one factor. As
we discuss below, offshore turbines
occupy a small niche relative to onshore
markets and with strong demand from the
US and elsewhere it is likely that a
considerable ‘niche premium’ will attach to
the offshore market. The supply chain
constraints experienced by turbine makers
will also have served to drive up costs and
as we discuss in Section 4.5.3, UK offshore
turbine prices have been profoundly
affected by materials costs and currency
movements.
Notwithstanding all the factors outlined
above, much of the recent literature has
noted the importance of the relatively
small number of manufacturers engaged
in turbine manufacturing for supply to the
UK offshore wind industry (Carbon Trust,
2008), (E&Y, 2009), and (RAB, 2009). 
The market has been dominated by
Siemens and Vestas, until recently the
only two turbine suppliers with significant
offshore capability. Together they have
accounted for 98% (48% and 50%
respectively) of offshore turbines installed
in the UK up to 2009 (E&Y, 2009) and have
thus been able pass on high commodity
and component costs to developers with
relative ease. In addition, competition was
further reduced in early 2007 when Vestas
withdrew its 3MW marinised turbine from
the market following gearbox problems.
The Vestas turbine was not reintroduced
until May 2008, thus making Siemens the
sole supplier to the sector throughout
2007 and much of 2008 (Carbon Trust,
2008). 
More recently, turbine manufacturers
REpower and Multibrid have won large
contracts with leading European utilities to
supply their offshore wind projects (E&Y,
2009). Specifically designed for offshore
use, their 5MW turbines are currently
being tested at the Alpha Ventus site,
Germany’s first offshore wind park (Alpha
Ventus, 2010). Additional manufacturers
such as GE, Mitsubishi and Clipper are now
entering or are expected to enter the
market (BWEA and Garrad Hassan,
2009a). It is however, still too early to tell
whether the increasing number of entrants
to the turbine manufacturing market will
significantly improve turbine costs for
developers. Moreover, industry experts
have stressed that it will take time for new
entrants into the offshore turbine market
to gain the confidence of UK developers
and financiers.
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Supply chain bottlenecks
Overview
Offshore wind power is still a relatively
nascent industry that currently relies on
both the onshore wind turbine supply
chain and general offshore industries.
Bottlenecks have been a symptom not
only of a supply/demand imbalance across
all the markets that these supply chains
deliver to but also of the offshore wind
market not being a strategic priority to
them (Carbon Trust, 2008). With only 1
GW of UK offshore wind power delivered
so far, for most companies in the supply
chain to developers (e.g. turbine and other
component manufacturers, vessel owners,
and ports) offshore wind power has
represented at most 10% of sales
revenue. To date therefore, the offshore
wind market has not been attractive
enough for most companies in the supply
chain to warrant the required level of
investment. Instead, turbine
manufacturers, for example, have focused
on the onshore wind market (especially in
the US), and for much of the rest of the
supply chain offshore wind has
represented less than 5% of sales (Carbon
Trust, 2008).
This may be set to change with Wind
Power Monthly (2010) anticipating a
significant expansion in the supply chain,
in particular in UK-based manufacturing
capacity. So far, however, the relative
immaturity of the supply chain for offshore
wind components and support services
appears to have resulted in market
inefficiencies and contributed to significant
cost increases particularly relating to the
cost of procuring and installing wind
turbines and foundations (E&Y, 2009). The
sub-sections that follow identify and
examine issues of delay and cost in the
different parts of the supply chain.
Supply of components
By the mid-2000s, rapid growth in the US
onshore industry was causing a global
shortage of turbine components, delaying
European offshore projects and forcing up
prices. Noting that almost all UK Round 1
projects had been delayed by costs issues
or problematic contract negotiations,
Gordon (2006) suggested that significant
responsibility could be directed towards
the US Production Tax Credit (PTC)
scheme. 
This federal scheme gives a tax credit of
$0.02/kWh of produced electricity for the
first ten years of production from any
renewable source, including wind (Snyder
and Kaiser, 2009b). This fostered a low-
risk, high-margin market in the US for
turbine suppliers to sell into. Since
inception, the PTC scheme has periodically
expired leaving the US onshore wind
market in the doldrums, but each revival
of the incentive has created a surge in
demand for turbines. The impact of the
‘boom and bust’ nature of the US market
has been to encourage European turbine
suppliers to target the US as a priority
whilst the PTC is in play, effectively
diverting turbines which might otherwise
have been destined for the UK market
(Westwood, 2006); (Aubrey, 2007).
By 2007, turbine supply was the dominant
bottleneck (BVG Associates, 2007) with
the UK offshore sector squeezed by
onshore turbine demand from China,
India, and elsewhere in Europe as well as
the US, and by insufficient competition
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between turbine manufacturers (BWEA,
2008). Lead times for turbine delivery
could be as much as two to three years
and turbine supply was seen by
developers as the major hurdle in
achieving successful project completion
(ODE Limited, 2007).
For their part, turbine manufacturers cited
the supply of turbine components as key
pinch points in the supply chain (BWEA,
2008). The increasing size of turbines had
significant implications in terms of the
number of gearbox suppliers who could
reliably satisfy demand. The same
problem, noted Aubrey (2007), applied to
blades and bearings and towers - as well
as to generators and transformers, and
also to foundations. BVG Associates
(2007), for example, reported that there
were only two or three European suppliers
of monopole foundations but also
cautioned that if more entered the market
this was likely to increase the competition
for the steel plate used in their production.
In 2008, the Carbon Trust was still
reporting supply chain bottlenecks in
gearboxes, bearings, and forgings (as well
as in cables, substations/transformers and
vessels). Lead times could be up to three
years for some components. The longest
lead times were found in the supply of
blades, bearings and generators. By then,
some blade manufacturers, including
market leader LM Glasfiber were reporting
lead times of two to three years. Bearing
manufacturers were quoting up to 32
months. No improvement to lead times
was anticipated before 2010 although
most of the major turbine manufacturers
claimed to have already secured supply
chain capacity to then (Carbon Trust,
2008); (Douglas-Westwood, 2008).
Douglas-Westwood Limited (2008)
reported that the strong market and
constrained turbine supply situation drove
turbine prices upwards by 30% between
2006 and 2008. This is supported by Ernst
& Young (2009) which studied the
evolution of wind turbine costs over time
for a range of UK Round 1 and Round 2
projects (see Figure 4.14). Turbine costs
increased 67% from an average £0.9m to
around £1.5m/MW over the five year
period to 2011 (i.e. where financial close is
expected in 2009).
Port facilities
Whilst UK supporting infrastructure will
naturally be a major issue for Round 3
developers given the huge size of the
undertaking, port availability and quality
are existing areas of concern for the
industry. In the past UK ports have been
judged as under-developed and expensive
in comparison to continental ones and in
need of local agency funding (Douglas-
Westwood, 2008) and (BVG Associates,
2007). In the March 2010 budget,
however, the government launched a
£60m competition for investment in one or
more UK ports (Wind Power Monthly,
2010).
Installation vessels
Offshore installation of foundations and wind
turbines requires heavy lift vessels (HLV)
and cable laying also requires installation
craft. Although this part of the supply chain
was not seen as a significant bottleneck in
2007, there was still insufficient confidence
in the prospects for the offshore wind
industry to stimulate the long charter of such
vessels or the ‘spec’ construction of them
(BVG Associates, 2007).
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By 2008, the lack of available installation
vessels was having an impact. New
installation capacity for larger turbines in
greater water depths was becoming
paramount, but ‘new builds’ for the
offshore industry were encountering
significant delays due to high demand for
vessels whose capabilities could span
multiple marine industries including oil
and gas (Douglas-Westwood, 2008). The
result was that installation vessel
companies were tied up with full order
books and long-term contracts. A2Sea, for
example, had a two-year waiting time;
Oceanteam had ordered four new vessels
with long term contracts already signed;
and MVO had to charter back the ‘Jumping
Jack’ installation vessel it had sold in order
to complete its orders (Carbon Trust,
2008). Moreover, the market leader in
turbine installation vessels was now
booked until 2013 (Douglas-Westwood,
2008). In the previous five years vessel
build costs had doubled, new vessel build
time had extended to up to four years, and
the lead times for cable installation vessels
were expected to rise significantly in the
next decade.
Electrical infrastructure
Between 2006 and 2007 the lead time for
cable supply increased to 18 – 24 months.
Meanwhile, the lead time for transformers
– a key element of offshore substations
–increased from 12 to 30 months over the
same period (BVG Associates, 2007).
The problem continued into 2008 with the
BWEA reporting developers experiencing
difficulty in securing supplies of cables
both for inter-array and connection to
shore (BWEA, 2008). Douglas-Westwood
(2008) noted that two suppliers currently
dominated the cable supply sector and
that new specialist players were finding it
difficult to access the market. An
additional issue was the UK’s requirement
for 3-metre cable burial depth which
significantly increased time and costs
because of the need for seabed ploughing.
Figure 4.14 WTG cost at CoD – indicative trend line 2006-2012 (E&Y, 2009)
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Skills and labour
Some commentators have identified a
shortage of skills as an industry concern,
caused in part by competition for
installation and service crews from the oil
and gas industries and other offshore
activities worldwide (BVG Associates,
2007); (BWEA, 2008). Analysts suggested
that by 2008, a significant increase in the
number of people with appropriate
knowledge and experience would be
required or lack of skills could very quickly
become a major problem as the industry
scales up (Douglas-Westwood, 2008).
Planning and consent
Planning and consent is one of the earliest
issues – and first cost drivers - that a
developer must face. The Round 1
consents process took considerable time,
ranging from several months to, in the
extreme case, a few years (ODE Limited,
2007). This consents process has been
going through a learning curve as more is
learned about the impact on the marine
environment, navigational issues, grid
connection and other aspects. Moreover,
until late 2009, there have been three
main consenting authorities applicable to
offshore wind: DEFRA; the DTI and its
successors; and the relevant local council’s
planning authority (ODE Limited, 2007).
These factors have led to an increase in
complexity and developers have therefore
had to expend significant time and money
in order to obtain consent.
Writing in 2008, the BWEA argued that
sufficient resourcing across the
government’s departments and advisors
was particularly urgent in relation to
planning. The industry association noted
that having consented approximately 3GW
in the seven years since 2001, ten times
that amount would now have to pass
through the system in ten years in order
for the government and the industry to
meet its capacity objective by 2020
(BWEA, 2008).
However, one of the provisions of the 2008
Planning Act should significantly improve
the situation. The Act is intended to
streamline and improve the planning
process for nationally significant
infrastructure projects in England and
Wales, including renewable energy
proposals. It provides for a single consents
regime with an independent Infrastructure
Planning Commission (IPC) to take
decisions. In the case of offshore wind
farms, “nationally significant” is defined as
any English and Welsh proposals with the
capacity to generate over 100MW of
electricity (DECC, 2009). The IPC was
established in October 2009 and given the
go-ahead to receive applications from
March 2010. This should dramatically
reduce the timeline for offshore wind farm
approval from as long as ten years to less
than three years in the future (Carbon
Trust, 2008). At the time of writing
(summer 2010) the coalition government
intends to replace the IPC with a system
that directs requests to the Secretary of
State. It retains an ambition to streamline
planning, however, and minimise delay
(Douglas-Westwood, 2010).
Operation and maintenance costs
Operational performance and resultant
maintenance requirements are especially
important to the economics of a wind farm
but in Round 1 operating costs have been
greater than expected (and availability
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worse than expected). Much of this was
due to the inadequate marinisation of
onshore machines for the offshore
environment (ODE Limited, 2007).
In Figure 4.15 below, Ernst & Young
(2009) shows the evolution of forecast
O&M costs over time (against Commercial
Operation Date – COD) for a range of UK
Round 1 and Round 2 projects. Total
forecast O&M increase from £38,000 to
around £60,000 per MW per annum – a
58% rise over the five year period to
January 2009 (which reflects projects
achieving COD up to and including 2012). 
Ernst & Young (2009) suggested that
increases in O&M costs may largely be
driven by:
• Improved budgeting reflecting track
record and experience gained from
operating early projects where costs
had perhaps been underestimated at
first (e.g., better handling of post-
installation repair work, frequency of
parts replacement, performance and
availability levels, accessibility).
• Evolution of O&M strategies which were
historically formulated assuming a 20-
year project life with limited preventive
maintenance. With The Crown Estate
lease periods now lasting 40 or 50
years, some participants are seeking to
develop more proactive O&M strategies
to extend asset and project life.
• Materials and services for O&M which
have been affected by increases in
labour, steel, and other commodity
prices, as well as by the more recent
strengthening of the Euro against
Sterling (E&Y, 2009).
4.5.3  External drivers
Costs of finance
A significant development since 2007 has
been the crisis in the global credit
markets. Utility developers, who represent
Figure 4.15 Forecast o&m costs (years one-five) – indicative trend line 2006-2012 (E&Y,
2009).
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the majority of offshore wind capacity
installed to date, have typically financed
offshore wind projects using balance sheet
financing (E&Y, 2009). Figure 4.16 below,
charts utility bond prices from January
2006 to January 2009 and suggests that
recent increases in the costs of financing
new capital projects are a result of a
higher cost of debt for these companies.
Under normal expectations increasing
experience in construction and operation
should gradually reduce the risk premium
for offshore installations resulting in a
decreasing cost of capital. However, the
significant rise in spreads for utility bonds
since summer 2007 has led to a general
rise in the cost of capital for these projects
(E&Y, 2009). 
With regard to future project financing,
according to industry commentators the
financial scale of Round 3 means that
developers will be unlikely to be willing or
able to fund construction of projects
largely or entirely on balance sheet hence
actual availability of capital could become
a concern. Whilst the role of the proposed
Green Investment Bank (GIB) is still under
discussion, the GIB Commission has
suggested that its focus should be on
lowering investor risk, which may well
improve access to capital for low-carbon
projects including offshore wind
developments. More far-reaching
proposals include bringing investment in
low-carbon infrastructure under the
umbrella of a regulated asset base, with
tax concessions for private and pension
fund investors (Helm et al., 2009).
Commodity prices
Steel has been estimated to contribute
approximately 12% of overall project costs
(BWEA and Garrad Hassan, 2009a). The
turbine nacelle is estimated to comprise
90% steel, and the transition piece (the
section fixed to the foundation which
carries the turbine tower) is primarily
composed of steel (ODE Limited, 2007).
Figure 4.16 Sterling utilities bond indices (E&Y, 2009)
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The increase in steel prices from the early
2000s to 2008 was thus a contributory
factor to turbine costs rising from £0.9m
to £1.5m/MW (67%) in five years (RAB,
2009). An historic analysis of steel prices
is shown in Figure 4.17 below. From 2002
to 2007 the index experienced growth of
47% CAGR although in 2008 the steel
price index fell by 58% returning to the
long-term historic trend (E&Y, 2009). 
In addition to the wind turbine itself, steel
is used extensively in typical offshore
wind foundations. Around three quarters
of foundation costs relate to material
costs and much of this is steel (E&Y,
2009). In consequence, a contributing
factor to increased foundation costs
(together with the strengthening of the
euro against sterling) has been the rapid
rise in steel prices in the second half of
the decade. Figure 4.18 shows the
evolution of foundation costs over time for
a range of Round 1 and Round 2 projects.
It shows that foundation costs have
increased from around £250k to
£700k/MW (a 180% increase) over the
five years to 2009.
The cost of other commodities also
increased from the early 2000s. Between
2002 and 2006 prices grew at 19%
compound annual growth (CAGR).
However, between 2007 and 2009 the
commodity prices index fell by 5% CAGR
although it was still substantially above
the historical trend line. Analysis by the
Carbon Trust suggests that if commodity
and materials prices were to return to
2003 levels, overall offshore wind power
costs would fall by 11% (Carbon Trust,
2008). Historic commodity prices are
shown in Figure 4.19 (E&Y, 2009).
Globally rising commodity and materials
costs between 2003 and the global credit
crisis in 2007/2008 account for around
half of the increase in turbine prices
(Carbon Trust, 2008). Figure 4.20 shows
the relative rise since 2003 in the main
input prices. Figure 4.21 illustrates the
proportional contribution of each of those
Figure 4.17 Steel prices – historic index rebased to 1988 (E&Y, 2009)
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inputs to the rising cost of wind turbines
over the period. What is striking is that
whilst a little over half the price increase of
offshore wind turbines over the four year
period is attributable directly to
commodity, steel, equipment, and labour
price rises, there still remains a significant
unexplained portion. This is partly
accounted for by the declining value of
sterling versus the euro (see following
sub-section) but is also likely to be due in
part to the lack of competition in the
offshore turbine market (see section
4.5.2).
Figure 4.18 Foundation cost - indicative trend line 2006-2012 (E&Y, 2009)
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Figure 4.19 Commodity prices – historic index rebased to 1988 (E&Y, 2009)
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Exchange rates
The euro/sterling exchange rate also
contributed to the rise in project costs
borne by UK offshore wind developers for
much of the decade. The majority of
offshore wind components imported into
the UK are either priced in euros or priced
in a currency tied to the euro hence until
2009 UK developers experienced
continued increases in component costs
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Figure 4.20 main input price increases 2003 to 2007 (Carbon Trust, 2008)
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Figure 4.21 Proportion of turbine price increase explained by input prices (Carbon Trust,
2008)
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Assumptions relating to Figure 4.20 and Figure 4.21: Contributions to costs of a turbine as follows: 4.2% from steel, 20% from
other commodities, 30% from manufacturing components, 17% from wages (based on Vestas reports).
Original data from: Commodity price: IMF Industrial Inputs; WTG Prices; Observed increases from BTM Steel price: Composed
steel price in the US published by MYB, converted to real terms by consumer inflation index (CPI); Machinery and equipment:
German manufacture of engines and turbines, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines from Eurostat; Employment: Wages
from German manufacture of engines and turbines, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines from Eurostat.
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because of the euro’s gradual
appreciation. Vessels and services are also
largely sourced from continental Europe,
hence installation costs also rose due to
the weakening of sterling against the euro
(E&Y, 2009).
Figure 4.22 illustrates how, since 2000,
the euro became stronger against the
pound reaching almost one-for-one parity
in December 2008. Thus, whilst prices for
commodities have fallen since 2008 as a
result of the global downturn any positive
effect on turbine prices had until recently
been more than offset by the appreciation
of the euro against sterling (E&Y, 2009).
However, in 2009 the euro started to
decline and by mid-June 2010 it stood at
approximately €1 = £0.83, which would be
expected to feed through into lower
turbine prices in due course.
Impact of credit crisis and subsequent
recession
During the post-boom credit crisis of
2007/2008, offshore wind costs continued
to rise. However, in 2009 the Renewables
Advisory Board expected the fall in steel
and other commodity price to be reflected
in future component contracts (RAB,
2009) and there is now some signs that a
possible plateau in costs may have been
reached. This suggests that the recession
of the last couple of years has had a
beneficial effect on offshore wind costs.
Indeed, this may well have helped the
wind industry in general to maintain
strong growth in the face of the recession
and of the consequent fall in competing
fossil fuel prices (Wind Stats, 2009b). By
the summer of 2009 there appeared to be
little evidence of a slow down in the
growth of the wind industry. 
Going forward, availability of finance could
be a particularly significant issue if the
economic climate deters investors. In June
2010, Bloomberg reported that German
offshore wind development could slow
down for this reason though UK
development is still expected to progress
steadily (Wind Stats, 2009b). That said, if
project finance markets worldwide are
constrained then UK development is likely
Figure 4.22 GBP EUR exchange rates – historic trend since 2000 (E&Y, 2009)
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to face the same funding challenge as
other countries.
4.5.4  Quantifying the relative
impact of factors
The factors that drove the costs
escalations from the mid 2000s are well
understood. For example, rises in
materials, commodities and labour costs
have contributed to between of 50-70% of
the increase in turbine costs. At the
current time around 80% of the value of a
typical offshore wind farm is paid for in
Euros, and in the period from 2005
currency movements increased costs to
UK developers by up to 30%. The
remainder is accounted for by the absence
of competition in key components; supply
chain constraints; the costs of going
further offshore; the full costs of early
offshore wind farms being revealed;
capital and O&M costs associated with
improving reliability; a ‘niche premium’ for
turbine makers; and planning and
consenting delays. Accurate quantification
of the contribution from these factors is
much more challenging and could not, in
our view, be substantiated by the available
data. Having said that, it is possible to
form a view of the relative contribution
from these past major drivers, and our
judgement is that they were (in
descending order of impact):
1. Materials, commodities and labour
costs
2. Currency movements
3. Increasing prices for turbines over and
above the cost of materials, due to
supply chain constraints, market
conditions and engineering issues
4. The increasing depth and distance of
more ambitious projects, affecting
installation, foundation and O&M costs
5. Supply chain constraints, notably in
vessels and ports
6. Planning and consenting delays.
In 2009, key industry actors considered
that the likely medium term trajectory of
offshore wind costs would be for a slight
rise in the following two years followed by
only a modest fall from 2009 levels out to
2015. Recent evidence suggests that costs
in 2010 are no higher than 2009,
suggesting costs may have ‘peaked’. As
noted in Section 4.2.3 there is some
evidence that a turning point may have
been reached with the agreed price of
Gwynt Y Mor, recently reported at
approximately £2.9m/MW. 
4.6  Summary
Progress on Round 1 and 2 has been slower
than expected, with the typical timeline for
a large UK offshore project now estimated
to be between seven and nine years. A
major reason for this according to industry
commentators has been the complexity of
the planning process. By June 2010, Round
1 projects totalling approximately 500MW
have still to be completed and another
400MW of capacity has been withdrawn
(although this should be mitigated by
Round 2.5). Meanwhile, Round 2 capacity
delivery is predicted to have a longer ‘tail’
than previously foreseen with the BWEA
projecting around 1.5GW still to be built
after 2015.
In addition, and contrary to expectations,
the costs of offshore wind development
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from the mid-2000s onwards have been
escalating. In 2008, offshore capital costs
were double the 2003 level and by 2009,
Ernst & Young reported average capital
costs of around £3.2m/MW installed,
whilst estimates of levelised energy costs
had increased 50% between 2006 and
2009. 
By 2009 the consensus of key industry
actors regarding the likely medium term
trajectory in offshore wind costs was for a
slight rise in the next two years followed
by only a slight fall from current levels out
to 2015. In 2009, the BWEA and Garrad
Hassan used a capex figure of £3.1m/MW
to hypothesise six scenarios impacting
capital costs from 2010 to 2015. A
significant level of divergence was
revealed between the various scenarios
with the difference between the most
optimistic and pessimistic being 51% at
mid-2014. This 'spread', was a reflection
of the uncertainty over macro-economic
and industry-specific factors. The results
also demonstrated the high importance of
supply chain response to shifts in macro-
economics and onshore wind growth
trends, and also the criticality of supply
chain confidence.
Regarding this latter point, assuming a
high level of supply chain confidence Ernst
& Young (2009) suggested that levelised
costs could be reduced by around 10% by
2015 and that capital costs could decrease
to between £2.3m and £2.8m/MW. By
contrast, if industrial momentum were lost
due to the supply chain losing confidence
in the viability of the sector, project capex
would be likely to rise over the next five
years, with projections suggesting a range
of £3.0 to £3.9m/MW by 2014.
The UK government’s view in 2009 was
that the increase in offshore wind costs
since the mid-2000s would be short term
and that in the longer term costs would
continue to fall. A range of commentators
forecast significant reductions beyond
2020. At its most optimistic, the Carbon
Trust suggested that the investment
required to deliver 29GW of offshore wind
could be reduced by as much as 40% by
2020 – from £75bn to £45bn. This implies
a very best case capital cost in 2020 of
approximately £1.55m/MW.
After 2005 forecast costs in the relatively
near future were higher, nevertheless
many commentators were still expecting
large cost reductions in the longer term,
with post 2020 scenarios often returning
to broadly the same level as earlier
forecasts. Modelled scenarios in UKERC’s
2009 report ‘Energy 2050’, for example,
use a capital cost range at mid-century of
approximately £500,000 to £850,000/MW.
This implies a higher rate of cost reduction
than originally conceived and raises the
question as to what the prospects are in
the longer term for such an outcome. 
Rises in materials, commodities and
labour costs, and adverse exchange rate
movements have made the largest
contributions to cost escalations from the
mid 2000s onwards. The remainder is
accounted for by: the absence of
competition in key components; supply
chain constraints; the costs of going
further offshore; the full costs of early
offshore wind farms being revealed;
capital and O&M costs associated with
improving reliability; a ‘niche premium’ for
turbine makers; and planning and
consenting delays. 
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Costs have risen since the development of
the early UK sites due to this range of
intrinsic and external factors but if we
account for both types there must remain
a significant degree of learning and
underlying cost reduction over time.
Indeed, there are now some signs that a
plateau in costs may have been reached
with the majority of commentators
suggesting that current typical capex of
around £3.0m/MW and energy costs at a
little under £150/MWh are approximately
the same as a year ago. We explore the
potential for costs to fall in the period to
around 2025 in Chapter 5.
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5.1  Introduction
Building on the evidence of past cost
trajectories and analysis of the main
drivers for offshore wind energy, Chapter
5 provides an analysis of the future of
capital and levelised costs over a 10-15
year time horizon – to around 2025. This
is done by considering the main cost
escalation drivers identified in Chapter 4,
together with a number of other factors,
including those with potential to reduce
costs.
This is a more detailed and ‘disaggregated’
approach than the use of learning curves.
The analysis essentially takes the form of
an ‘expert view’ on each of the main
factors, informed by the literature and our
engagement with key stakeholders. It
goes beyond engineering issues to include
factors such as finance, market conditions
and macro-economic effects. Section 5.2
provides a qualitative assessment of the
key factors, and indicates which of these
factors have a readily quantifiable and
substantive impact upon costs (or prices).
Where possible, the range and scale of
potential cost implications is indicated.
Building upon this, Section 5.3 provides a
review of the potential scale of impact
(both positive and negative) of the
principal drivers of cost increase/decrease
in offshore wind. Section 5.4 draws out the
main findings that emerge from this
assessment whilst Section 5.5 presents
conclusions regarding future costs.
Section 5.6 discusses implications for
policy and Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2  Cost drivers
5.2.1 Turbine costs
The wind turbine itself is the most
important cost component of an offshore
wind project constituting up to 50% of
total capex (see Section 5.3). A range of
interacting drivers will affect costs into the
future; we consider here increasing
competition, competing markets,
innovation, scale effects and
standardisation before drawing
conclusions about the overall scale and
trajectory of change to turbine costs.
Increasing competition in wind turbine
supply
As noted in this Chapter 4, the offshore
turbine market to date has been
dominated by just two companies,
Siemens and Vestas and there is some
evidence that the lack of competition has
been significant. Additional manufacturers
such as GE, Multibrid, Mitsubishi, Repower
and Clipper are now entering or are
expected to enter the market (BWEA and
Garrad Hassan, 2009a). GE and Siemens
are also planning to build factories in the
UK, whilst Clipper and Mitsubishi are
developing turbines in Britain (Wind Power
Monthly, 2010). UK production has the
potential to both reduce transport costs
and counteract currency movements
(discussed below).
Whilst increased competition is likely to
place downward pressure on turbine
prices, dramatic reductions over the
period to 2015 are not expected by
industry commentators. Reductions are
certainly not expected to be substantial
5.  Future costs, issues for 
policy and conclusions
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enough to shift cost levels back onto the
learning curve trajectories suggested in
the mid-2000s and earlier. Longer term,
beyond 2015, more significant reductions
in turbine costs may be available
stemming from both new technology (see
below) and from even greater competition
assuming a strongly rooted and maturing
supply chain. However, this must be set
against a context of high and potentially
competing demand for turbines, both from
UK Round 3 itself and other offshore
projects and from the global onshore
market, as we now explain. 
European offshore, US onshore and other
competing markets
Turbine supply to the UK offshore wind
sector must be considered within the
context of onshore turbine demand from
rapidly growing markets such as China,
India, and the US, as well as from Europe
(both on and offshore). The UK cumulative
installed offshore wind capacity is
approximately 1GW which represents less
than 3% of the wind capacity installed
worldwide (on and offshore) during 2009.
The UK offshore wind market has
therefore to date represented a small
niche within the global wind turbine
industry. Whilst there may be long term
benefits for companies (and perhaps
countries) who gain ‘first mover’
advantage in such a niche, in the short run
manufacturers would typically expect a
premium return (hence price) to operate
in such a specialist niche. 
Quantifying the impact of competing
markets – and of any mitigation thereto –
is subject to considerable uncertainty and
is not included as a specific cost driver in
our sensitivity analysis. Nevertheless,
despite the threat to supply availability
and cost containment represented by
competing markets, two factors appear
likely to mitigate this. One is the probable
increase in the number of turbine and
other component suppliers from 2010
onwards. The other factor, already alluded
to, is the sheer size of the market
represented by UK Round 3 and the
‘attractive force’ that Round 3 will become.
Innovation and efficiency
Whilst onshore wind technology is largely
mature, the offshore wind sector offers
significant scope for technology
acceleration. Offshore developments
include size increases, advanced
materials, control, reliability and
installation techniques (Winskel et al.,
2009). Commentators suggest that there
may be potential for acceleration in the
design and manufacture of ‘dedicated’
offshore turbines rather than simply using
marinised versions of onshore turbines.
The IEA points to several technical and
engineering developments in turbines that
might lead to efficiency and cost savings in
the future (IEA, 2009):
• Dedicated offshore turbine 
– Two-bladed turbine rotating
downwind of the tower
– Direct-drive generator (no gearbox)
– Simplified power electronics.
• More research into turbine behaviour
including:
– advanced fluid dynamics models 
– methods to reduce loads or suppress
transmission 
– innovative aerofoil design
– technology to reduce icing and dirt
build-up.
8018_6_Chap5:UKERC  10/09/2010  14:17  Page 72
G
re
a
t 
E
x
p
e
c
ta
ti
o
n
s
: 
T
h
e
 c
o
s
t 
o
f 
o
ff
s
h
o
re
 w
in
d
 i
n
 U
K
 w
a
te
rs
 –
u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
in
g
 t
h
e
 p
a
s
t 
a
n
d
 p
ro
je
c
ti
n
g
 t
h
e
 f
u
tu
re
73
• Turbine rotor size 
– The larger the swept area, the more
power that can be extracted
– Capacity could be as much as 10MW,
with a rotor 150 m in diameter. 
• Advanced rotor materials 
– E.g. carbon fibre and titanium 
– Higher strength to mass ratios to
help cope with increased loading. 
• Lighter generators and other drive train
components 
– To reduce tower head mass. 
• Turbine O&M enhancements 
– system redundancy
– remote, advanced condition
monitoring
– self-diagnostic systems.
In the longer term, offshore-specific
turbines may be able to increase
performance and reliability thereby
reducing the cost of generation. For
example, the goal of one UK manufacturer
of vertical axis offshore wind turbines is to
reduce generating costs by 20-30% (Wind
Stats, 2009b). However, the potential for
dedicated and advanced turbines to
reduce costs significantly in the medium
term remains uncertain and difficult to
quantify. 
Scale effects and standardisation
There are several areas in which cost
reductions may be realised from scale
effects. Increasing the number of turbines
installed in total may realise economies of
scale through series production. In
addition, economies of scale from the wind
turbines themselves may be realised by
increasing the capacity beyond the current
maximum of 5MW. Whilst this would
necessitate increased spacing because of
wake effects, this is unlikely to be a
limiting factor given the size of future
offshore zones (Junginger et al., 2008).
As turbine capacity increases, this should
result in a saving in the amount of other
components or services required, e.g. the
number of foundation structures, turbine
towers, and operating hours for
installation vessels should all reduce
relative to capacity installed. A key factor
here will be the interactions between the
different supply chain capabilities, e.g.
port infrastructure and crane capacity.
Until the supply chain is genuinely offshore
wind-dedicated and capable of meeting
greater logistical demands, the potential
benefits of much larger turbines cannot be
realised.
Further R&D would be required but with
increased production, standardisation and
orders the cost of turbines could be
reduced by 15% (no timescale given)
(ODE Limited, 2007). This could reduce
the capital cost of a typical offshore
project by over 7%.
Conclusions about the scale and
trajectory of cost trends for turbines
A number of different drivers affect the
cost of offshore turbines. Increased
competition is likely to provide downward
cost pressure, as will innovation,
efficiency, scale effects and
standardisation. There is however a
potential upward pressure from competing
markets. Taken together, we believe the
maximum turbine cost reduction that may
be achievable is approximately 40%.
However, should these factors fail to come
to fruition, should supply chain
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bottlenecks escalate or the attraction of
onshore markets ‘outcompete’ offshore, a
risk of cost escalation remains. 
5.2.2  Foundations
One of the most significant challenges
facing offshore wind engineers is the
effective and cost-efficient fixing of the
turbine tower to the seabed. To date, this
has typically been achieved via a monopile
foundation which constitutes
approximately 20% to 25% of total capital
expenditure in offshore wind farm
construction. As with turbines, a range of
factors have the potential to affect future
costs. We consider here two principal
issues; innovation and improvements to
the supply chain.
Innovation and efficiency 
Foundation design represents a major
area for potential innovation and possible
cost reduction (ODE Limited, 2007). With
the move towards greater depth, together
with larger turbines, greater wind loads,
longer blades and taller structures, so the
limits of the monopile design will
increasingly be challenged. 
Foundation alternatives include:
• Jacket.
• Tripod.
• Gravity-based and suction caisson
designs.
• Floating structure (for substantially
deeper water).
With regard to the foundation costs for
deeper sites, ODE Limited (2007) reports
that with more R&D, there may be the
potential for up to 20% savings compared
to current estimates for deep water
foundations (although no timeframe is
given). Assuming that the relatively more
expensive deep water foundations
contribute approximately 25% to overall
capex, this represents a 5% total saving. 
Supply chain developments
With the exception of BiFab Ltd’s
manufacture of the jacket structures for
the Beatrice project, to date there has
been no significant UK content for
foundations. According to industry
experts, most of the monopile foundations
used in UK projects have been sourced
from Holland and have therefore been
subject to sterling-euro currency impacts.
It is possible however that the scale of
Round 3 will stimulate greater foundation
competition, and new companies are
entering the market, many of which are
British (Wind Power Monthly Special
Report 2010), which has benefits related
to currency movements (see below).
However, increased demand may create
supply chain constraints, hence price
rises. In addition, the greater depths likely
to be faced in the future will place
increasing demand on alternatives to the
monopile approach. The manufacturing
capacity for alternatives such as steel
jackets and tripods is still at a relatively
early stage (BWEA and Garrad Hassan,
2009a), and for floating structures even
more so. Furthermore, whilst concrete
foundations can alleviate the commodity
(steel) risk, the BWEA suggests that
substantial investment in UK port facilities
may be needed to facilitate this (BWEA
and Garrad Hassan, 2009a). Overall
therefore, a mixed picture emerges with
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regard to foundation supply, making a
clear ‘cost trend’ impossible to discern.
Conclusions about foundation costs
In the shorter term there is the potential
for upward pressures on foundation costs
of up to 20%. This is because as depths
increase the monopile approach will be
increasingly replaced with alternatives
which are at an earlier stage of
development and have not therefore
benefited from learning and
standardisation. However, longer term, as
experience increases, there is the
potential for foundation cost reductions of
up to 30% through innovation, improved
supply chain and increased competition.
5.2.3  Depth & distance
The development of UK Round 3 involves
depths and distances which are in most
cases considerably greater than current
projects.  It is worth noting for comparison
how much nearer and shallower the Round
1 wind farms are. Excluding the deep
water pilot project at Beatrice (50m
depth), Round 1 projects, either
completed or under construction, lie within
a range of 4 – 21m depth and 2 – 13km
distance from shore. The Round 3
averaged range is 35 – 53m depth and 20
– 160km distance.
The potential effect of depth and distance
on UK Round 3 projects can be illustrated
using the relationships between different
depth/distance combinations and costs
outlined in the Carbon Trust (2008) report
discussed in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4.11
and Figure 4.12). We can calculate the
percentage change in cost for each of the
Carbon Trust’s depth/distance
combinations relative to this notional mid-
depth, mid-distance project costs. For
example, a site categorised by the Carbon
Trust as both deep and far offshore bears
capital costs that are 22% more, and
levelised costs that are 24% more, than a
mid-depth, mid-distant site. By contrast, a
site categorised by the Carbon Trust as
mid-depth and near to shore has capital
costs that are 4% less, but levelised costs
that are 10% more, than a mid-depth,
mid-distance site.
Depth and distance data for Round 3 sites
is available from The Crown Estate
(2010b). This data can be translated into
the depth/distance descriptions used by
the Carbon Trust, to provide a ballpark
estimate of the impact on costs relative to
a notional ‘mid depth, mid distance’ site,
which is more typical of Rounds 1 and 2. 
Table 5.1 illustrates the relationship
between the distance/depth characteristics
of the nine UK Round 3 zones and a
nominal mid-depth/mid-distance site,
assuming all other things are equal.
Table 5.1 is of course a considerable
simplification. Construction of Round 3 is
not due to begin until 2014/15 for the
earliest sites and multiple variables are
likely to affect costs over the next five
years and beyond. Costs are not generic to
distance/depth, since individual site
characteristics (such as sea bed
conditions) will affect construction costs
and load factors will be a function of local
wind conditions. Moreover, the majority of
both the depth and distance figures are
medians between the minima and maxima
applicable to each Round 3 zone. 
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Nevertheless, the percentage cost
adjustment factors show in very general
and crude terms how costs rise with
increasing depth and distance. If the
relationships charted by the Carbon Trust
are broadly correct then for the most part
the better wind speeds that may be
available further from the shore are not,
with current construction costs, sufficient
to compensate for the higher costs
associated with building in deeper, more
distant locations. The analysis above
indicates that the capex implications of
Round 3, relative to a notional mid
depth/distance site lie in a range of -4% to
+24%, with six of the nine sites increasing
by 8% or more. With the exception of one
mid-depth, mid-distance site, levelised
costs increase in a range between 5% and
24%. On balance, the likelihood is that
increasing depth and distance will put
upward pressure on total capital costs,
unless compensated for by other cost-
mitigating factors13. Figure 5.1 illustrates
this, showing the sensitivity of levelised
cost to a zero to 37% increase in depth
and zero to quadrupling increase in
distance.
5.2.4  Availability/load factor
As explained in Chapter 4, relatively poor
availability at some UK wind farm sites has
been the main driver of lower than
Round 3 zone Median Median or ave. Description Approx. cost
or ave. distance in change from
depth in kilometres and mid-depth,
metres nautical miles mid-distance 
Capex LC
Moray Firth 43.5 m 28 km/15 nm Deep/mid-distant +8% +5%
Firth of Forth 50 m 54 km/29 nm Deep/mid-distant + 8% + 5%
Dogger Bank 41 m 160 km/86 nm Deep/far +22% +24%
Hornsea 35 m 112 km/60 nm Mid-depth/medium-far + 8% +10%
East Anglia 37.5 m 56 km/30 nm Mid-depth/mid-distant + 0% + 0%
Hastings 40 m 20 km/11 nm Mid-depth/near - 4% +10%
West Isle Wight 42 m 21 km/11 nm Deep/near + 3% +10%
Bristol Channel 40 m 24 km/13 nm Deep/mid-distant + 8% + 5%
Irish Sea 53 m 30 km/16 nm Deep/mid-distant + 8% + 5%
Table 5.1 Depth and distance characteristics of UK Round 3 zones
13 One industry expert has observed that with increasing distance from shore, the sea becomes significantly less busy thus
enabling larger projects which in turn should help economic viability.
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expected load factors for some Round 1
sites, with a substantive impact on
revenues and levelised costs. Moreover,
wind farm availability falls with distance
from shore (reflecting the challenges of
repairing faulty equipment further
offshore) and over the lifetime of a wind
farm (reflecting ageing equipment)
(Carbon Trust, 2008). 
The likely implications of these factors for
Round 3 development in the medium term
and for further development beyond 2020
will depend upon success in improving
reliability relative to the cost of doing so.
Experience to date indicates that the
higher wind speeds and greater distances
compared to Rounds 1 and 2 might not
augur well for availability and therefore for
load factors and levelised costs. On the
other hand, better equipment reliability,
an already more proactive O&M
philosophy, and more sophisticated
(probably remote) condition monitoring
should increase availability and lengthen
maintenance cycles to avoid winter
months (Carbon Trust, 2008); (E&Y,
2009). Such improvements will come at a
cost but should also increase annual
energy yield (Feng et al., 2010).
The impact of availability on load factor14
is dramatic. As described in Chapter 4,
failure to achieve expected reliability
levels correlated very closely with load
factors of around 30%, when 35% was
expected. If moving further offshore
increases wind speeds, the impact of low
availability increases15. It is reasonable to
assume that the fundamental importance
of availability, together with a variety of
learning effects (in turbines and in O&M)
makes it more likely that availability will
improve than decline. This will of course
be traded against the increased costs of
maintaining and repairing more distant
sites, though load factors ought to
outweigh O&M costs, as we explain below.
At the same time, the nearer sites of
Rounds 1 and 2 should benefit
considerably with consequent
improvement in cost of generation. The
combined effect of improved wind speeds
and better availability suggests that the
load factors may improve by up to seven
percentage points from a baseline of 38%.
However, we also explore the effect of
lowering the load factor by up to three
percentage points to acknowledge the
possibility of poorer availability in
potentially less accessible sites. As we
illustrate in Figure 5.1, even these
relatively small changes in load factor
have a large impact on levelised costs.
Reliability (O&M) 
According to industry experts, O&M costs
in UK waters are currently averaging
approximately £50,000/MW per annum
(and the 2009 Ernst & Young report uses
an O&M figure of £54,000/MW per annum
in their levelised costs calculations).
However, note that the O&M of a specific
wind farm will be highly dependent on
14 In this example and elsewhere UKERC uses a simple load factor function as an approximation for turbine outputs We recognise
that this is a considerable simplification, and that maximising load factor may not, in isolation, deliver the maximum return on
investment because of the non-linear relationship between turbine size, cost and actual output at a given site.
15 Consider for example a site with wind conditions sufficient to deliver a 40% load factor in a fictional 100% available turbine.
If availability levels seen onshore are achieved (around 98%), such a site would achieve over 39% load factor. However if
availability falls to 80%, as in some Round 1 sites, load factor falls to 32%. This is of course a simplification because it takes no
account of the actual wind speeds during the periods of unavailability. 
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location. As discussed in Chapter 4, O&M
costs have risen steadily over recent years
as a result of:
• Improved budgeting reflecting track
record and experience gained from
operating early projects, where costs
had perhaps been underestimated.
• Evolution of more proactive O&M
strategies to extend asset and project
life.
• Increases in labour, steel, and other
commodity prices, as well as currency
impacts (E&Y, 2009).
Several of these issues are dealt with in
other sections. As developers seek to
optimize the reliability and life of their
assets, and as the distance, depth, and
marine/weather conditions become more
challenging, so this will add to absolute
costs. On the other hand, greater
reliability and extended asset life
(together with possible higher load factors
from more distant site location) should
improve levelised energy costs. This may
be further enhanced by (i) improved
weather forecasting to identify suitable
‘windows of opportunity’ for O&M activity,
and (ii) less need for O&M as turbine
technology becomes increasingly offshore-
dedicated rather than ‘onshore marinised’.
The relationship between improving O&M
and optimising availability is important.
Whilst a range of learning effects are likely
to improve effectiveness and increase
costs, absolute increases in O&M costs
appear likely, given both more challenging
conditions and the importance of improved
availability. It is therefore important to
note that the absolute impacts of
increasing O&M spend are not
overwhelming, indeed they are relatively
minor in comparison to many of the other
key drivers reviewed in this chapter. For
example, as shown in Figure 5.1 a 25%
increase or decrease in O&M spend will
respectively increase or decrease levelised
costs by less than 3%.
5.2.5  Vessels and port facilities
Vessels
Foundation, turbine, and cable installation
together comprise approximately 15 –
20% of overall capex. The same tension
between, on the one hand, potentially
increased supplier competition resulting
from greater supply chain confidence and
on the other hand, competition amongst
developers in a supply squeeze also exists
in the installation vessel market. 
A 2009 offshore wind report forecasts that
the recent crunch in vessel supply is
actually likely to get worse out towards
2015 unless additional capacity comes
through (BWEA and Garrad Hassan,
2009a). Indeed, the supply-demand
imbalance will continue to be exacerbated
by project-specific requirements (e.g.
water depth, turbine technology and
foundation design) which have the impact
of narrowing the vessel supply field,
reducing competition and potentially
placing some further upward pressure on
pricing. 
Nevertheless the BWEA/Garrad Hassan
(2009a) report indicates that there are
many bespoke vessels targeting the
offshore wind sector on the drawing board
and nine additional main installation
vessels are under construction or on order.
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Whilst new vessel build times can be up to
36 months and there is significant
potential for cancellation or at least delay,
this current trend indicates that
confidence within the vessel element of
the supply chain has risen. 
The report considers the most significant
'competing national market' – at least until
2015 - to be offshore wind development in
Germany. However, the majority of
German activity will be in areas of the
North Sea where the environment is by
and large more challenging than projects
constructed to date elsewhere in northern
Europe and more onerous even than
Round 1 and 2 UK projects. The BWEA and
Garrad Hassan report suggests that this
fact to some extent mitigates the degree
of supply chain overlap between the UK
and Germany. Whilst this may be true in
the shorter term, 2015 will see the start of
the more challenging projects of UK Round
3. In addition, the Netherlands is also an
offshore wind market likely to compete
with the UK for finite supply chain
resources. Here, the physical
characteristics of the planned projects are
more similar to those in the UK, at least
until 2015 (BWEA and Garrad Hassan,
2009a). 
Overall, the potential for either significant
cost reduction or escalation in this area in
the period to 2015 appears low. Longer
term, increasing confidence in the stability
of the offshore market especially from
Round 3 would be expected to lead to
increasing supply and some modest easing
of cost pressure. The impact of vessel
availability on cost is particularly difficult
to quantify and we do not include
installation as a key factor in the
sensitivity analysis shown in Figure 5.1.
One uncertainty is the prospect of
expansion in the oil and gas industry
diverting resources away from offshore
wind.
Ports and docks
UK supporting infrastructure will be a
major issue for Round 3 developers given
the huge size of the undertaking, and both
port availability and quality are already
existing areas of concern (BVG Associates,
2007); (Douglas-Westwood, 2008). Many
northern European ports are accessible for
UK installations with Denmark, Germany
and the Netherlands all offering a choice of
deep water harbours. However, whilst
sufficient capacity is currently available in
continental ports, increasing future
demand from Round 3 combined with a
possible further decline in the Sterling-
Euro rate has the potential to increase
non-UK port facility costs. 
However, from a project developer’s point
of view direct port costs are a minor
constituent of overall capex, and therefore
this is less a cost issue and more one of
facilitation/operation. For this reason we
do not include installation as a key factor
in the sensitivity analysis shown in Figure
5.1. The Carbon Trust argued that levels of
port capacity in the UK were too low to
adequately support the growth of the
supply chain, particularly in areas likely to
be development hubs such as the east
coast of England and the North West.
Many existing ports offered insufficient
access for large vessels, quaysides that
could not support the weight of large
turbine components, a lack of space for
new manufacturing, operations and lay-
down facilities, or some combination of all
these issues (Carbon Trust, 2008). 
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Mitigating this requires investment in UK
facilities with sustained commitment, and
perhaps further public spending, likely to
be needed to support an emerging UK
supply chain (one example cited by an
industry expert being Able UK Ltd’s plans
for an integrated facility on the Humber).
Notwithstanding the £60m of government
investment in one or more UK ports
announced in the March 2010 budget
(Wind Power Monthly, 2010), considerable
additional investment is likely to be
needed. Whilst in opposition the Liberal
Democrats suggested investment of
£400m or more was needed (Windpower
Monthly June 2010) but at the time of
writing it is not clear if this will be a
feature of the Coalition Government
energy plans.  Industry experts agree that
investment in docks and ports is likely to
be absolutely critical to the success of
Britain’s offshore wind industry, to
attracting inward investment from
equipment makers and fostering a
domestic component and installation
industry. The impact on costs is not
possible to estimate, but the importance
of this factor in creating a UK offshore
industry should not be understated.
5.2.6  Macro economic conditions
Many of the factors discussed above are in
some way ‘intrinsic’ to offshore wind farm
development, companies and other actors,
and policy. This section considers some of
what Chapter 4 refers to as ‘external’
drivers. 
Global macro-economic environment
The wider macro-economy may be very
important to the future of offshore wind.
For example, analysis of future costs by
the BWEA and Garrad Hassan suggests
offshore wind capital cost may be
inversely proportional to global economic
recovery and/or the growth of onshore
wind (BWEA and Garrad Hassan, 2009a).
The rationale for this is not explained in
detail. However, the implication is that a
prolonged recession results in depressed
commodity prices, lower costs of capital
and, perhaps, aggressive competition
amongst component and services
suppliers for the business offered by
offshore wind development. Similar
considerations apply to a slowdown in
onshore growth. Of course, this is rather
speculative and counter arguments are
not hard to formulate – if growth is slow
governments may curtail support for
offshore wind in a bid to protect
consumers for example, supply chains
may contract as companies fail, and low
growth may not be associated with cheap
credit indefinitely. 
It is outside the remit of this report to
speculate on the likely trajectory of the
global economy (or regional economies)
over the next decade. In any case our
view is that it is not wholly clear what
affect a trajectory either way would
actually have on the prospects for offshore
wind costs. We therefore set macro-
economic considerations (important
though they are) to one side in our
examination of likely future costs and do
not include in our sensitivity analysis.
Finance availability and cost
Separate from, though related to, the
macro-economic outlook is the issue of
finance, in particular the availability or not
in the UK of balance sheet funding for
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offshore wind projects, the likely impact of
credit markets either easing or not and the
risk-reward perception of potential
financiers.
Large-scale non-recourse project finance
for independent wind developers (whether
onshore or off, in the UK or mainland
Europe) has been difficult – if not
impossible – to obtain (BWEA and Garrad
Hassan, 2009a). In fact, of the nine Round
3 projects, all are part-owned by utility
companies or an industrial conglomerate
rather than being wholly independent.
Nevertheless, the financial scale of Round
3 means that developers are very unlikely
to be willing or able to fund the projects on
balance sheet hence actual availability of
capital could become a concern16. Indeed,
if the credit market mechanism were to
freeze up again, financing would likely
become an impossibility. 
In any case, because of the credit crisis,
the cost of capital has gone up. As
previously discussed the cost to utilities of
issuing corporate bonds rose sharply after
the global credit crisis first emerged in
summer 2007 though it began to fall again
during 2009. 
Clearly there is an interest rate level at
which utilities would no longer be willing to
incur debt in order to raise funds for
projects such as offshore wind farms.
However, the precise magnitude of this will
depend on a number of uncertain variables
such as project hurdle rates and the future
price of electricity. 
With regard to non-recourse project
finance, the BWEA/Garrad Hassan report
suggests that should there be a continuing
thawing of credit markets then the return
of easier non-recourse debt funding is
likely to put upward pressure on capex.
This is because such a financing stimulus
will encourage greater activity in the
independently developed European wind
power sector as well as further afield in,
for example, the US and China. The effect
will be to exert additional demand
pressure on an already overstretched
supply chain (BWEA and Garrad Hassan,
2009a). 
Finally, access to capital and on what
terms depends particularly on the
situation and perception of potential
project financiers. These will consider their
own ability to raise finance, at what cost,
their perception of project risk and internal
hurdle rates, and their consequent
willingness to invest. All these factors may
change over time and are subject to
considerable uncertainty.
As with the overall macro-economic
environment, the view of this report is that
any long-term forecasts of bond spreads
and corporate debt finance costs, of credit
market prospects and project risk
perceptions are necessarily speculative.
Hence the likely availability and cost of
financing is a consideration that is set
aside and we do not include financing
costs in our sensitivity analysis.
Currency impacts
Overall, approximately 80% by capital
value of a typical UK offshore wind project
may be imported and has therefore been
16 According to one industry commentator, Round 3 could take two decades to complete if developers were to finance
construction on balance sheet.
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paid for in steadily devalued sterling. As
noted in Chapter 4, sterling has gradually
depreciated against the European
currency, falling from a high of over £1 -
€1.75 in 2000 to near parity in December
2008. This has had a considerable impact
on offshore wind costs. For example, a
developer devising and budgeting a
component sourcing strategy in 2007 for
delivery/ installation in 2009 would have
seen the euro strengthen from under
£0.70 to a spike of over £0.95 two years
later – making any component costs
denominated in euros more than 35%
more expensive at that time. On the basis
of the turbine component constituting
47% of project total, a project budgeted in
2007, for example, at £2.0m/MW and
realized in 2009 could have faced an
increase of £350,000/MW from the turbine
element alone. 
DECC has made a forecast of the euro-
sterling rate out to 2015 (E&Y, 2009),
estimating that sterling is likely to
strengthen somewhat to approximately £1
= €1.25 by 2012 and remain at about that
level for at least the following three years.
At the time of writing the euro has already
declined in value to close to this level at
nearly £1 = €1.20. Whilst it is certainly
possible that sterling may appreciate even
more, DECC’s medium term forecast
envisages a pound that is still weaker than
it was in the early to mid-2000s with a
consequent impact on the cost of
components and services imported into
the UK relative to UK-based activity.
It is outside the scope of this study to take
a view on the likely direction and
magnitude of future euro-sterling
exchange rates, however it is clear that,
either way, currency risk creates a great
deal of price uncertainty whilst as much as
80% of the total value of an offshore wind
farm is imported from elsewhere in Europe
(whilst currency hedging may be
employed, this obviously incurs a cost).
The UK government is in a position to
improve the situation by encouraging and
stimulating the growth of UK-based
manufacturing and services suppliers such
that more of the total value of offshore
wind production is located – and priced -
domestically. Budgeting and financing
uncertainties will be reduced and, in
addition, local economies and employment
prospects will benefit.
Currency movement is thus a key cost
driver and we have explored the effect on
levelised costs of sterling appreciating by
up to 20% and also depreciating by up to
20% against the euro (see Figure 5.1).
5.2.7  Commodity, materials and
labour costs
Oil
The contribution of oil (in, for example,
manufacturing processes and vessel fuel)
is a relatively minor part of offshore wind
capex. However, the price of oil is
important because of its indirect impact
i.e. its potential for diverting marine
resources away from offshore wind
development towards the oil and gas
industry, thus making these resources less
available and more expensive (BWEA and
Garrad Hassan, 2009a).
Again, this is an area of substantial
uncertainty, first because the oil price over
the medium to long term is a matter of
speculation, and second because
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quantifying the potential impact of the
fluctuating fortunes of the oil and gas
industry on offshore wind costs is highly
problematic – not least because of the
time lags involved between a price signal
and the oil and gas sector’s response to it
in terms of changed activity levels. 
For example, the price of crude spiked
dramatically over an eighteen month
period from early 2007 to mid-2008. At
the same time, the capital and generation
costs of offshore wind projects were also
rising sharply. However, it is difficult to
disaggregate the various drivers in terms
of their relative contribution to cost and to
identify the part played (if at all) by a
rising oil price. Indeed, it is possible that it
had little or no effect at all on the offshore
wind sector for when the oil price
collapsed in the second half of 2008,
offshore wind costs continued to rise. This
could, of course, mean that the
plummeting price of crude did indeed
beneficially impact offshore wind but the
effect was masked by other more potent
cost drivers. Alternatively, it is possible
that the oil price had little or no effect on
the way up and consequently, little or no
effect on the way down. 
Either way, the so-called secondary impact
of the oil price appears to be relatively
minor and is in any case difficult to
disaggregate and quantify. For these
reasons, it is not factored into our medium
to long-term projections of offshore wind
costs nor included in our sensitivity
analysis. 
Steel and other commodities
In terms of overall project cost the value-
content of steel in a typical offshore wind
project is no more than approximately
12% and therefore care should be taken
not to overstate its relative importance as
a cost driver. Indeed, it is one of the least
significant of the cost drivers in our
sensitivity analysis in Figure 5.1.
This point is even more applicable to the
price of copper which is not included in our
sensitivity analysis. Copper is used in
significant quantities in the electrical
infrastructure. However, whilst electrical
infrastructure typically contributes 10 to
20% of overall capex, the raw material
value-content of components such as
cabling and transformers is small with
most of such costs incurred during the
manufacturing process (BWEA and Garrad
Hassan, 2009a). 
In 2008 and 2009 the steel price index fell
sharply, returning to its long-term trend.
The commodity price index as a whole has
also been trending downwards, albeit less
precipitously. Ultimately, the medium and
long-term price of steel and other
commodities will largely depend on future
macro-economic conditions which, as
discussed above, are subject to a high
degree of uncertainty and outside the
scope of this report. Given the price
volatility of steel and its contribution to
overall costs we have explored the effect
on levelised costs of steel prices rising by
up to 50% and falling by up to 50% (see
Figure 5.1).
Skills and labour
UK national labour costs have shown a
steady growth of 3.15% per annum over
the 20 years to 2007. Ernst & Young
(2009) projected the annual growth figure
to be the same for 2008, dropping to just
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under 2% for 2009, presumably as the
effects of recession feed through to labour
market statistics. 
The future cost of labour is closely tied to
global macro-economic developments and
the UK’s specific fortunes within that – a
matter of speculation that is outside the
scope of this report. However, given the
consistency of the historical trend line,
there appears to be little risk of labour
costs deviating significantly to the upside.
Indeed, the likelihood of continued
recession – or at least an absence of
significant growth - over the medium term
makes it more likely that UK labour costs
overall could deviate below the trend line.
One caveat, however, is that the offshore
wind sector is still a young one and not
properly represented by the labour market
as a whole. As noted in Chapter 4, there
are already concerns in the industry
regarding a shortage of skills, caused in
part by competition for installation and
service crews from the oil and gas
industries and other offshore activities
worldwide. Thus, in the medium term,
specific skills shortages in specialised
areas could put upward pressure on parts
of a developer’s payroll. Over the longer
term, however, as the industry gains
maturity and scale, this skills squeeze
should recede. Overall therefore, the
impact of skills and labour costs on total
capex is likely to be broadly neutral and
we do not include them as a key factor in
the sensitivity analysis shown in Figure
5.1.
5.2.8  Other factors – confidence,
planning and information flows
Growing confidence in the supply chain
Whilst not a direct cost driver, and
therefore not included in the sensitivity
analysis, industry experts also emphasise
the importance of building commercial
confidence in the supply chain overall as
well as addressing the individual
components of it. The scale of UK Round 3
will require a dramatic increase in
manufacturing capacity for offshore wind,
and building confidence is key to
persuading companies to invest in
increased supply chain capacity dedicated
to offshore wind. A major benefit of this
would be a reduced reliance on other
sectors such as onshore wind and oil and
gas (BWEA, 2009). In a sense, this is a
‘chicken and egg’ issue: on the one hand,
Round 3 success requires greater supply
chain confidence; on the other hand, the
promise of Round 3 engenders greater
confidence. 
However, it is likely that the combination
of (i) the government’s commitment to the
UK’s share of the EU 2020 renewables
target, plus (ii) an improved and swifter
planning/consent process (see later) plus
(iii) the on-going development of Round 2
and, especially, (iv) the prospect of game-
changing scale represented by Round 3 is
already, and will continue to, increase
confidence in all aspects of the industry.
This will have the effect of stimulating
supplies of goods and services,
increasingly dedicated to the offshore wind
sector and therefore lessening the sector’s
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reliance on inputs from related sectors
such as onshore wind, oil and gas, and
coastal engineering. Thus, in the medium
to longer term, the cost benefits of
increasing supply chain confidence
engendered by the prospect of greater
demand will help to constrain and balance
the potential cost escalations arising from
that demand.
Planning/consenting
Around 9-12% of offshore wind capital
costs relate to project management
including a significant portion (more than
half) pertaining to planning and consent,
and this has an important, though indirect,
impact on supply chain confidence. At a
recent UK offshore wind conference, one
industry actor described planning as being
‘in a state of flux…the bugbear of the UK
offshore wind industry….not easier than
onshore’ (Garrity, 2010). The same
commentator went on to say that it ‘may
be possible to reduce capex if the planning
regime gives [the industry] more certainty
resulting in a confirmed pipeline of
projects that would lead to greater
standardisation and therefore reduced
costs’. 
The 2008 Planning Act should significantly
improve this situation via the
Infrastructure Planning Commission. The
IPC provides a single approvals process for
all offshore wind farms greater than
100MW based upon national policy
statements (NPS), defining national needs
and priorities (which include development
of offshore wind). In principle, this should
dramatically reduce the timeline for
approval from as long as ten years today
to less than three years in the future
(Carbon Trust, 2008). At the time of
writing (summer 2010) the Coalition
Government intends to replace the IPC
with a system that directs requests to the
Secretary of State. It retains an ambition
to streamline planning, however, and
minimise delay. Whilst the likely impact of
the faster planning is difficult to quantify in
monetary terms, the effect should be to
boost supply chain confidence and
encourage new suppliers into a more
vigorous and faster-acting market. This is
an additional factor which in the medium
to long-term is likely at the very least to
help prevent costs from escalating
significantly beyond their current 2010
level. Because of the range of impacts on
project finance (for example interest
during construction, revenue foregone,
etc) we do not include
planning/consenting as a specific cost
driver in our sensitivity analysis.
Information sharing
As far back as 2006, at least one
commentator was suggesting that greater
interaction and communication was
needed throughout the supply chain and
that by actively working with a contractor,
a project developer’s final costs could be
reduced (Westwood, 2006). In a similar
vein, Smit et al. (2007) observed that
there was a lack of knowledge-sharing in
the UK and that institutes such as
university research departments did not
get access to potentially fruitful project
information because offshore wind
developers were ‘afraid of knowledge
leaking away’. And at a January 2010
offshore wind conference, the head of
offshore wind at Senergy Alternative
Energy advocated greater use of learning
including more learning from other
8018_6_Chap5:UKERC  10/09/2010  14:17  Page 85
G
re
a
t 
E
x
p
e
c
ta
ti
o
n
s
: 
T
h
e
 c
o
s
t 
o
f 
o
ff
s
h
o
re
 w
in
d
 i
n
 U
K
 w
a
te
rs
 –
u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
in
g
 t
h
e
 p
a
s
t 
a
n
d
 p
ro
je
c
ti
n
g
 t
h
e
 f
u
tu
re
86
offshore industries, more from Rounds 1
and 2, and more sharing of information
and experience amongst developers and
within the supply chain (Garrity, 2010).
The idea here is that knowledge and
experience should be viewed as common
resources which can benefit the industry
as a whole rather than be seen as
competitive tools.
The IEA has similarly argued that
reliability and other operational
improvements would be accelerated
through a greater sharing of operating
experience among industry actors. The
IEA points out that, unlike the early stages
of the offshore oil and gas industry, there
is little evidence of information sharing in
the offshore wind industry (IEA, 2009). A
database of operating experiences is
currently under development at the
German Institute for Wind Energy
Research and System Integration (IWES),
which could represent a potential nucleus
for wider, international research
cooperation.
Our view is that whilst information sharing
may be a sensible and cost-reducing
approach, it is difficult to quantify and to
make meaningful future projections about
and we do not include it as a specific driver
in our sensitivity analysis.
5.3  Cost sensitivities
The analysis in Section 5.2 indicates that
there is the potential for developments
related to turbines, foundations,
O&M/availability and various supply chain
factors such as vessel availability and
docks/ports to reduce costs. Of these
turbines, foundations and availability are
most important and most amenable to
quantification. Moving to deeper, more
distant locations is generally likely to place
upward pressure on costs, since it appears
that improved wind conditions are unlikely
to be sufficient to offset higher cabling,
installation, foundation and maintenance
costs. Macro-economic factors are also
important, particularly currency
movements. Finally, steel, oil and other
input prices can affect costs, though it is
important that their impact is not
exaggerated. In the sub-sections that
follow we quantify the impact on total
costs of the ranges described above for
turbines, depth and distance, currency
movements, O&M availability/load factor,
foundation costs and steel prices.
UKERC has developed a simple model17 of
the relative share of various cost
components in the levelised costs of
offshore wind farms. The baseline data
were drawn from Ernst & Young (2009),
and reflect the approximate capital cost
breakdown for projects at or near financial
close in January 2009:
• Turbine - 47% share at £1.5m/MW
• Foundations - 22% share at £0.7m/MW
• Electrical infrastructure - 19% share at
£0.6m/MW
• Planning and development costs - 12%
share at £0.4m/MW.
The actual cost breakdown for individual
offshore developments will of course vary
17 We are grateful to our colleague Dr. Tim Cockerill of Imperial College who created the initial spreadsheet and assisted with
its calibration.
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– both as a result of the time of
development (as prices change) and
location (reflecting depth, distance and
other factors). See Box 5.1 for a summary
of cost component breakdowns from a
range of sources.
Other key assumptions for the baseline
calculation were:
• Project life of 20 years
• Load factor of 38%
• Discount rate of 10%.
The model output is a levelised cost in
£/MWh, and by adjusting the values for
the cost drivers within plausible ranges,
the overall impact of each driver can be
demonstrated. 
The ranges in cost drivers variables over the
next 10-15 years are based on the review of
the evidence and analysis of the direction
and scale of each driver. The following cost
sensitivity ranges were explored:
Turbine prices (-40%, +10%)
Foundations costs (-30%, +20%)
Depth and distance (0%, +22%)18
Load factor (-3%, +7%)19
O&M costs (-25%, +25%)
Currency movements (-20%, +20%)
Steel costs (-50%, +50%)
The results are shown in Figure 5.1 below,
and demonstrate the critical importance of
maximising turbine availability (and
therefore load factor), reducing turbine
costs, the consequences of going further
offshore and in deeper water, and the
opportunity that locating more of the
supply chain within the UK presents. 
There are of course many ways of
categorising costs, and in practice there is
a considerable degree of overlap and
interdependency between any such
categories and the cost drivers
18 The percentages represent the absolute change in capital costs of going to a deep, far site. 
19 The percentages represent absolute changes the in the load factor e.g. changing from the baseline of 38% to a high figure
of 45%.
Figure 5.1 Levelised cost sensitivities
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represented in Figure 5.1. For example,
different operation and maintenance
regimes which are designed to increase
reliability and load factor may impose
additional costs (albeit with the
expectation that such costs will be
outweighed by load factor improvements
or extension of plant operating life, which
in turn would result in a lower levelised
cost overall). The categories used in
Figure 5.1 are not additive, partly for the
reason described above but also because
the plausible range of variation for a
particular category takes into account the
possible impact of variation in other
relevant categories (for example, currency
movements bear upon the cost of turbines
for delivery to UK projects).
In section 5.5 we build upon the analysis
above to develop and explain UKERC’s
view of the likely range of cost outcomes
for offshore wind, looking ahead to the
mid 2020s. 
% of total cost according to each data source
Cost element A B C D
Turbine/tower 33 47 45 49
Turbine installation 2 5 included
Foundation 19 22 17.5 21
Foundation installation 6 7.5 included
Installation presumed included
Electrical supply 9 21
Electrical installation 6 included
Cabling 10 19
Cabling installation 9
Substation 4
Table 5.2 Cost breakdown of offshore wind project cost elements
Table 5.2 below provides a review of cost breakdown data from the literature within the
last two to three years. For each of the data sources the table presents the cost
component/ element and its percentage of total cost. It is interesting to note the
percentage variation for a particular component – for example, across the four sources
the turbine plus turbine installation cost lies in a range between 35% and at least 50%.
The different data sources do not necessarily categorise the cost components in the
same way (some separate towers from nacelles whilst others don’t, for example) and
the table therefore reflects this fact.
Box 5.1 Cost component breakdown from four data sources
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5.4  Cost drivers and
sensitivities: summary of key
findings
Chapter 5 has considered the possible
trajectory of future costs out to the 2020s,
examining each of the drivers or factors
that impact on the cost components of
offshore wind power. With around 1GW
installed in the UK, and around 1.5GW
installed elsewhere, offshore wind remains
at a very early stage of development,
equivalent in capacity terms to just one
conventional power station. In energy
output terms, the UK has so far built the
equivalent of a single conventional power
station of around 350MW. So called ‘first of
a kind’ costs still apply in large part to
offshore wind. Supply chains remain under
developed, offshore turbines represent a
tiny fraction of the global wind market,
dedicated facilities and services are only
beginning to emerge, considerable scope
for innovation, learning and scale remains.
As a result very few of the key factors that
will affect future costs can be assessed
with much certainty. This section provides
a brief summary of the main findings on
costs, before assessing the sensitivity of
total costs to the main drivers, as
presented in Figure 5.1.
Turbines represent the largest single cost
item in an offshore wind farm, up to half of
overall capital expenditure. Turbine prices
have gone up in part because of increasing
commodity prices, particularly steel.
However the total impact of materials,
commodity and labour cost increases
explains only around half the rise in turbine
costs. The remainder may be explained in
part by ‘learning’ – many early sites
suffered from poor availability and turbine
failures, and making turbines more robust
has implications for costs. However many
Project management 5 5 6
Consents 7
Testing & commissioning 2
Finance presumed presumed presumed presumed
included included included included
Other 3 12 5 3
O&M additional 23% additional additional but additional
of total over £80,000/ not stated £13/MWh/
lifetime MW/year year
Total 100 100 100 100
continued
Source: A = (ODE Limited, 2007)
B = (E&Y, 2009)
C = (BWEA and Garrad Hassan, 2009a)
D = (EWEA, 2009a)
Notes: ‘additional’ = additional to capex
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analysts and industry experts believe that
low levels of competition in turbine making
has had an important impact. Moreover,
offshore wind is a small element of wider
turbine manufacture. Whilst in the long
term the UK offshore wind industry may
reap the benefits of ‘first movers’, in the
short run it is to be expected that serving
such a ‘niche’ will require a premium.
Technology experts also expect a range of
upscaling and other innovations to emerge
in the coming decade. 
Looking ahead, new market entrants,
scale effects, design improvements,
innovation and lower commodity prices
bode well for the future price of turbines.
Given the uncertainties, a downside risk
remains and if a range of problems are not
addressed the price of turbines could even
rise. It does not appear likely that turbine
prices will fall rapidly; indeed they are
likely to remain at or around their current
level until around 2015 or so. However,
provided a range of drivers move in the
right direction together and assuming no
further adverse currency effects (ideally
because production moves to the UK) cost
reductions could be significant in the
period to 2025. We suggest that turbine
cost reductions of up to perhaps 40%
could be achieved. The implication for
levelised cost is a reduction of up to
around 15% relative to 2010 levels.
Foundations are subject to a similar set of
drivers to turbines. With the exception of
the Beatrice development, to date there
has been no UK manufacture of
foundations. Most of the monopile
foundations used in UK projects have been
subject to sterling-euro currency
fluctuations. Steel prices have also had a
significant impact, and moving to deeper
waters creates a significant challenge that
is likely to increase costs in the short run.
Whilst we did not find evidence of
insufficient competition in foundation
supply, several commentators highlight
supply chain constraints. There is
considerable potential for innovation,
which many believe to offer substantial
potential for cost reduction. Overall, we
believe that there is a considerable spread
of possible outcomes for foundations, the
range is from a 20% cost increase to a
30% reduction. The impact on levelised
costs is moderated by the fact that
foundations account for a relatively small
share of total costs, and lies in a range of
less than 5% either way.  
Depth and distance are of particular
relevance to future UK offshore wind
development given the more challenging
ambitions of UK Round 3. We provide crude
estimates of the cost levels for the nine
Round 3 zones relative to the capital and
levelised costs of a typical mid-depth/mid-
distance site more typical of Round 2.
Levelised costs increase in all cases but one
by between 5% and 24%. Whilst innovation
and learning in installation, foundations,
maintenance and a range of other factors
ought to mitigate the impacts of going to
more inherently costly locations, on the
whole we believe that depth and distance
are likely to place upward pressure on
costs. It appears unlikely that better wind
speeds will be sufficient to compensate for
additional costs associated with going
further offshore. Assuming no mitigating
factors, a range of up to around 15 to 20%
increase in levelised cost of energy appears
possible. 
Load factor is another key intrinsic factor.
This has been given particular attention by
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developers and manufacturers, and
improved turbine reliability and better
O&M should improve turbine availability. A
downside risk remains, since it is possible
that the greater distances associated with
some Round 3 sites will negatively affect
availability, due to greater access
restrictions. If Round 3 sites are only able
to achieve availability and load factors that
are at the lowest end of the plausible
range then levelised costs may rise by
around 9%. If availability problems are
resolved then better wind conditions and
optimisation of turbines has the potential
to reduce levelised costs. If UK Round 3
developments are able to secure load
factors similar to those achieved in several
Danish developments, other factors being
equal, levelised costs could be reduced by
up to around 15%. 
O&M costs. The relationship between
improving O&M and optimising availability
is important. Whilst a range of learning
effects are likely to improve effectiveness
and decrease relative costs, absolute
increases in O&M costs appear likely, given
both more challenging conditions and the
importance of improved availability. The
overall implications of O&M should not be
exaggerated. A 25% increase or decrease
in O&M spend will respectively increase or
decrease levelised costs by less than 3%.
Currency movements are obviously
outside the control of project developers
(currency hedging aside) or policymakers
focused upon offshore wind. Whilst we do
not speculate on the future of sterling, it is
important to note how large an impact
currency movement has had on offshore
wind prices. Appreciation/depreciation of
20% has the potential to
increase/decrease costs by around 12% in
either direction, assuming that around
80% by value of an offshore wind farm is
imported. Increasing the UK built, sterling
denominated, proportion of offshore wind
farm costs therefore has considerable
merits in terms of reducing uncertainty as
well as bringing wider economic benefits
to UK regions. It will also maintain
downward pressure on costs if the pound
remains relatively cheap by historic
norms, in line with recent UK government
expectations. 
Commodity price movements had a big
impact on the price of some of the key
components of offshore wind farms,
notably turbines and foundations.
However, the impact of any single material
input on the overall costs of offshore wind
should not be overstated. Steel for
example accounts for only around 12% of
the capital cost of an offshore wind farm.
We do not speculate on commodity prices
out to 2025, though it is important to note
that the prices of steel and copper have
returned to their historic mean and there
are few reasons to expect dramatic
increases in the short term. We illustrate
the impact of steel over the longer run by
testing sensitivity to a 50%
increase/decrease in costs. Fluctuations of
this magnitude only change levelised costs
by around 5% in either direction. 
For the most part the cost impact of the
other factors discussed in Chapter 5 is
more difficult to assess, but this does not
detract from their importance to the
growth of offshore wind and cost
reduction. The following factors are
particularly notable:
Docks and ports are already inadequate to
the task and considerable investment is
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needed. Better facilities exist in mainland
Europe, in part because of public
investment in docks. Sustained
commitment, and perhaps further public
spending, is likely to be needed to support
an emerging UK supply chain.  
Vessels and the wider installation supply
chain are also tightly constrained at
present and the wind industry must often
compete with offshore oil and gas. Longer
term, increasing confidence in the stability
of the offshore market especially from
Round 3 would be expected to lead to
increasing supply. Investment in vessels
and associated capabilities is expanding.
Economies of scale cut across and apply to
several of the above factors including
turbines, foundations, docks and ports,
and vessels. In the medium to longer
term, downward pressure on costs
resulting from economies of scale would
appear highly likely – provided a range of
interacting factors can be addresses
(larger turbines can only be effectively
deployed given appropriate dock, vessel
and other infrastructure).
Planning delays have had a substantive
impact on Rounds 1 and 2. We have not
attempted to quantify this, but in terms of
both absolute costs and revenue foregone
it has a substantial and material impact on
project finance and economics. It also
places further strain on the supply chain,
since lengthy delays undermine
confidence. The IPC promised to improve
matters according to industry observers,
and it is essential that the coalition
government’s revised arrangements do
not compromise these improvements.
5.5  Conclusions about
future costs
Recent analyses do not envisage a
meaningful reduction in costs between
now and 2015 and our assessment of the
cost drivers tends to support this. Supply
chain pressures remain, it will take time
for new entrants to penetrate the market
and innovation is expected to play a larger
role in the medium than short term.
Nevertheless many of the factors that
drove costs up have either moderated or
have the potential to be remedied; in short
there are grounds for optimism.
To illustrate the range of possibilities,
UKERC used the sensitivity analysis
described above to develop a range of
plausible developments in key cost factors
in the period to 2025. Because of the
uncertainties that currently surround
offshore wind costs we do not attempt to
apply a learning curve based approach,
instead we recommend expert market and
engineering based assessment. 
Figure 5.2 provides an overview of ‘best
case’ ‘worse case’ and ‘best guess,’
estimates developed by the TPA team.
These estimates are derived from the
sensitivities above, modelled using the
offshore wind cost calculator developed for
this project, and use the following data:
• 2009 base case: baseline data from the
analysis described in section 5.3.
• ‘Worst case’ changes from base case:
load factor reduced by 3 percentage
points to 35%, turbine costs increased
by 10%, foundation costs increased by
20%, O&M costs increased by 25%,
plus an additional 10% increase in total
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capital costs to allow for extremes of
depth and/or distance.
• ‘Best guess’ changes from base case:
load factor increased by 5 percentage
points to 43%, turbine costs reduced by
25%, foundation costs reduced by 5%,
O&M costs increased by 10%.
• ‘Best case’ changes from base case:
load factor increased by 7 percentage
points to 45%, turbine costs reduced by
40%, foundation costs reduced by
30%, O&M costs reduced by 25%. 
In all these cases, exchange rates are kept
constant. We illustrate the effects of
exchange rate fluctuations in section 5.3.
In our worse case, the costs of offshore
wind rise from a current level of around
£145/MWh to around £185/MWh. On the
other hand, if favourable developments
take place in all of the main factors, then
costs could fall to just under £95/MWh.
The corresponding capex values are
£3.8m/MW for the worst case and £2.4m
for the best case.
Cost projections have to be tentative at
the current stage in the history of the
offshore wind industry. Whilst mindful of
the remaining uncertainties we believe it is
reasonable to expect a gradual fall in the
cost of offshore wind over the period
between now and the mid 2020s,
particularly if policy can place downward
pressure on costs and support the
emerging UK supply chain. Our ‘best
guess’ figure for 2025 is a fall of around
20% from current levels to £116/MWh
(£2.8m/MW capex), with continued falls
thereafter.
Greater reductions are possible, but would
require most, if not all, of the major cost
drivers to move decisively in the right
direction at once. A significant downside
risk remains and it is possible that the
costs of offshore wind could continue to go
up, particularly if supply chain problems
are not addressed.
Figure 5.2 Offshore wind costs projections
£50
£90
£110
£130
£190
£210
£70
£170
£150
£/
MW
h
2009 Base case Worst case Best guess Best case
Offshore wind levelised costs projections (mid 2020s)
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5.6  Implications for policy
At the time of writing the support regime
for offshore wind in the medium term is
somewhat uncertain. The coalition
government has indicated that it wishes to
bring in a Feed-in Tariff (FiT), but details
are not yet available. Meanwhile, the
current 2 ROC multiple is due to expire in
2014. Our analysis indicates that
sustained cost reductions will be required
to bring costs down to the 1.5 ROC range
(see Box 5.2). 
Our analysis suggests that achieving
overall costs which are consistent with
reducing support from the ROC multiple
back down to 1.5 ROCs/MWh will require
capital cost reduction of the order of 17-
18%, assuming no major change in other
factors. 
Long term signals and cost monitoring
capabilities
Concern has been expressed by some
commentators about the relationship
between the emergence of the 2 ROC
multiple and the market power of some in
the offshore wind supply chain, with
limited competition in some areas and
strong demand from a booming onshore
market. A range of factors conspired to
drive up costs and the government made
the decision to provide ‘emergency’ 2 ROC
support in response. Without additional
support it is likely that offshore wind
development would have faltered.
Industry representatives will obviously
wish to alert policymakers to cost
escalations when development depends in
part on policy subsidies. However, industry
‘capture’ of regulatory change is clearly a
danger if support levels are in some part
the product of a negotiation between
policymakers and industry, particularly
where industry structure is relatively
concentrated. 
Detailed development of a process for
setting ROC multiples or FiT rates is
beyond the scope of this report.
Nevertheless we believe that it is essential
for such arrangements to create clear,
long term and binding signals that costs
need to be reduced. Periodic ‘reviews’
cannot set long term signals and may be
amenable to lobbying by special interests,
particularly where key cost data is allowed
to reside solely within the private sector.
One means by which this might be
achieved would be for the government to
establish clearly specified regression in
support levels over time. This is common
in FiT regimes overseas, a feature of the
micro-generation FiT, and whilst simplest
in FiT systems could apply to either FiT or
ROC based support for UK offshore wind in
future. In order to better inform this it
may also be desirable for the government
to support the development of an
independent, non-commercial cost
monitoring capability, perhaps in
collaboration with other countries,
international bodies and academia. Such a
capability could shape expectations ahead
of time. 
Planning and transmission
It is essential that government’s proposed
changes to planning rules do not
undermine progress made towards
accelerating planning. ‘Join-up’ is essential,
since the benefits of a streamlined system
for offshore assets would be undermined
8018_6_Chap5:UKERC  10/09/2010  14:17  Page 94
G
re
a
t 
E
x
p
e
c
ta
ti
o
n
s
: 
T
h
e
 c
o
s
t 
o
f 
o
ff
s
h
o
re
 w
in
d
 i
n
 U
K
 w
a
te
rs
 –
u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
in
g
 t
h
e
 p
a
s
t 
a
n
d
 p
ro
je
c
ti
n
g
 t
h
e
 f
u
tu
re
95
The banding of the Renewables Obligation which came into force in 2009 was designed to align
more closely the support offered to the actual costs of technologies at different levels of
maturity. The ROC multiple available for offshore wind projects was set at 1.5 when banding
first came into force but this was subsequently revised upwards to 2 ROCs as it became
apparent that costs had risen steeply. When announced, the increase to 2 ROCs was for a
limited period, with the intention that the multiple would reduce back to 1.5 ROCs by 2014. 
Since the implication is that policy makers expected costs to decline to a level which was
consistent with the support offered by 1.5 ROCs, the TPA team undertook their own analysis to
illustrate the degree of cost reductions required to be consistent with this level of support. The
baseline data for the analysis were drawn from (E&Y, 2009), with the levelised cost and ROC
multiple calculations calibrated to an assumption that 2009 baseline costs  were consistent with
the support offered by 2 ROCS, on the basis that projects are currently proceeding at this level. 
The analysis explores the effects of capital cost reductions in the turbine only, and also the effect
of capital cost reductions (and increases) in the other elements that make up the total overall
capital cost. The results are shown in Figure 5.3 below, where the central solid line plots the
ROC multiple effect of reducing turbine capital costs whilst holding other components of total
capital cost constant. The dashed green lines show the additional effect of reducing the other
components of total capital cost by 10% and 20%, whilst the dashed red lines show the
additional effect of increasing the other components of total capital cost by 10% and 20%.
What Figure 5.3 suggests is that achieving overall costs which are consistent with the support
of 1.5 ROCs will require capital cost reduction of the order of 40% if limited to the turbine alone,
or between approximately 18% and 28% for the turbine if combined with capital cost reductions
in other elements. Whilst levelised cost calculations are notoriously sensitive to the underlying
assumptions (Gross et al., 2007), this does give an indication of the required cost reductions if
offshore wind is to be compatible with the support available from 1.5 ROCs.
Box 5.2 Cost reduction implications for ROC multiples
1
1.25
1.5
1.75
2.25
2.5
2
RO
C 
m
uli
ple
 re
qu
ire
d
% reduction in capital costs
50 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Additional effect of 20% capital cost increase in other components
Additional effect of 10% capital cost increase in other components
Effect of turbine capital cost reduction with 0% reduction in other components
Additional effect of 10% capital cost reduction in other components
Additional effect of 20% capital cost reduction in other components
Figure 5.3 Cost reductions and ROC multiples
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by a slower process for substations and
other onshore assets.  Similar concerns
relate to OFTOs and connections to the
national grid – though we have excluded
these aspects from this review.
Support for innovation
Given the importance of continued
innovation to cost reduction we also
recommend that support for innovation in
offshore wind continues to be given a
priority in RD&D programmes. Important
research on innovative, cost-reducing
solutions is already a focus of the Carbon
Trust’s offshore wind ‘accelerator’, the ETI
offshore wind work and the European
Wind Energy Technology Platform.
Support for the supply chain
Our analysis also suggests that building a
UK industry offers benefits related to
currency movements. It also brings with it
obvious employment and industrial
development benefits, at a time when the
government is seeking to both rebalance
the economy towards manufacturing and
create a ‘green economy’. Given that UK
consumers will foot the bill for offshore
wind, a case can also be made that it
would be reasonable to expect the benefits
to accrue to UK companies. This will
require investment, particularly in dock
facilities, since there is little point in
making turbines and other large
components in the UK if we lack the
wherewithal to install from UK bases. We
believe that direct and targeted support
lower in the supply chain, in addition to
the overarching incentive provided by the
RO (or a FiT), is likely to be a cost effective
way to secure UK based offshore wind.
Failing to do this effectively risks both a
higher cost trajectory for offshore wind
and that UK developments are built out of
ports in other parts of Europe. It is beyond
the scope of this report to speculate
further about the role of policy in securing
UK manufacture, but doing so is likely to
be key, both to cost reduction and perhaps
to maintaining support from consumers. 
Further work could investigate the
potential to explicitly target a fraction of
the support coming through the RO to the
UK supply chain and perhaps UK RD&D.
5.7  Conclusions
Offshore wind offers lessons for
policymakers and technology analysts
alike. This report has charted the progress
with offshore wind – and the aspirations
for it – from its beginnings in Denmark in
the 1990s to present developments in
Britain, now the world leader in offshore
installation. Our review suggests that
early, small scale, developments did not
give a good guide to future costs and
indicates that rapid upscaling of an
emerging technology can create supply
chain constraints, amplify design flaws and
cause costs to rise whilst progress is
slower than expected. External economic
factors can also – at least for a while –
overwhelm intrinsic learning or other
effects. There is actually nothing new or
unique to offshore wind about this. 
Chapters 2 and 3 document a relationship
between encouraging cost trends and
ambitious policies. Chapter 4 explains how
costs rose and expectations changed. The
factors that drove the costs escalations
from the mid 2000s are well understood.
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Recent evidence suggests that costs in
2010 are no higher than 2009, suggesting
costs may have ‘peaked’ and there is some
evidence that a turning point may have
been reached. 
In this chapter we have shown that there
are grounds to believe that offshore wind
costs can be reduced over time. In the
medium and longer term, the potential for
cost reductions arising from greater
competition and from increased supply
chain confidence, along with innovation,
learning and economies of scale in key
areas, may outweigh the cost increases
resulting from greater depth and distance
of Round 3. However, the trend
downwards is not likely to mirror the
recent precipitous trend upwards. The
period to the mid 2020s is most likely to
see gradual reductions. And these can
only be delivered if a range of key drivers
can be aligned. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing
policymakers is reconciling the scale and
pace of development desired for offshore
wind with the potential growth rate the
supply chain can sustain. The scale of
Round 3 represents an ‘attractive force’
that has the potential to bring in new
capacity and reduce costs. However, the
pace of growth implied by meeting EU
targets could create upward pressure on
costs. It is important for policy to create
clear signals that costs must fall, whilst
encouraging the supply chain to mature
and bringing more of it into Britain.
It is important not to lose sight of the fact
that offshore wind is still in its infancy, less
than 2% of total wind capacity is currently
located offshore. In effect we are still
building the equivalent of our first
conventional power station. In energy
output terms, the UK has so far built a
single power station of around 350MW. So
called ‘first of a kind’ costs still apply in
large part. It is also important to avoid
‘dogged optimism’; extending the
timeframe in order to demonstrate that
costs can be attractive, eventually.
However, we should not be particularly
surprised that we have arrived at a point
in the history of a particular emerging
technology when costs have increased and
problems mounted. Many technologies go
through such a period, and still go on to
offer cost effective performance in the
long run. Overall, there are grounds to be
optimistic about offshore wind, tempered
with realism about the challenges
associated with its development and the
need for policy to engage effectively with
all the factors that will affect its success. 
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Annex 1: Systematic review
With the exception of consultation with industry actors and with the project’s expert group,
and in line with defined UKERC TPA practice, this report does not undertake new
quantitative or qualitative research. The majority of the data therefore are sourced from
a review of the available literature most directly relevant to offshore wind power costs. To
this end, a systematic search was carried out for reports and papers related to the subject
in academic and other targeted research sources. 
The principal academic databases used were Elsevier Science Direct, ISI Web of Science,
CSA Illumina (Natural Sciences, Social Sciences, Technology), and Compendex. A set of
key words and search terms was determined (Table) which provided the basis for the
creation of specific search strings. 
Table A1.1 Systematic review search terms
“offshore wind” cost or “cost “engineering “learning effects” “supply chain” 
reduction” assessment” or or “learning curves” or bottleneck
or “cost engineering or or “experience
escalation” assessment curves” or
experience or
learning or curve
The search strings are described using Boolean terminology and where a search term is
contained within quotation marks (e.g. “supply chain”) the words within the marks will
only be found when they occur next to each other as a phrase. The challenge was to keep
the number of search strings to a manageable level without losing relevant papers from
the review process. The project team selected those combinations of terms deemed to
provide the appropriate coverage (Table) but in the event that a search string resulted in
an unfeasible number of ‘hits’ (e.g. “offshore wind” AND engineering), the search results
were not saved to the reference management system and instead the string was refined
to produce a more focused and manageable number of results.
Annexes
Table A1.2 Systematic review search strings and results
Database Search String Hits Notes
Science Direct TITLE-ABSTR-KEY("offshore wind") AND 31 All years
TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(cost OR "cost reduction” OR
“cost escalation”)
Science Direct TITLE-ABSTR-KEY("offshore wind") AND 0 ,,
TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(“engineering assessment”)
Science Direct TITLE-ABSTR-KEY("offshore wind") AND 12 ,,
TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(engineering)
Science Direct TITLE-ABSTR-KEY("offshore wind") AND 25 ,,
TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(assessment)
Science Direct TITLE-ABSTR-KEY("offshore wind") AND 0 ,,
TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(“learning effect*” OR “learning 
curve*” OR “experience curve*”)
continued overleaf
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Science Direct TITLE-ABSTR-KEY("offshore wind") AND 11 ,,
TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(experience)
Science Direct TITLE-ABSTR-KEY("offshore wind") AND 3 ,,
TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(learning)
Science Direct TITLE-ABSTR-KEY("offshore wind") AND 4 ,,
TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(curve)
Science Direct TITLE-ABSTR-KEY("offshore wind") AND 2 ,,
TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(“supply chain” OR bottleneck)
Science Direct Total saved hits from all Boolean combinations 88
tried above
ISI Web of Science TS=("offshore wind") AND TS=(cost OR “cost 73 ,,
reduction” OR “cost escalation”)
ISI Web of Science TS=("offshore wind") AND TS=(“engineering 0 ,,
assessment”)
ISI Web of Science TS=("offshore wind") AND TS=(engineering) 37 ,,
ISI Web of Science TS=("offshore wind") AND TS=(assessment) 72 ,,
ISI Web of Science TS=("offshore wind") AND TS=(“learning effect*” 0 ,,
OR “learning curve*” OR “experience curve*”)
ISI Web of Science TS=("offshore wind") AND TS=(experience) 34 ,,
ISI Web of Science TS=("offshore wind") AND TS=(learning) 3 ,,
ISI Web of Science TS=("offshore wind") AND TS=(curve) 5 ,,
ISI Web of Science TS=("offshore wind") AND TS=(“supply chain” 1 ,,
OR bottleneck)
ISI Web of Science Total saved hits from all Boolean combinations 225
tried above
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(cost OR 71 Natural
“cost reduction” OR “cost escalation”) Science
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(“engineering 0 ,,
assessment”)
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(engineering) 143 ,,
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(assessment) 96 ,,
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(“learning effect*” 1 ,,
OR “learning curve*” OR “experience curve*”)
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(experience) 38 ,,
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(learning) 6 ,,
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(curve) 4 ,,
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CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(“supply 
chain” OR bottleneck) 2 ,,
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(cost OR “cost 82 Technology
reduction” OR “cost escalation”)
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(“engineering 0 ,,
assessment”)
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(engineering) 465 ,,
Not saved
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(assessment) 56 ,,
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(“learning effect*” 3 ,,
OR “learning curve*” OR “experience curve*”)
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(experience) 30 ,,
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(learning) 5 ,,
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(curve) 4 ,,
CSA Illumina KW=("offshore wind") AND KW=(“supply 5 ,,
chain” OR bottleneck)
CSA Illumina Total saved hits from all Boolean combinations 546
tried above
Compendex ("offshore wind") wn KY AND (cost) wn KY 180 From 1987
Compendex ("offshore wind") wn KY AND (engineering 17 ,,
assessment) wn KY
Compendex ("offshore wind") wn KY AND (engineering) wn KY 198 ,,
Not saved
Compendex ("offshore wind") wn KY AND (assessment) wn KY 116 ,,
Not saved
Compendex ("offshore wind") wn KY AND (“learning effect*” 2 ,,
OR “learning curve*” OR “experience curve*”) 
wn KY
Compendex ("offshore wind") wn KY AND (experience) wn KY 64 ,,
Compendex ("offshore wind") wn KY AND (learning) wn KY 9 ,,
Compendex ("offshore wind") wn KY AND (curve) wn KY 15 ,,
Compendex ("offshore wind") wn KY AND (“supply chain” OR 6 ,,
bottleneck) wn KY
Compendex Total saved hits from all Boolean combinations
tried above 293
Above four Grand total saved hits from all Boolean 1152
databases together combinations tried above
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On this basis, the systematic search revealed approximately 1150 evidence hits. However,
a great many of these were duplicates across the four databases and removal of these
reduced the results total to approximately 450. This number was then approximately
halved by removal of any hits that, judging from their title or abstract, were immediately
obvious as being of little or no relevance. The total was then increased by the addition of
evidence from following ‘citation trails’ and from specific recommendations, and also from
non-academic sources such as industry publications (e.g. Wind Power Monthly) and
relevant websites (e.g. BWEA), 
This process produced a total of approximately 350 pieces of evidence that were rated for
relevance. The relevance ratings are as follows:
• A rating of 1 indicates that the piece of evidence deals very clearly with one or more
aspects of the research questions. 
• A rating of 2 indicates that although the paper is relevant, its findings are presented in
a way that could preclude direct comparison with other results. 
• A rating of 3 indicates limited relevance and/or clarity. 
• A rating of 4 denotes papers that are duplicative or, on closer inspection, were deemed
not relevant.
In the writing of this report, the majority of the evidence used is rated 1 or 2 with only
very limited contextual use made of evidence rated 3 and 4.
Annex 2: Actual and forecast capital costs
Figure A2.1 shows all the individual values for reported actual costs for offshore wind
farms, drawn from the literature identified by the systematic review described in Annex 1.
All values were converted to 2009 GBP in a two step process:
• Values denominated in currencies other than GBP were converted to GBP using the
exchange rate prevailing for the year which the reported value relates to.
• Values (now all denominated in GBP) were inflated to 2009 values using the Office of
National Statistics RNNK index.
Figure A2.1 represents the full data set used to calculate the in-year average values shown
in figures 2.2 and 4.1 in the main report.
Figure A2.2 shows all the individual values for forecast costs for offshore wind. As for
Figure A2.1 all values were converted to 2009 GBP using the same process as described
above (except that the conversion rate used was that prevailing for the year the forecast
was made). There is an additional complexity in Figure A2.2 in that as well as the year the
forecast was made, there is also the year the forecast relates to. In the figure, forecasts
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made in the same year e.g. 1998 are grouped as a data series. Figure A2.2 represents
the full data set used to calculate in-year average (pre and post-2005) values shown in
figure 4.8 in the main report.
Figure A2.3 combines figures 4.1 and 4.8 from the main report to show actual and forecast
values on the same chart.
Figure A2.1 Reported actual costs data
£0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
£1,000,000
£500,000
£2,000,000
£1,500,000
£4,000,000
£3,500,000
£4,500,000
£3,000,000
£2,500,000
GB
P
Actual CAPEX per MW, 2009 GBP
Year
Figure A2.2 Reported forecast costs data
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Annex 3: Acknowledgements
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Figure A2.3 In year average forecasts (pre and post 2005) and in-year average actual
data
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